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The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the utilitarian martial 
purpose which was superimposed on the field of sport during World War 
II. The government of the United States manipulated the rationale for 
its pursuit as well as the number of people who felt. the benefits of 
its practice. A postwar society was given to sport forms and expres-
sions. 
Federal agencies closely involved in the formation of sport policy 
were vastly influenced by the huge Army and Navy programs. War and Navy 
Department records on physical training located in the National Archives 
in Washington have proved invaluable. For a general overlay of sports 
policy as a component in overall war planning and regulation, I have re-
lied largely upon the papers of Franklin D. Roosevelt in Hyde Park, New 
York. In order to evaluate the overall impact of government on civilian 
sport, the records of the Professional Football Hall of Fame Library in 
Canton, Ohio, and those of the National Collegiate Association in Mis-
sion, Kansas, have been especially helpful. Much travel has gone into 
the research of this paper, and an investigation of the Paul McNutt 
Papers, Bloomington, Indiana, the Dwight D. Eisenhower Papers in 
Abilene, Kansas, and the George C. Marshall Papers in Lexington, Vir-
ginia, are among the far-flung sources which have been used in gathering 
information. I am especially grateful to Rear Admiral (Ret.) Thomas J. 
Hamilton for forwarding many of his documents on Navy athletics to me. 
Special gratitude must be expressed to Dr. Odie Faulk for his 
iii 
patience, advice and encouragement in chairing my doctoral committee. 
The scholarly advice of other committee members has been appreciated, 
including Dr. Ivan Chapman, Dr. John Rooney, Dr. James Henderson, and 
Dr. Norbert Mahnken. 
Thanks must also go to Dr. Charles Dollar who started me on the 
track in doctoral work. My typists, Carolyn Mathis and Bertha Taylor, 
have spent long hours of persistent effort in preparing the first thesis 
drafts. 
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INTRODUCTION:· ATHLETICS IN THE WAR' EFFORT 
The experience of a nation in world war causes not only political, 
economic and spiritual tribulation, but also alters the social mileau of 
that country to accommodate new requirements for survival. Changing 
patterns of work, family living, and ideology force constant re-
examination and evaluation of its cultural baggage. After the military, 
diplomatic, governmental, and business phases of a war have been ex-
amined, historians are left with evidence that points to social change 
as the lingering influence of war's dramatic upheaval. 
During World War II, the American people were barraged with prob-
lems, each of which had to be countered with the military, economic, and 
ideological arsenal at their disposal. Within that phase of American 
social history, the seemingly uncomplex field of organized athletics had 
a symbolic and rhetorical appeal whi7h harbored simple answers to a 
country beset with material and emotional burdens. Athletic events, 
representing the spirit of the American past, were used to train troops, 
raise war funds, satisfy public morale and physically equip the young 
generation. They represented a guide for the mobilization of opinion. 
Sport was believed to have unique qualities representing the moral and 
physical superiority of the United States. Therefore the nation's in-
stitutional leaders and its government worked to unleash and develop 
sport and physical training around the war effort. 
1 
Playing athletic games and attending sporting events were alter-
nately considered to be a healthy continuance of normal national life 
and a means of preparing for defense. By the time the war was over, 
millions of men and women had been exposed to the ideals of physical 
training stimulated by the heritage of the American playing field. 
Countless others were indoctrinated with the symbols, myths, rhetoric, 
and euphemisms of athletics as related to the American victory. 
2 
When the United States turned to peacetime military conscription, 
competitive varsity athletic games between military bases became funda-
mental to preparedness. Designed to ease the transition between military 
and civilian life and act as a conduit for morale, a service-wide ath-
letic plan had been completed by the Army only two days before the cata-
lystic episode at Pearl Harbor. 1 This was only a portion of the wartime 
activity that was conveyed through sport. Before V-J Day, the War De-
partment had committed the service to a massive demobilization training 
program in which young men from all over the country were introduced to 
organized athletics. The Navy made sport a part of its regular physical 
training regimen and also used rugged games as part of a psychological 
conditioning plan in aviation. The federal government made efforts to 
institute a national preparedness program through sport. This accomp-
lished a feeble attempt to coordinate civilian sporting activity, which 
embroiled professional athletics in a myriad of war agency regulations. 
Colleges and universities furnished a base for intellectual thought in 
war~related physical training, and, in turn, the Navy saved intercol-
legiate athletics. Athletics were a means of raising revenue, conveying 
militant attitudes, enlivening weary war workers, and tilting morale 
toward occasional feelings of normality. 
3 
Through the impetus of preparedness spending, the year 1941 saw 
Americans partially recover from the physical and emotional doldrums of 
economic depression. In the late 1930s, professional and amateur sport 
returned to the boom which had marked its progress during the 1920s. 
Industrial sport grew rapidly, and projections were made that 40,000 
semi-pro baseball games would be played on opening day in 1942. 2 The 
1941 college football season had broken all attendance records. Atten-
dance at minor league baseball games in 1941 peaked at over 15,000,000, 
a twenty-five percent increase from 1940, 3 and horseracing had the "most 
4 successful year the turf has ever known." Pearl Harbor day found a 
record-breaking professional football crowd of over 55,000 attending 
the last regular season football game between Brooklyn and New York. 
Nearly 16,000 crammed Madison Square Garden to view the New York Rangers 
edge the Boston Bruins in professional hockey. Three weeks later Bobby 
Riggs and Frank Kovacs opened their professional tennis tour at the 
5 Garden before a crowd of 11,237. Nor was the sporting activity limited 
to civilian pursuits. Each of the nine Army Corps had a full complement 
of camp and division football activity. 6 The Great Lakes Naval Training 
Station embarked on a "barnstorming" basketball campaign to initiate a 
recruiting drive for the Ninth Naval District, engaging such potent 
fives as the Universities of Kentucky, Wisconsin, Northwestern, Mar-
quette, Minnesota, Bradley, Kansas and Notre Dame. The latter game for 
Navy Relief was played before 12,236 fans in Chicago stadium, a re-
splendent array which featured a one-hundred-voice Navy choir, military 
"brass," celebrated clerics, and a sixty-five-piece Navy band. The 
latter unleashing a deafening rendition of "Anchors Aweigh" as the silk-
7 clad opponents took to the court. 
4 
An idolizing public expected the war to spur enlistments of many 
of their sports heroes. Some university athletic teams enlisted en 
masse, notably the Sugar Bowl champion football team from Fordham Uni-
versity. Twenty-eight of these stellar youngsters were taken into the 
Army Air Corps flying program at Floyd Bennett Field, and were dubbed 
the "Flying Rams" to go with the "Flying Indians" from Dartmouth, the 
"Air Crusaders" of Holy Cross, and the "Navy Eagles" from Boston Col-
8 
lege. The Navy accomplished a public relations coup by enlisting 
Cleveland pitching star Bob Feller only three days after Pearl Harbor. 
Hank Greenburg, the American League's most valuable player in 1940, re-
enlisted in the Army, and Heisman trophy recipient Tommy Harmon was ac-
9 cepted by the Air Corps. Military publicists rushed lists of enlist-
. 10 ments to news media, with names of the athletes' posts and ass1gnments. 
Athletes were expected to be qu1ck and beneficial in their response to 
duty. Those who did not were often sanctioned. When Selective Service 
officials discovered one professional football quarterback having en-
listed in the Navy Reserve in order to delay his induction until after 
the 1941 football season, the Bureau of Navigation took correction ac-
tion. Instructions were relayed "to have this sterling character 
11 ordered immediately to active duty." 
An ideology emerged which insisted that national morale and fer-
vency could best be exemplified by those who had athletic backgrounds. 
Sportswriter John Kieran noted, "War is competition and the boys in 
this country grew up on a background of competition •••• We're not con-
tent to play a game, we want to win that game •••• To lose is intoler-
able." Athletic organizations were urged to "find out ••• how sports can 
contribute to the ••• American spirit as it is fostered in the developing 
5 
. d "12 mln o••• The editors of Scholastic Coach insisted there was "no 
better way of building physical and moral fitness ••• ," for sports were 
"indispensable in developing teamwork, tenacity, courage, leadership 
13 and loyalty. This "tenacity," to Arthur Daley of the New York Times, 
was an admirable national characteristic, like that of the Finns whose 
"grim unsmiling tenacity ••• was revealed in their distance runners" but 
not like the "fanatical persistency" of the Japanese or the "thorough-
14 ness and unscrupulousness of the Germans •••• " The most admirable 
trait was to be built through a program of "vigorous athletics that 
will develop a will to win, to carry on against overwhelming odds ••• ," 
wherein an "athlete learns to discipline himself. 1115 One physical edu-
cator put these factors in terms of "total fitness," entailing the max-
. d 1 f h " h . 1 1 . 1 d . . 1 ,J6 1mum eve opment o t e p ys1ca , menta , soc1a an sp1r1tua •••• 
These attitudes marked a surge of patrQotic spontanaeity from edu-
cators, coaches, and sportswriters, and if sport was to be one of the 
moral weapons through which Americans would be guided to victory, then 
the harder combative games were emblematic of a greater resiliency. 
"It goes without mention," noted one physical education editor, "that 
the combative sports~-boxing, wrestling, jiu jitsu, fencing and joust-
ing--can be utilized in military purpuits •••• All the well known team 
sports have an additional importance because of the group unity, fight-
17 ing spirit and leadership they engender." George T. Stafford, a 
speaker at the national convention for physical educators, charged in 
April of 1942 that Americans had been "hoodwinked by an over intel-
lectualized cultural influence'' into accepting "lighter, softer sports." 
Noting that we needed "strong, sturdy men who can endure hardships" for 
a "philosophy of victory," this university administrator urged a program 
6 
of "defensive and combative activities for ••• endurance ••• and persistent 
d • • d II 18 an aggress1ve att1tu e. To imaginative sports writers, war fostered 
an image of a gigantic football game in which a "unified conunand [head 
19 coach]" was the "best way of winning the big game." Nor was this an-
alogy lost on war leaders. Dwight D. Eisenhower, writing early in the 
war from his conunand post in Europe, mused: "This thing is a good deal 
like a football game •••• It takes thorough training, planning and tre-
mendous hitting power to push the ball across the goal •••• 1120 In less 
symbolic terms, one cartoon in the Chicago Tribune displayed an army of 
Japanese invaders fleeing an onrushing group of football players carry-
ing banners proclaiming "The American Gridiron CRUSADERS," and "Speed 
Quick Thinking, Fighting Heart, Endurance" with the caption ''Why not a 
battalion of football stars? They are the fight ingest men we have. " 21 
Marine Corps recruiters even scoured college football teams to find 
. 22 "combative types" to serve as officers dur1ng World War II. 
These stirrings were the foundation of a network of preparedness 
movements formed and maintained by the unique American sporting culture. 
The institutions of sport subtly affected efforts of Americans to mo-
bilize their ideals into action. Prewar values were instituted into 
post-war structures. The issue of athletic fitness was promoted as the 
essence of the American character. A search for this characteristic was 
launched before the war began. 
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CHAPTER II 
PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL PREPAREDNESS 
THE RESPONSE TO WAR 
When France suddenly collapsed before the Nazi war machine in June 
of 1940, many physical educators were among those Americans concerned 
about national preparedness. Although public school and college pub~ 
lic·~ty had drawn attention to particular athletes of high achievement, 
much concern was directed to the physical,capabilities of the average 
man. World War I statistics had shown one-third of the registrants to 
be unfit for military duty'·because 6f physical deoi lit at ion. The abun-
dance of modern luxuries and conveyances gave rise to the fears that 
statistics would show American youth to be even further underdeveloped 
than in 1917. When high Selective Service rejections bore out some of 
these fears after the passage of peacetime conscription in the fall of 
1940, there was some consternation that the American educational system 
could not operate a physical preparedness curriculum without infusion 
of federal funding and advice-~a type of national mobilization in physi-
cal fitness and athletics. 
Even the military was suspect. Many felt that the services could 
not stand the physical strain of modern war. Under Secretary of the 
Navy, James Forrestal, a former naval aviator, was convinced and even 
obsessed with the idea of moral fitness for combat bearing a direct re-
lationship to physical training. 1 An acquaintance of Forrestal's, 
9 
10 
former World Heavyweight Boxing Champion Gene Tunney, warned the Under 
Secretary early in September, 1940, that the physical and mental pre-
paredness of American youth was not reliable for the defense of the na-
tion against the physically indoctrinated youth of authoritarian states. 
He urged that a system of physical discipline be developed around Amer-
2 ican aims for defense. It was Forrestal who inspired Secretary of the 
Navy Frank Knox to issue Alnav 100, which became the well-spring of the 
Navy's future leadership in physical training. The directive of Octo-
ber 18, 1940, charged: "modern war required the Acme of physical fit-
ness and fighting edge. Nothing shall be left undone to insure that all 
men are properly conditioned to meet the utmost demands of physical en-
duranceo" Knox charged that all "commands afloat and ashore" were to 
"immediately institute adequate and systematic exercises" including 
3 
sportso The Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation formed 
a subcommittee on athletics the following spring to advise on the es-
tablishment of organized athletics in military camps, primarily in the 
Army. Almost simultaneously with the issuance of Alnav 100 and the 
first Selective Service drawing, President Franklin D. Roosevelt ap-
pointed John B. Kelly as a National Coordinator for Physical Training, 
a position that was brought into the office of Civilian Defense the 
following May. 4 In December of 1940, the American As.sociation of Health, 
Physical Education and Recreation began lobbying for a National Physical 
Preparedness Bill, 5 and the National Collegiate Athletic Association de-
voted an entire session to "Intercollegiate Athletics and their Relation 
to National Defense." 6 
On January 3, 1940, legislation was introduced in the 76th Congress 
to authorize a survey of national resource facilities and personnel "for 
11 
purposes of improving assets in physical education and athletics." The 
measure, introduced by Representative William H. Sutphin of New Jersey, 
was in response to a study performed by the College Education Federal 
C . 7 ommi.ttee. Hampered by the lack of an immediate crisis and smacking 
of New Deal planning schemes, the bill was not reported, but was re-
placed the following fall by H. R. 10606, supported by the AAHPER. In-
troduced by Representative Pius L. Schwert of New York, the measure was 
the result of planning by the physical education group and a committee 
which was chaired by Jesse Feiring Williams of North Carolina Univer-
sity. The bill, as drafted by the committee, was introduced on October 
3, 1940, and provided for federal funding of public school physical ed-
ucation, including "preventative and developmental programs of physical 
8 
activity including sports." That bill died in committee but was re-
worked from December 29-31, 1940, at a conference held in New York City, 
attended by representatives of the AAHPER, National Education Associa-
tion, Parent-Teacher Association, American Legion, Elks Clubs, and the 
u. S. Office of Education. 9 
A revised document was reintroduced by Schwert on January 3, 1941, 
in the new 77th Congress as H. R. 1074. The measure appropriated fed-
eral revenues to be matched by the states within three years to "make 
adequate provisions through schools for physical education, including 
athletics; instruction and guidance in healthful living; wider recrea-
10 tional use of school facilities; and the development of school camps." 
A popular conception was that the camps would give "reality to the dem-
ocratic ideals" and promote "national solidarity."ll It was precisely 
this implication that the new proposal was designed to overcome, since 
it suggested work camps of physical culture and indoctrination similar 
12 
to the Hitler Jugend. This pitfall was softened by the guaranteeing of 
local control and by making participation of individuals and districts 
voluntary. The new Schwert bill also guaranteed equal facilities for 
women. Coaches were reminded that "athletics" rather than "sports" had 
12 become a major feature, a deference to varsity-type team play. 
Physical education and athletic groups lobbied for passage of the 
bill through the winter and early spring of 1941, and on February 13, 
1941, Schwert requested the support and suggestions of the administra-
. 13 t1on. Roosevelt was already connnitted to an alternative program 
through the Office of Civil Defense, which he created by executive or-
der on May 20, 14 and after Schwert 1 s death in Apri 1, support for the 
bill in Congress scattered. Kelly, who headed the Physical Fitness Di-
vision in the OCD, had presented a similar program the previous Octo-
ber15 to be administered by an already established branch of the federal 
bureaucracy. The Kelly plan was primarily a promotion and coordination 
of existing agencies, leading Williams to charge that the 11 government 
expects to secure fitness in the nation by publicity," and that there 
was "no place in official circles for competence and experience in ••• 
physical education •••• 1116 Raising Williams 1 ire was the well~publicized 
appointment of Kelly, who was a member of the 1920 Olympic rowing team 
and Democrat party fund raiser, to the office of Civilian Defense and 
the selection of former World Heavyweight Boxing Champion Gene Tunney 
to head physical training in the Navy. 
In September of 1940, Roosevelt requested that Kelly submit a pro-
gram to "toughen up America," whereupon the Philadelphia industrialist 
called together a number of figures from medicine, education and physi-
cal training to present a composite plan. The Kelly program devised a 
13 
formal and informal range of activity to include people from school age 
to sixty years, to be directed by each community with a federal com-
mission acting as promoter. Kelly envisioned the actual inception of 
local programs to be launched through established organizations, in-
eluding schools, clubs, churches and the medical profession. Practi-
cally the only innovative part of the proposal was the suggestion that 
the program coordinate existing facilities. Other than that, the Kelly 
committee recommended a program of health examinations, nutrition, rec-
reation, and body building exercises for adults as well as compulsory 
school physical education, expansion of athletic facilities for stu-
dents, and a six-weeks summer camp for boys. 17 
Without funds or personnel, Kelly could do little until his pro-
gram w:as made a division in the OGD of the Federal Security Agency. In 
August of 1941, Kelly's office was upgraded to Assistant Director of 
Civilian Defense in Charge of Physical Fitness, and in September an ad-
visory board was created from membership of professional physical fit-
ness and athletic groups. Expansion was marked by the creation of a 
sports board headed by sportswriter Grantland Rice and including na-
tional coordinators for both men and women in the public schools and 
colleges, a director of physical training for women, and another for 
Negroes. The latter was headed by Jesse Owens, track and field star of 
the 1936 Berlin Olympiad. In October, 1941, Eleanor Roosevelt was named 
Assistant Director in charge of ·voluntary Participation, which further 
diffused efforts for physical fitness came under her direction. 18 
The Physical Fitness Division of the Office of Civilian Defense, 
meanwhile, had neither the funds nor the authority to launch a unified 
national fitness program. Kelly sought to develop a physical 
14 
conditioning program for prospective draftees and to organize civilian 
fitness through the development of local athletic and recreational 
activities. This program, which was launched shortly after the coun-
try's entry into the war, was termed "Hale America," a gesture to 
President Roosevelt's remarks that the "wealth of a nation is in the 
strength of its people." The research necessary for fitness standards 
was carried out by college physical educators, notably A. H. Stienhaus 
of George Williams University and Nelson Metcalf of the University of 
Chicago. 19 That program was eventually coordinated through the U. S. 
Office of Education. Therefore Kelly's activity was directed at co-
ordinating and publicizing the various community centered fitness ac-
tivities. The director appointed no less than sixty-two national co-
ordinators for everything from handball and bag punching to ping-pong 
and hiking. 20 One professional baseball league, the Southern Associa-
tion, agreed to wear the "Hale America" emblem on its uniforms. 21 
Jack Kelly 1 s publicity-oriented "Hale America" operation received 
a boost when the Executive Committee of the United States Golf Associa-
tion voted to drop its championship tour of the Open, Amateur, and Pub-
lie Links championship to cooperate with "Hale America" in staging a 
22 national elimination tournament in Chicago. The event was staged 
from June 18 to 21, 1942, after 1,500 entrants paid the entry fee to 
participate in district elimination tourneys. Proceeds were turned over 
to war relief. Ben Hogan carded the victory in the national tournament, 
but 1,800 local "Hale" tournaments made the average American fitness 
conscious before the year was out. 23 
The diversity of the Kelly effort made it hard to control, and 
. . . h" h . 1 24 cr~t~c~sm ~t t e operat~on ear y. Funds were discovered being spent 
15 
for such physical culture as theatrical dance for kindergarten stu-
dents, and this "fan dance scandal," attributed to "Eleanor's friends," 
was a source of aggravation to Kelly. Senator Harry Byrd of Virginia 
attacked the sanctioning of bowling alleys and charged that the fitness 
operation was "unbelievable as an integral program of national defense 
25 at a time of great peril to our country." These problems paved the 
way for the administrative reorganization of Kelly's office, and in 
March, 1942, Federal Security Administrator Paul McNutt appointed the 
Philadelphian as Assistant Director in Charge of Physical Fitness in 
. 26 the Office of Defense, Health and Welfare Serv1ces. Kelly's function 
was to advise the United States Office of Education on matters of school 
fitness and offer coordination to Recreation Division of ODHWS. 27 One 
of the primary objectives of the Office of Education was to promote 
guidelines for compulsory physical education in schools and colleges. 
The early "Hale America" plan, developed under the Office of 
Civilian Defense, had come close to placing Kelly in the role of co-
ordinator for amateur sport. However, the director was kept ensconced 
as a coordinator to various federally sponsored fitness conferences. 
Even there, Kelly's influence was minimal. Presidential Assistant Mar-
vin Mcintyre turned down the Fitness Director's draft for a Presidential 
h C f . c. . . 28 statement at t e War Fitness on erence 1n 1nc1nnat1. The gregarious 
Irishman tended to speak out on a number of items relating to sport, not 
confining himself to the narrow channel designed for him. This con-
cerned Mcintyre, who reminded the President that Kelly was "pretty much 
off the reservation, 11 having failed to "click" with Manpower or War 
29 Planning operations. Consequently the Physical Fitness Division was 
in danger of being phased out. Kelly appealed to Presidential Secretary 
16 
Ed . w t . ff h" 11 . 30 h" h w1n a son 1n an e ort to save 1s sma operat1on, a move w 1c 
led the President to reprieve the Fitness Office from the budget 31 axe. 
On April 29, 1943, the office was transferred by Executive Order to the 
32 Office of Community War Services under the Federal Security Agency, 
thereby limiting Kelly's advisory role to the Office of Education. Con-
current with the transfer of Kelly's office, the President established 
the framework for a committee on physical fitness. The outgrowth of 
this was the National Council on Physical Fitness, established on June 
16, 1943, which included the representatives of many amateur sports 
b d . 33 o 1es. It fundamentally served in the same promotional capacity as 
did the OCD program under Kelly at the war's outset. 
This frustrated the Fitness Chief's designs for institutionalizing 
a national fitness program. Kelly was increasingly concerned about the 
number of Selective Service rejections, and he laid this to the tendency 
in the United States to foster "an aristocracy in sports." He did not 
see the stamina of American manhood running beyond "our first couple of 
million," and his office supported various concepts of neighborhood fit-
ness groups which would break this "aristocracy.rr34 The Office of Com~ 
munity War Services was an ideal locus for this type of program, which 
led to the organization of a number of locally directed sports clubs. 
This became a mechanism to break the monopoly of the Amateur Athletic 
Union, the elite power broker in American sport. 
The AAU had launched a nationwide war fitness effort in December 
of 1942, and private athletic clubs were used to develop a competitive 
testing program in the martial skills for all participants between four-
teen and fifty years of age. Obstacle races, endurance running, chin-
ning, putting the shot, and a one-half mile race carrying a pack and gun 
17 
were designed for the membership, with club, community, state, regional 
. 35 and national competition 1ncluded. Although the AAU plan was never 
developed on this scale, its position as the arbiter for amateur sport 
policy was enhanced by its supervision over numerous war-time events, 
especially that of the national track and field meet. The OCWS plan on 
the other hand, had encouraged local athletic associations, financially 
self- or community-supported, developing community sports rivalries 
which would encourage mass participation outside of AAU control. This 
system had been nominally tried in New York to provide a "method of 
athletics for the working boy." However, one of the directors of the 
New York program, E. W. Hjertberg, alarmed at athletic union advance-
ments in the same area, protested that the AAU method was designed to 
exploit the talents of returning troops. Fearing an innundation of the 
neighborhood concept, Hjertberg called for support of the club plan, 
thus preventing the "same old merry-go-round that has been going on ••• 
in athletics. 1136 
Another government venture in athletics had developed in the Navy 
Department with the appointment of J. J. (Gene) Tunney. That branch 
had appointed a recreation officer in each naval district in the summer 
37 of 1940 to organize a servicewide athletic program. After the is-
suance of Alnav 100 in October of that year, the principles of athletic 
conditioning were introduced into regular Navy training program. The 
physical condition of the individual sailor was the responsibility of 
each commanding officer, but there was no unified system of condition-
ing and tra~ning. On December 12, 1940, Tunney was put on temporary 
assignment as the chief athletic advisor to the Navy, and on January 21, 
1941, each training station was instructed to appoint a drill and 
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physical education officer. 38 
Tunney was brought to Washington by the Chief of Naval Aviation 
Training and introduced to Assistant Navy Secretary James Forrestal, 
with whom Tunney was acquaited. Forrestal wanted Tunney to take over 
athletic training for student pilots, and after clearing the appointment 
with Knox, Reserve Marine Officer Tunney was commissioned a Lieutenant 
39 Commander in the Navy. Although he was not a college educated physi-
cal educator, the well-read Tunney had valuable experience as a business 
executive, had worked widely with young people, and was in demand as a 
lecturer. A World War I Marine, the New York City native had won an 
AEF boxing championship before turning professional and was highly es-
teemed as boxing champion before retiring in 1929. Nevertheless, the 
fact that Tunney was not part of the Regular Navy and had little back-
ground in teaching and research was to prove a nagging problem, but it 
was through the Navy and its physical training program that the American 
people and the remaining services took much of their wartime and post-
war philosophy of athletic competition. 
Tunney was assigned to the Naval air station at Pensacola, Miami, 
Jacksonville, and Corpus Christi. Perceiving that the "stunts of bat-
tle flying" needed "modes of exertion all their own," he "devised a 
f d • 11 b d • f . h • • II 40 system o r1 ase on pr1ze 1g t tra1n1ng. Tunney's thirty 
minute morning period of "setting up exercises" were accompanied by a 
planned program of organized athletics in the cadets' off-duty time. 41 
In April, 1941, Lieutenant Commander Tunney was transferred to Washing-
ton where Captain Chester W. Nimitz placed him on duty within the 
Training Division of the Bureau of Navigation to assist in the physical 
development program at all naval stations. 42 A non-commissioned rating 
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was created, Specialist Third Class (Athletic), to serve in base leader-
ship capacities. Only four men held these ratings and an eight-week 
course of training had to be established at Norfolk, Virginia, to train 
other specialists. The first ten-man class was graduated in July. 43 
The Bureau of Navigation was determined to use the former cham-
pion's thorough and personable manner to its best advantage, and he was 
sent in August, 1941, on a fifteen week recruiting tour throughout the 
eastern United States to bolster his "body building battalion." Each 
visit by the fitness chief was hailed by newspaper and radio interviews 
and publicity. By November 22, Tunney had visited thirty-three 
44 
cities, and the end of the year, fifty men per month were going 
45 
through the Norfolk training. It was during this period that criti-
cism began to be heaped on the purposes of the Navy program. 
Chief among the judgments was an understanding among civilian edu-
cators that the Bureau was recruiting incompetent, untrained amateurs 
to establish a professional physical education program. The presence 
of several famous name athletes among recruits bolstered the belief 
that the section was simply recruiting glorified "muscle boys." The 
Commander's own lack of professional training was ridiculed~ as were 
some of his training methods. The Navy publicist had developed a 
series of personal fitness exercised based on controlled breathing and 
posture, and he was marketing a home physical fitness kit, the "Gene 
Tunney Exerciser." These exercise boards were purchased by BuNav, and 
fifty were distributed to shore and fleet units throughout the Navy with 
the admonition that "judicious use daily will insure the physical fit-
46 
ness of the user." 
On July 18, 1941, Jesse Feiring Williams heatedly wrote Secretary 
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Know "about some of the ideas proposed by Commander Tunney for making 
and keeping the Navy fit •11 Williams alluded to newspaper stories de-
scribing Tunney's methods of physical training as a "principle of cor-
rective suction" by which a "new hinge is created in the back." The 
47 educator stormed: 
Whatever the Navy wanted ••• apparently professional com-
petence was not of major importanc·e.... It would be 
easy to name twenty-five men, any one of whom would have 
done the job that a prize fighter is unfitted for en-
tirely. 
Aetually the Navy was committed to recruiting only specialists with de-
grees in physical education except in special circumstances when indi-
viduals like Bob Feller were recruited into the program for their 
publicity and leadership value. In addition' a physical testing program 
had been established at Norfolk along with thorough training in team 
48 sports and leadership of command, The Navy Secretary responded, "The 
success which Lieutenant Commander Tunney has achieved in this direction 
is sufficient proof for the Navy Department that his selection for this 
job was proper." The Navy's purpose, the Secretary insisted, was to se-
lect a person who was an "example of physical fitness," since the "rou-
tine in the Navy is such that physical education as taught in the 
49 colleges and schools could not be similarly taught in the Navy." Never-
theless, in September of 1941, a Civilian Advisory Committee was ap-
pointed by the Chief of BuNav to assist the training branch, ostensibly 
to assist in recreational matters. By January, 1942, its purpose had 
extended to advice in training. 50 
The progress being made by the Navy to incorporate athletic train-
ing within the regular physical and military regime was noted by the 
Joint Army-Navy Committee's subcommittee on athletics. Tunney was 
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invited to the organizational meeting of that group on June 6 and 7, 
1941, to explain his program. The other services had made athletics 
largely a part of the welfare and recreation (off-duty) entertainment, 
but the JANC subcommittee was interested in transferring features of 
the Navy program to the Army. 
The JANC on Welfare and Recreation was the outgrowth of the War 
Department's desire to maintain military control over off-duty morale 
51 activities, unlike World War I, when civilian direction predominated. 
During that conflict, the Army had relied heavily on the personnel and 
resources of the Young Men's Christian Association. Later in World War 
I, the War Department had commissioned a civilian expert, Dr. Joseph 
Raycroft, as chairman of the Athletic Division, War Department Commis-
sion of Training Camp Activities. A similar position had been held in 
the Navy by Walter Camp. From that experience, the services knew the 
value of allowing an outlet to troops through athletics, as masses par-
ticipated in athletic games for the first time. Athletics, however, in 
the Army came to be the responsibility of the Morale and Welfare Branch, 
which had been created under the Adjutant General's office in July, 
1940, and after March, 1941, as division, 
52 
rather than under a separate 
training as in the naval services. 
53 
Athletics in the morale branch 
were under the direction of Theodore Bank of the Army and James Pixlee 
in the Air Corps. 
The JANC Subcommittee on Athletics was a "blue-ribbon" panel, un-
likely to take a back seat on matters of advice on morale or athletics 
in training. It included as its chairman Philip 0. Badger, Athletic 
Director at New York University and President of the NCAA; John Grif-
fith, Commissioner of the Western Athletic Conference (Big 10) and 
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editor of the Athletic Journal; Grandland Rice, the nation's foremost 
sports journalist; Raycraft; and 17 other university coaches, admini-
strators, club owners, sports writers and broadcasters. At its first 
meeting, the subcommittee took a stand on eliminating the distinction 
between recreation and training in athletics. There was general ad-
miration for the Navy program and that of the Air Corps, which had been 
incorporating these theories through a civilian team of physical educa-
tors. The group also broadened its advisory latitude to include inter-
est in relations between camps and communities and the preparation of 
young people for service. Additionally, the group suggested the en-
1 f h h d ff f A athlet1·cs. 54 I b argement o t e ea quarters sta or rmy n a su se-
quent letter to Frederick Osburn, Chairman of JANC, Badger declared "the 
importance of making clear to all commanding officers that the athletic 
program ••• was of key importance in the training of loyal, courageous, 
and physically fit fighting men. 1155 
In its first meeting the subcommittee had gone behond the scope of 
expectations for the athletic program, and no one exemplified the mili-
tancy for military athletic training more than Griffith. The retired 
Army major, who had served as a bayonet and physical instructor during 
the First World War, carried out a personal campaign to have the Army 
athletic program incorporated into training. In October, 1941, he 
wrote the Assistant Executive Director of JANC insisting that the 
greatest proof in the soundness of his proposals lay in the example of 
the college physical training programs, which draft statistics in the 
previous war had shown to prepare a better trained fighting man. 56 Com~ 
paring an Army regiment to a university freshman class, in which the 
needs of every man were varied, the major urged a broad program of 
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intramural and varsity athletics with "emphasis on rugged contact 
sports." Griffith's primary rationale was based on the socio-
psychological development of the recruit. In order to "develop a spirit 
of loyalty and aggressiveness," each commander could "utilize the 
average American's interest in sports as a means of aiding in the de-
velopment of an efficient fighting force." Not only would this soldier 
"be able to meet the physical demands which will be made of him ••• ," 
and to make any sacrifice in order to win an objective." Griffith fore-
saw such a program instituted along democratic lines in which the "in-
ept, the fair and the superior" would each be given "full opportunity 
to progress to a group of greater efficiency, distinction and oppor-
. 57 tun1ty. 11 
Despite Griffith's opinion that "the idea that athletics in the 
camps is only for exercise and ••• is erroneous," 58 JANC officials doubted 
the Army would be willing to change ~ts procedure to allow Griffith's 
World War I ideas of elan to be incorporated. 59 That branch was behind 
in setting up a comprehensive peacetime athletic program, a situation 
60 that concerned Chief of Staff George c. Marshall. The slowness came 
because one high-ranking officer did not like the emphasis on varsity 
61 football. The athletic subcommittee continued to desire opportuni-
ties for advising the Army on incorporating athletics into military 
training. In December, Badger inquired of JANC officials whether a 
private foundation grant co~ld be obtained to continue the subcommittee's 
active work. Associate Director Samuel Crocker warned the collegiate 
official that the JANC had "no other function except to be a liaison 
between civilian authorities and the ••• Army. 1162 After the Morale and 
Recreation Division was reorganized into the Army Special Services in 
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January of 1942, the role of the athletic subcommittee was further re-
duced.63 
Colleges were interested in the unique idea of military physical 
training through athletics. After the passage of the Selective Service 
Act in September of 1940, representatives of the Executive Committee of 
the NCAA offered to aid in the mobilization training effort. This over-
ture was received coolly by Army officials, although representatives of 
some institutions did help a few encampments establish intramural pro-
grams of recreation. The colleges also were interested in preserving 
their own programs in the hope that the government would recognize the 
value of substituting college training with liberal doses of fitness and 
combative activities for military training. Higher education then 
would be able to maintain deferment for their students until graduation. 
Griffith insisted that "it is better for our young men, in addition to 
their academic work, to be given training that will make them physically 
1 h h h k f 11 "64 H strong and a ert t an to ave t em ta en out o co ege.... owever, 
War Department officials could guarantee education deferments only un-
til July 1, 1941. 65 Therefore, the NCAA convention of December, 1940, 
saw many calls for action by representatives of higher education to do 
something about military preparedness. 
Outgoing NCAA President W. R. Owens called on member institutions 
to expand their sports programs. Drawing on the experiences of the 
First World War, he claimed: "That athletic competition developes the 
qualities which make a good soldier, has been demonstrated so conclu-
sively, it no. longer needs argument." Striking a chord that was to be 
repeated many times for those who saw team games as the epitome of the 
American spirit, he saw the "well trained athlete" as the "outward 
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result of an inner, mental and spiritual development." He urged that 
the colleges protect their guardianship over traditional values from 
66 regimentation by the State. From "an examination of recent social 
trends," Owens warned that the "church and the family have lost many of 
their regulatory influences over behavior, while industry and govern-
ment have assumed a larger degree of control&" 
The President of Lafayette College, William M. Lewis, suggested 
that it was up to athletics, more than any other academic department, 
to preserve civilization during a time of world threat to free inquiry 
by building a "strong mental purpose" and a "love for truth" in young 
American manhood. The educator declared, "We need as never before in 
the history of the world men who are unselfish; men who are kindly; men 
who are thoughtful." These qualities were represented by boys in team 
athletics whose loyal and appreciative qualities were superior to those 
"who spend their leisure time in smoke filled rooms--those pseudo-
67 intelligentsia discussing what is wrong with the American way." Grif-
f]. th 11 d 1 d "d 1 . . f t . t. 1168 ca e on sports ea ers to eve op a sp1r1t o pa r1o J.sm. 
This preoccupation with the psychological and social conditioning 
was striking in pre~war days. Alarm was spread that American education 
had been overwhelmed by an "over-intellectualized cultureo 11 According 
to Wilson Staffer of Johns Hopkins University, it was time for a "new 
emphasis on the physical and emotional.'1 His stand was militant& "We 
must insist on a ruggedness, develop new energies and hardihoods, refuse 
to allow softness to thrive." Shaffer's object was to "promote charac-
ter development through play," the result of which would be 
••• the development of a vigorous courageous youth with a 
well developed social consciousness; a boy who has the 
hardihood courage to fight for his country but who has 
also the tolerance for the point of view of others and 
a humane spirit which includes generosity, kindliness, 
fair play and good wil1.69 
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Through this eighteen-century idea of virtue, these American educators 
apparently hoped to develop an ideal man. John Griffith was apparently 
thinking of this when he referred to the rise of an "American type" 
based on the ideas of "athletic asceticism." This concept, taken from 
an essay by Stuart Sherman, was said by Griffith to represent the Amer-
ican "competitive system" rather than "collectivism" which was a 
"foreign ideology. 1170 
John R. Tunis attempted in 1941 to consolidate these views regard-
ing the relationship of individualism to collective behavior in his 
essay Democracy and Sport. Tunis insisted that democracy stressed in-
dividual sports which allowed initiative in small groups, while the die-
tatorships of that day, communist and fascist, stressed mass demonstra-
, 
tions, "muscle flexing." Germany used this technique of "unthinking 
submission to discipline" to promote wars of aggression, thereby cor-
rupting athletics through physical exercise into "a branch of military 
. . 1171 tra1.n1.ng .. 
Just how American physical educators would be able to compromise 
individualism and mass attitudes on one hand against "collectivism" on 
the other is difficult to fathom. Raymond Gramm Swing struggled with 
this in the introduction to Tunis' book. Swing noted that sport called 
both for "intense individual effort ••• and team play, both of which are 
the foundations of successful democracy." On the one hand, sport sub-
mitted to "technical law," the rational concept of collective effort, 
and the other to the "spirit of fairness,"·the reference of which lay 
deeper in society, along lines of an emotional commitments to group 
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t d d " h" h level than technJ.·cal law." 72 s an ar s, on a J.g er 
By the eve of war, great faith had been placed in the ability of 
the American system of institutional and team sport training to respond 
to any international threat. Seward Staley of the University of Il-
linois was succinct when he wrote, "Any invader, of course, will be im-
mediately annihilated. This conclusion is based on the belief that ••• a 
high percentage of the young men of this country are athletic, robust, 
and 'full of fire' •1173 Griffith, in his November, 1941, issue of 
Athletic Journal, ran a six page layout of statements by men in military, 
industrial, political, and academic leadership about the value of the 
trained athlete in national defense. These figures portrayed a lexicon 
of endorsements on victorious attitudes abroad in the field of physical 
competition. The athletic director at the University of Iowa, E. G. 
Schroeder offered a summation by writing: 
Physical combat in war and competition in athletics have 
much in common. Both require ardous discipline and 
training ••• maximum action, instantaneous decision, a high 
degree of skill, emotional control at high pitch, and a 
complete coordination of the groups •••• 74 
Not incidently, a militant portrayal of energetic you~h ran concurrently 
with the endorsements, through which the full-throated cry of physical 
preparedness was given vision. From "The Soul of Football" rang the 
challenge: 
I am the onrushing tide; the stern, tense, 
immutable spirit of progress. 
I am cooperation; I am teamwork; 
I am the breath of energy, 
The spirit of stamina and the supreme test 
of endurance ••• 
Who drive the enemy over his last line of resistance. 
For I am the tide of conquest and victory •••• 
I book no weaklings 
And my sons are strong men within whom 
is red running blood •••• 
And the will to do or die-
Such are my men •••• 
I am the spirit of perfect machine. 
I am Art, for I am perfection of body, 
And clocklike coordination of brain. 
I am the sport of gentlemen and the glory 
of young virile manhood •••• 75 
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Stamina, initiative, courage, resourcefulness, cooperation, self-
discipline, generosity, sincerity, the will to win, quick and realistic 
thinking had all become words and phrases insipient in the athletic 
ethic. All that was left was the opportunity to incorporate them. 
After the United States entered the war, schools and colleges were 
hopeful of obtaining unified direction in establishing physical pre-
paredness programs for students. One metropolitan physical education 
director wrote that there should be a "physical fitness program that 
will enable them to step from school or college into combat training •••• 
Even the skills and knowledge of army games ought to be taught and 
1 d ,J6 p aye •••• The Fitness Division of the Office of Civilian Defense 
was bogged in a morass of diverse effort, forcing education to turn to 
the military, particularly the Navy, in view of its combination of rec-
reational athletics and physical training in a single network. The Navy 
made a plea for leadership in this regard through a circular letter ur-
ging college presidents to "institute ••• a regime of self-discipline and 
conditioning ••• " in order to correct "an era of soft living and rampant 
. d .. d 1. 1177 1n 1v1 ua 1sm. 
The Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation was also 
anxious to serve as an official counseling agency for colleges. The 
group sought to mold the service philosophy around a system of athletic 
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physical toughening. On October 13, 1941, T. K. Cureton, one of the de-
velopers of the University of Illinois' fitness program, wrote the wel-
fare and recreation group. He asked aid for "certain universities to 
lay down demonstration and experimental centers to train physical . 
training leaders •••• " Although the Norfolk system had provided a work-
able program, doubt was expressed in the "rather incidental way in 
which Mr. Tunney has had to select leaders for his naval 
. 79 This criticism was passed to the Badger subcomm1ttee. 
1178 program •••• 
Opportunity for 
action came on December 11, 1941, when BuNav Chief Nimitz directed that 
80 a committee appointed by JANC study the Norfolk program. 
Tunney was still involved in an aggressive recruiting campaign, 
which was rapidly expanding the number of his physical training special-
ists. Two hundred men graduated from the Norfolk training school in the 
first month of 1942 and never less than 350 per month for the rest of 
the year. These versatile men served as physical conditioning leaders, 
recreation directors, coaches, and recruit training commanders through-
out the Navy. Later they were to serve aboard ship and in other phases 
81 of combato In this rapidly expanding situation, Tunney on March 4 was 
placed in charge of all Navy physical training in the Field Administra-
tive Division under the Training Director of the reorganized Bureau of 
82 Personnel. Meanwhile, the Badger Committee assembled at Norfolk on 
January 19 and spent five days evaluating the program. The group in-
eluding Raycroft, Staley, Charles H. McCloy of the University of Iowa, 
Frank s. Lloyd of New York University, T. Nelson Metcalf of Chicago Uni-
versity, and Dean Carl P. Schott of the Pennsylvania State University. 
Only McCloy and Staley were members of the original Civilian Advisory 
Commission that had provided liaison since the previous September. 
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The report, delivered on March 31, 1942, was sharply critical of 
the Navy program. The connnittee ridiculed the "Tunney morning exer-
cises," concluding, "It does not seem desirable to use individual's 
names in connection with Navy programs." The members counseled instead 
the replacement of the regime with "another set devised by experts in 
the field." The study reconnnended expansion of sports and games on duty 
time and a lengthening of the physical hardening tasks. This latter 
philosophy was outlined in the panel's "concept ••• of the scope of Phys-
ical Fitness Program," in which "mental alertness, discrimination, 
initiative, determination and other like qualities ••• contribute to the 
d 1 f f . h . . . ,,83 eve opment o a 1g t1ng sp1r1t. The Badger report was met by al-
most innnediate hostility among Navy officials. The request by JANC to 
form a Joint Physical Training Board was rebuffed by Secretary Knox 
with the admonition that there were already too many such boards in the 
government. He defended the Navy's physical fitness program and 
threatened to rely on the advice of other civilian research groups and 
b h lf d . . 84 ypass t e we are an recreat1on connn1ttee. 
Meanwhile, the Training Division of Navy BuPers refused to allow 
the release of the Badger Report on Norfolk unless the criticisms were 
85 
removed~ Chairman Fowler Harper then drafted a letter to university 
presidents to show the Connnittee 1 s leadership in the evaluation with an 
urge for them to "develop an intensive program of athletics and other 
86 physical training courses."· The Training Division quickly disclaimed 
this and its release for any reason by claiming the study was confi-
87 
dential. As the sunnner wore on, Tunney became disgruntled and was 
convinced that the college and university representatives on the Joint 
Army-Navy Connnittee were trying to ram through their particular brand 
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of military training. He eventually junked the JANC program and 
started afresh with his own handpicked group of advisors in September, 
thus delaying the Navy Physical Training Manual until 1943. Schools 
and colleges continued with available data on conditioning. 
The Army was initially cordial to the idea of a unified combat 
conditioning program, but General Marshall's philosophy toward athletics 
in training were generally unfavorable, for he feared these were a 
waste. However, the general had a well-developed sense of organiza-
tional pride and had been an outstanding football player at Virginia 
Military Institute. His ideas of group loyalty were fundamental to his 
concept of morale, and he felt that "active contests between units help 
build the aggressive, competitive spirit." Therefore he supported a 
88 broad off-duty program. Nevertheless, while the Navy recruited well-
known coaches, athletes, and physical educators, the Army officer in 
charge of athletics in a speech to the National Collegiate Athletic As-
89 sociation Convention in December, 1941, was compelled to discourage 
applications for physical training duties. This policy was later to 
prove detrimental to the establishment of an Army-wide athletic program 
and actually retarded the training of ground combat troops, for it 
denied to that service "many thousands of men of the finest physical 
d h ' h d f d ' d 1 ' ' ' ' II 90 types an ~g egree o e ucat~on an persona ~n~t~at~ve. The of-
ficial history of the Army Special Services conceded to the Navy and 
h A. c . 1 d . h' 91 even to t e ~r orps a spec~a a vantage ~n t ~s area. Writing af-
ter the war on the procurement of ground combat troops, official u. S. 
Army historians observed that the Army system of relying on Selective 
Service rather than on direct commissioning of specialists swung to the 
Navy and Marine Corps the advantage of maintaining the character of 
32 
handpicked personnel. Moreover, soldiers in ground arms were allowed 
to volunteer for Air Corps pilot training if they were of superior 
physique and intelligence. Most of these remained in that branch even 
after "washing out."92 
The commissioning of Frederick Osburn, who had been the civilian 
chairman of the Committee on Welfare and Recreation, as a Brigadier 
General commanding the Army Special Services Division gave the JANC an 
opportunity to introduce its testing program around results gleaned from 
the Norfolk study, a proposal which was approved by Osburn on April 13, 
1942. 93 The tests were a tedious undertaking. Since the Army had no 
control or singular program for fitness training at that point, McCloy 
was sent out to run a battery of tests with various associates. This 
effort was carried out with 4,450 soldiers in different stages of train-
ing at ten posts throughout the country between May 8 and June 12, 1942. 
The testing was carried out entirely in the off-duty time of the 
94 troops. Nevertheless, at the completion of these exhaustive tests, 
the Secretary of the Joint Army-Navy Committee proposed to Osburn and 
the Chief of Ground Forces that Special Services should train athletic 
and physical education specialists for assignment to training commands. 
In addition, a proposed merger of welfare and recreation with physical 
training was suggested. 95 Neither proposal was followed. The exper-
ience left McCloy perplexed. As a civilian, he had been met with sus-
piciono Furthermore, testing men in their off-duty time had left them 
disinterested in the tests. On June 25, 1942, he wrote the Secretary 
of JANC that "training in the Army is in a terrible mess" and complained 
h h II b h h 1 II 96 t at t ere was more sa otage t an constructive e p •••• The pro-
fessor found the Air Co~ps much more receptive, and his advice proved 
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valuable in establishing their program. 97 
The Army proceeded to take test results from the McCloy investiga-
tion in order to set up its physical training manual, which was released 
in November of 1942. 98 It was devoted mostly to remedial and muscular 
conditioning work. The exercised were primarily a repetition of the 
tasks that an infantryman would face in combat. The assumption that Army 
forces would engage in athletics during training was developed within 
the manual, and participation in sports was "strongly advocated." How-
ever, it emphasized that men would "gladly engage in calesthenics, guer-
illa exercises or grass drills if they know they will be able to play 
speed ball, soccer, touch football, and push ball afterward." In other 
words, the Army circular emphasized athletics not for its motivational 
value toward combat but as a motivation instrument for participating in 
conditioning drills. The TC-87 manual outlined "total military fitness" 
as evidenced through technical, mental and emotional, and physical fit-
ness." Physical fitness was separated from emotional fitness, which was 
largely filled along lines of morale activities. Combat tasks were sim-
ulated through strength, endurance, agility and coordination drills. 
Especially emphasized were "grass drills" and guerilla exercises" along 
99 with dual combatives and running, including relays. However, even 
these tasks were athletic in nature, Ted Bank noting that the drills 
were "just about the same as the football coach uses ••• to get his men 
. h 11100 1.nto s ape. Moreover, the Army method was an athletic :imnovation, 
for it operated on an "overload" principle similar to weight training, 
. 101 wh1.ch became very popular after World War II had ended. 
While the Joint Army-Navy Committee was quarreling with the Navy 
about the best way to use athletics in conditioning troops, there emerged 
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a revolutionary method of military athletic training. Its sudden, 
spectacular, and doctrinaire technicues of military conditioning and its 
influence over athletic programs in American secondary schools and col-
leges were enormous. The program was known as Navy V-5 Preflight Train-
ing. It became a motivational school which would be a model in social 
engineering. The program did not have a staff organization until after 
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, yet in little more than five months, 
four training facilities had been leased, instructors recruited and 
trained, a syllabus drafted, students procured, and training begun. 
Theoretically, preflight training was based on the idea that a man 
was psychologically prepared to dedicate extreme measures of effort in 
physically demanding situations when symbolic meanings of emotional re-
call were recreated through athletic training. Its morphology lent 
great importance to the ability of the group to create cohension based 
on natural leadership and the sharing of common emotional experiences. 
Fully one-third of the training and most of the off-duty time was de-
voted to rugged athletic sports and games or combatives. It was purely 
and simply a case of the troops being trained for war with athletics. 
The V~5 philosophy had come straight from the American sporting cul-
ture. Its potential had been spotted during World War I by Joseph Ray-
croft. Raycroft was director of the War Department Commission on Train-
ing Camp Activities and had been instrumental in setting up an experi-
mental two-week camp for aviation officers in physical drill, group 
games, and mass athletics had been devised against a battery of tests 
which measured a man's ability to concentrate on a spoken order and his 
reliability in reproducing a complicated set of orders. From this ex-
periment the Army War Plans Division had issued a circular which ordered 
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physical training to include "competitive games as a means of a common 
end, namely, the development of the greatest possible efficiency and 
power in offensive combat." His standards of efficiency were in-
fluenced by his discrimination between results obtained by "education" 
and those obtained by "exercise." · His motivational athletic climate 
went beyond mere "exercise" and entered the realm of "education." Ac-
cording to Dr. Raycraft, the man through education "gets orders just as 
truly as he did in his physical drill, except that these orders are ex-
pressed in terms of changing conditions during the progress of the 
game." 102 Thus Raycraft relied on athletics to teach men the coopera-
tive sharing response to roles and tasks. As early as 1940, this theory 
was repeated by Thomas Wintringham who urged the British Army to adopt 
the American game of football in its training program rather than soccer 
or rugby because "it has more points of resemblance to war than any 
other sport that I knowe 11 Astounded at the swiftness and broad deploy-
ment of German troop movements in Poland and France, Wintringham, a mer-
cenary soldier, called for the abandonment of rigid methods of drill 
and the substitution of physical games to teach men initiative. Seeing 
in this a means to instill "a large dose of democracy" in modern war, 
the military writer tied sports training to "voluntarily, understood and 
thinking discipline and elastic tactics based on initiative and inde-
d 11103 pen ence.... · 
The novel American V-5 program was the brainchild of Arthur Radford, 
Head of Aviation Training in the Navy during the fall of 1941. The 
scope of pilot training had become so large that coordination diffi-
culties had grown between the Bureau of Navigation, which maintained 
authority over training, and the Bureau of Aeronautics, which directed 
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tactical deployment. On November 21, 1941, Radford was given respon-
sibility for aviation training, jointly responsible to BuNav, BuAero, 
and the Chief of Naval Operations. This enabled him to implement a 
nationwide system of preflight training centers with physical training 
independent of that run by Gene Tunney under the Director of Training 
in BuNav6 104 Shortly after the declaration of war, Radford met with one 
of his pilots, Thomas J. Hamilton, who was stationed in Washington, and 
asked him to submit a training syllabus outlining his plan for pilot 
training. Hamilton was then dispatched to the NCAA Convention of De-
cember 29-30, 1941, to recruit instructors and administrators for the 
program. Radford maintained that in order to obtain the superior qual-
ities needed by pilots and flight. crews, there needed to be developed a 
system of training based on sports, with emphasis on competitiveness. 105 
He noted later to John Griffith that "we want men who 1 11 drive into a 
f . h f . II 106 . H . 1 d b h . d 1 ~g t not veer away rom ~t. am~ ton prove to e t e ~ ea se-
lection for Director of Physical Training. He had been head football 
coach at the Naval Academy and a star on the 1926 gridiron team. He 
also was a carrier pilot with an ideology suited to the program. Hamil-
ton wrote in 1974: 
Admiral Radford ••• was way ahead of the other services and 
of our time in his concept of utilizing the skills, dis-
ciplines, teamwork and training methods of sports to de-
velop or enhance the qualities of trainees. He obtained 
many of the results of close order drill ••• in far greater 
degree by this ••• method.l07 
His tentative syllabus elicited all the attributed one would expect a 
combative physical toughening program to have. Hamilton proposed four 
preflight centers on abandoned college campuses, redistributing students 
there to other educational centers. He noted that "it will detract 
greatly from the purpose ••• of our program if our Spartanlike life 
discipline and hard work is paralleled by modern college life •••• " 
Liberty and privileges were to be restricted and the cadets subjected 
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to a rigorous hardening program to loosen them from a "soft, luxurious, 
loose-thinking, lazy, peacetime life •••• " The competitive athletic 
part of the plan was to be arranged around the principle of building 
"mental alertness, agility, initiative and a sporting competitive 
spirit" to contend with enemy youth who were "stronger, tougher, better 
physically trained in a nationalistic and fanatical frame of mind •••• " 
Every prospective pilot was to engage in a daily physical regime in-
cluding an hour and a half of running, wood chopping, calesthenics and 
hard labor followed by up to another hour and a half of instruction in 
team sports and dual combatives. After a day of physical drill, in-
fantry drills, and academic instruction, each man was required to en-
gage in two hours of competition in intramural or varsity practice. 
Forty-mile hikes and survival training were to conclude preflight. 
The campuses were to be run like an accelerated version of the 
Naval Academy, and its extreme form of military regimen was similar to 
that institution. Separate departments for the administration of aca-
demics and athletics were established. A Director of Athletics was to 
supervise an eighty-three-man physical training and coaching staff. 
Each physical training officer and, indeed, each instructor was ex-
pected to be an example of strength and virility, and each was to en-
gage in the same physical regime as his men. Practically the entire 
staff, initially, was taken off college c~puses, for they were not to 
have "pacifistic" or "connnunistic learnings." Daily chapels were de-
108 signed for spiritual reflection directed by a "fighting parson." 
Huge quantities of athletic gear, as well as a ten-man medical 
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staff to attend the trainees, were required. The cadets were to be 
given the best attention for injuries, returned to training rapidly, 
and provided the best food with up to 5,100 calories per day. 109 Simi-
lar athletic facilities were urged to become part of the fleet. Hamil-
ton noted that benefits from such an athletic plan would go beyond men 
in training and "provide much valuable publicity and interest for the 
general public •••• "· Hamilton conjectured, "The caliber and scope of 
inter-collegiate athletics will undoubtedly fall off, so thus the Navy 
h 11 h . 1' h . . ,,110 as an exce ent c ance to cap1ta 1ze on t e s1tuat1on. 
Although the Preflight proposal was not approved by the CNO until 
March 13, 1942, lll it was well on its way by then. Possible sites for 
training centers were being examined before Christmas of 1941, selec-
tions were made in February of 1942, and expansion of facilities began 
1 . d. 1 112 a most 1mme 1ate y. Hamilton described his program to the NCAA 
delegates at Detroit on December 29 and 30, 1941, where his speech was 
"the highlight of the convention." The Naval Academy became the train-
ing ground for prospective staff. A group of civilian experts in ath-
letics convened with Hamilton at the academy in February, using the 
staff and facilities at Annapolis as a guideline for organization. 
Bernie Bierman of the University of Minnesota, perhaps the most cele-
brated football coach in the United States at that time, was called to 
active duty as a Marine major in January of 1942 and met with the group. 
The• advisory list included four university athletic directors: William 
Bingham of Harvard, Ray Eckmann from the University of Washington, Jack 
Meagher of Auburn, and L. W. St. John of Ohio State. Also included were 
Elmer Mitchell, Director of Intramurals at the University of Michigan, 
as well as Griffith, Dr. Raycraft, and Schott. This team served as the 
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initial selection board for staffing the Physical Training billets. 
After that body worked out the organizational and training problems, 
the path was cleared for the first staff trainees, who arrived in March 
of 1942 for a month's training in naval customs, military drill, and 
mastery of the training syllabus. 
On April 19 the first two-hundred graduates of the instructor's 
~ d .program were turne out. Unlike those in the regular Navy physical 
training program, they were commissioned reserve officers. Rank was 
designated according to responsibility in the various training schools. 
Athletic directors were ranked as lieutenant commanders, head coaches as 
Navy lieutenants, assistant coaches as lieutenant (j. g.), and physical 
instructors as ensigns. This instruction was carried on through July of 
1942 at Annapolis, at which time it shifted to the preflight school at 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina. After September of 1942, orientation was 
113 carried on at the individual schools. Over 25,000 men applied for 
commissions in the instructional phrase of Preflight, but only ten per-
cent of them were accepted. Annual and semi-annual turnover of staff 
brought hundreds of new coaches and administrators into the athletic 
program. Transfers served with the fleet or in advanced bases, spread-
114 ing their philosophy throughout the Navy. 
Four preflight bases were established in the spring of 1942. They 
included centers on the campuses of the University of Iowa, Iowa City; 
the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill; the University of Georgia, 
Athens; and St. Mary's College, Moraga, California. The latter matched 
Hamilton's desire for a rural, monastic environment perfectly. Another 
base was commissioned in 1943 at Del Monte, California, near San Fran-
cisco, and survived the war as a type of "post-graduate" facility. The 
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first training battalions were aboard by May 28, 1942, and soon classes 
in all units had been inaugurated. Many of the first cadets were stu-
dents who had been enrolled in the Reserve V-5 program, one of the 
several "V" programs launched by the Navy to obtain trained personnel 
from colleges. Thus "V-5" came to be a code word for Preflight Train-
ing. 
Friends of athletics were enthralled by the operation. The Ameri-
can Association of Health, Physical Education Recreation unanimously 
sanctioned it at its New Orleans convention on April 18, 1942. Casting 
aspersions on the myriad war programs "sponsored by persons not profes-
sionally trained," the resolution did "approve and give wholehearted 
support to that type of program consisting of combat activities, rugged 
team and individual games, track and field athletics, and the necessary 
conditioning exercises •••• " Jesse Feiring Williams, one of the measure's 
backers, got in a further joust at regular Navy physical training with 
the provision that urged the government to use "competent and profession-
ally trained personnel. 11 The AAHPER directed a letter to Navy officials 
claiming that the preflight program "best represents this point of 
view. 11115 One sportswriter, Arch Ward of the Chicago Tribune, said of 
V-5, "Its success or failure will determine the outcome of the war ••• 
[because] it requires leaders who s·peak a language young America under-
116 
stands."· 
Some educators were politely cautious at first. While the training 
program was being considered by the advisory committee at Annapolis, 
Seward Staley cautioned Hamilton to use veteran physical educators over 
thirty years of age as his training cadre because of rumors that the 
program would provide "cushy commissions" for big-time coaches and 
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athletes. Yet the University of Illinois professor complimented the 
naval commander for being "on the right track" in training aviation 
d h h h . 1 . . 117 ca ets t roug p ys1ca reg1mentat1on. While assuring Staley that 
no eligible aviator would be assigned to the program, Hamilton re-
sponded by defending the use of younger officers because of the physical 
demands of leadership. The former football coach corrected Staley by 
indicating that his was "not a program of physical education," but 
rather "strictly one of physical training and physical fitness." Hamil-
ton preferred the appointment of coaches because preflight had "placed 
·a great deal of emphasis on competitive athletics •••• " As an aviator, 
he was convinced of the value of athletics to flying, pointing out that 
nthe flyer must not only be strong and fit but must be instilled with a 
1 h . h "11 f h" d"ff" 1 . n 118 menta urge w 1c w1 orce 1m to surmount any 1 1cu t1es •••• 
As the physical training program at the V-5 schools was established, 
practical instruction was stressed in at least nine sports. The aim of 
these activities was designed, according to the sports program manual, 
to show every cadet that "there is no substitute for winning." The out-
line continued, "Gracious defeat that has been a definite part of the 
sportsman code during peace-loving days must be forgotten ••• ~ There 
must be developed rugged, ruthless, determined competitors." The guide-
book featured competition for all hands, varsity, junior varsity, squad-
ron and platoon~ Every man was required to participate in realistic 
game competition "requiring rigorous body contact and strenuous physical 
effort." This social engineering was also intended to give the cadet 
"objective interests and outlooks" by directing the individual's atten-
tion away from himself and toward outside interests. Not only was this 
considered a good remedy for homesickness, but also it helped the 
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aviation candidate to form definite group ties. The sports program was 
considered a requirement for maintaining common objectives and sharing 
b 1 . "d 1 119 sym o 1.c 1. ea s. 
Each activity in the program had its purpose. Football was para-
mount, for it taught mental and physical aggressiveness, coordination, 
alertness, discipline and teamworka Basketball was used for hand and 
eye coordination, training for "instantaneous pnd correct decisions," 
agility and endurance. Speed and timing were aims of track, while box-
ing taught self-assurance, courage, self-reliance, and an "aggressive 
combative nature." Gymnastics were ideally suited for pilot training 
to orient students to unusual attitudes as well as to promote daringe 
Soccer was taught because of the dexterity required and for its inter-
120 national appeal. There were three sports the training purposes of 
which were so unique that they represented the character of preflight 
training. These were wrestling, military track, and football. 
Military track was an adaptation of track and field and cross 
country to military skills. Teams of thirty men competed for honors in 
running obstacle races which used speed, endurance, coordination, and 
strength to surmount, in the course of one or two races, everything that 
a track participant might do in the course of an entire meet in several 
eventso Obstacle races were scored as cross country meets, and the ca-
121 det participated in contests such as the caber toss and tug-of-war. 
Consequently, each preflight school generally had an outstanding varsity 
track and field program. One V-5 cadet, Cornelius Warmerdam, topped the 
ld I d . h 1 1 h. 1 d . h I c. 122 wor s recor 1.n t e po e vau t w 1. e on uty w1.t owa 1.ty. 
Wrestling, preflight style, included normal collegiate wrestling, 
"rough and tumble," knock-down, catch~as ... catch-can contests, and the 
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teaching of bone-breaking holds. The purpose of these exercises was to 
expose the normally sedate American civilian to a pressurized situation. 
Wrestling in the V-5 schools d~anded that one take advantage of an op-
. 123 ponent whenever possible, aggressively and merc1lesslys 11 Hamilton 
124 called the sport the "nearest thing to actual war" approached by man. 
The epitome of the athletic concept for V-5s, however, was foot-
ball. If wrestling was the nearest thing to war, then football was war. 
Commander Hamilton viewed football, Navy, and war as analagous to modern 
combat. He wrote in the NCAA Football Guide in the summer of 1942: "The 
analogy of football and war is becoming more and more apparent each day. 
The benefits of training in football are helping many American soldiers, 
sailors and marines in their wart.ime duties." The strategies of offense, 
defense, strong and weak points, versatility in attack, along with speed 
power, and deception, were noted for their carryover values in pilot 
training. 125 All hands were instructed in the game in every season of 
the year, in pads, throughout the V-5 system. Two-thirds of the men had 
never participated in such activity, but according to Bierman, since all 
men had exhibited some form of admiration for the athletic hero, their 
participation in football would eliminate any tendency for them to have 
an "inferiority complex," which had been allegedly brought about through 
a philosophy of physical education of not encouraging a boy to do some-
126 thing he was supposedly unable to do. 
Every cadet was required to participate on an intramural or varsity 
team in either football or soccero Regulation football was held on the 
squadron level at every base. Teams were named for Navy aircraft, such 
as "Devastator" or "Vindicator," and leagues playing a round-robin 
schedule were constantly in operation. Each team. having thirty members, 
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there were approximately 350 men, not counting varsity, constantly en-
gaged in football practice year-around at each of the four or five in-
stallations. Counting seasonal varsity squads of over sixty men, nearly 
6,000 cadets per year were receiving instruction and game experience in 
football. Instruction was amenable to mass demonstration, and each pla-
toon had a coach. Teaching was "by the number." The initial drill 
featured demonstration of stances, blocking maneuvers and ballhandling. 
The second drill was devoted to tackling and passing, the third to foot-
work and defensive charges, and so forth, with constant review. The 
teams finally worked their way to "scrimmage" by the eighth drill. Over 
three-hundred football games per year were played in the sports pro-
127 gram. Another three-hundred were played in the instructional phase. 
Military track also proved to be fundamental to the training re-
gimeo There were 4,419 meets held in the first year alone. The cadets 
also participated in 9,139 boxing ¥latches, 3,276 swimming meets, 2,828 
128 gymnastic events, 2,003 basketball games and 875 soccer matches. One 
observer wrote~ 
Thus from one end of the day to the other there is a 
sports picture without parallel in the history of this 
or any other nation ••• You see a great panorama of sports 
being used for a utilitarian martial purpose and no 
lover of athletics could fail to look with pride upon 
this program.l29 
Willis Hunter, a former athletic director at the University of 
Southern California, concisely placed the sports program with a patter~ 
of functional analysis through which athletic games were to project an 
entirely different "philosophy" to the participant: 
In this plan, geared to a war-time necessity, sports 
for sports sake was out, and in its place came a new phi-
losophy of sports for what they will contribute to the 
war effort. The development of stamina in the war-time 
sense of the expression definitely involves amental as 
well as a physical aspect. If physical, it d·epends up-
on a well-developed body, made strong by such contact 
sports as soccer, football, etc., if mental it is built 
by an abiding belief that the mind and body are pre-
pared •••• The approach is different as is the emphasis. 
Time is ~ available, participation made compulsory, 
definite progressive lesson plans adopted, teaching pro-
cedures intensified and the tinsel removed as the sports 
are categorized by the contributions which they make 
toward the war effort. Those which cannot contribute 
are eliminated.l30 
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All games were designed for as much body contact as possible. The rules 
were often altered to suit this purpose. In soccer, body checking was 
allowed, and fouls often were not called in basketball. Cadets were en-
couraged to think offensively and "break down years of playing under in-
volved rules." This concentration on offense was stressed continually 
in all sports. . 131 High scoring and number of goals were valued h1ghly. 
The intramural sports program itself was one of magnitude. Each 
base had dozens of playing fields and courts constructed. Gymnasiums 
operated all through the day and evening as competition was stressed 
throughout the waking hours. One intramural football team arose at 
4:00 a.m. to play off a tie game. The logistical and planning support 
was meticulously detailed. Accurate records of participants, scores, 
standings, statistics, brackets, schuling time, and location were cen-
tered in a huge intramural hall. Outstanding squadrons in each sport 
were selected at each facility. Each team received extra compensation 
132 for members of their unit to be selected for a varsity squad. 
The varsity itself was a "super" team, the "cream"· of 1,750 trainees 
in each sport. Football was the chief varsity sport and was financed 
through "Preflight Athletic Associations," modeled after the athletic 
associations in the military academies and similar to booster clubs at 
major universities. An executive committee administered the varsity 
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program. Membership in the associations were extended to duty officers 
on base, instructors, and "public spirited citizens." Dues were col-
133 lected, and any surplus was returned to the Bureau of Personnel. 
Plans for a varsity football program were laid before the first 
student was aboard. Originally, until modified by BuPers, each station 
was to play thirteen games, mostly against intercollegiate competition. 
Well-known coaches were recruited to coach the teams, and they, like the 
cadets, were with the team but one season before going on to spread 
their particular talents throughout the fleet and shore stations. The 
first four mentors assigned to the V-5 schools were Bierman, James 
Crowley of Fordham, Harold (Tex) Oliver of Oregon University, and Ray 
Morison of Southern Methodist. Others who followed as head or assistant 
coaches included Don Faurot, Charles (Bud) Wilkinson, Raymond (Jack) 
Sutherland, Paul Brown, Paul (Bear) Bryant, Woodrow (Woody) Hayes, Jim 
Tatum, Raymond (Bear) Wolf, Warren Woodsen, and Madison (Matty) Bell. 
Younger coaches like Wilkinson and future President Gerald R. (Gerry) 
Ford went on to serve aboard combat aircraft carriers, Wilkinson aboard 
the Enterprise, Ford on the Monterey. Such an array of Navy talent was 
awe inspiring, leading John Kieran to write whimsically, "Uncle Sam 
won't need to maintain a standing Army, all he'll need to do is to mus-
ter all the football squads and name MacArthur and Nimitz as the quarter-
b k 11134 ac s. 
Varsity athletics were intensified in the Navy during the 1942 
football season. Unhampered recruiting and the unification of athletics 
with physical training made leadership exceptional. With its air sta-
tions leading the way, a service-wide gridiron record of fifty-two 
wins, twenty-eight losses, and four ties was chalked up in the fall. 
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The preflight schools, although not dominating their college schedules 
as many had predicted, were still very good. None lost more than three 
games, and two, Sts Mary's and Chapel Hill, were undefeated until the 
last game. Iowa City Preflight had a seventy-man team, which included 
135 twenty-three officers, some of whom were former professional players. 
The dashing "Seahawks" captured the fancy of sportswriters in the first 
game of the season by toppling mighty Minnesota, Major Bierman's former 
1 b . h h "d f f" f M" 136 H J" c u , w1t t e a1 o 1ve ormer 1nnesota stars. owever, 1m 
Crowley was not able to do the same trick for the Chapel Hill team. 
The "Cloudbusters" fell to the coach's old Fordham squad in New York 
City in the season's finale despite the presence of ten former "Ram" 
1 1 . f h N . 137 p ayers p ay1ng or t e avy un1t. The V-5 teams played major col-
lege football schedules and gave that last "normal" wartime football 
season an air of quality. The Big Ten, with Griffith's leadership, 
made special provision for expanding their schedules to accommodate the 
preflight teams. Iowa City played five from that league, plus three 
from the Big Six, in addition to Notre Dame, St. Mary's, North Carolina 
Preflight, and Ft. Knox. 138 
The aviation training institutions thoroughly dominated the four 
campuses on which they were located, although all colleges continued to 
hold classes. The Navy had control of most of the athletic facilities; 
jurisdictional disputes between the university and the service over 
their use favored the Navy, for the campus was technically a military 
reservation. 139 The Navy added its own improvements, which included, 
at St. Mary's, an Olympic-size swimming pool, twelve outdoor basketball 
courts, and "many acres of athletic fields.n 140 
By the end of the 1942 football season, Tom Hamilton was recognized 
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as the individual most responsible for the preservation of collegiate 
athletics. Although he was Radford 1 s surrogate in the matter of pre-
flight ideology, Hamilton's organizational and recruiting worth, as well 
as his ability to span the gap between military needs and ch~·ilian 
interests, had gained him wide respect in college athletics. Not only 
was he named the "Man of the Year" by the Football Writers Association, 
but also the National Soccer Coaches Association gave him the same honor 
f h . 141 or t e1r sport. The preflight concept was university admired by 
sportswriters and had gained authority as a method of training. 
The commandant at NAS Pensacola informed the Director of Aviation 
Training in December of 1942 that the preflight cadets received at the 
base not only showed superiority!in military bearing, but also were 
physically advanced over non-preflight students. Although noting the 
cadets admitted to having "far too much" athletic training in the V-5 
schools, he observed them to have "higher standard of military bearing" 
and a greater degree of "endurance and stamina. 11142 "The enthusiasm with 
which these college coaches of other years discuss Commander Tom Hamil-
ton's preflight program," observed journalist Arthur Daley, "demonstrates 
h • 11 • • II 143 more emp at1ca Y•• .1ts em1nent correctness. · 
Preflight became a laborato·ry for contemporary thought in athletic 
coaching. The administration of the schools initiated an annual series 
of coaching clinics. The first clinics were held from August 3-15, 
1942, and public school and college coaches were invited to live at the 
bases, observing and participating in the program first-hand. Curricu-
lum for the workshops included fundamentals of team and combative sports 
and military drill. The purpose of the project was to "enable the 
civilian physical training specialists to learn how to adapt their 
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school and college training programs to the nation's wartime need for 
144 stronger, keener, more rugged youth." Procedures at the school were 
well received, and many physical educators applied the obstacle courses 
and the hardening exercises directly to their own athletic programs. 
The clinics were complemented by the issuance of a bulletin out-
lining the V-5 system for use in the public schools. The document, 
which appeared in August of 1942, was the first systematic guideline 
issued by the government for war fitness. It included lesson plans and 
coaching procedures for each sport, physical characteristics for ob-
stacle courses, and measurement and rating charts. This was later ex-
panded into a series of le$son plans for each sport in the preflight 
school, which were widely used long after the war as clinical guides 
for athletic coaching. 
By late autumn, Hamilton's training system for pilots had drawn 
wide admiration, through the spectacular performances of their gridiron 
teams, of the superb condition of the men who had completed the train-
ing. W., J., Bingham observed, "When I saw t~e program outlined on 
paper ••• ! wondered if our peace-trained·youth could take this grueling 
[sic]." Amazed that no officers club existed and that discipline was 
outstanding, Bingham admitted that Hamilton had "the best training 
course yet devised for aviation cadets," and that "their taut muscles, 
their tanned bodies convincingly refute the softness of our youth." 
Washington officials were treated to a display of physical stamina of 
these men during a cold November football halftime at Chapel Hill in 
1942 as the men, stripped to the waist, went through a spectacular of 
h . 1 d' 1 145 p ys1ca 1sp ay. One observer, former Navy Secretary Josephus 
Daniels, was thrilled that "athletics had gone to war and is doing a 
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fine job ••• ," editorializing, "one of the great training jobs of World 
War II is being accomplished." The aviation training program, accord-
ing to Daniels, was "more carefully planned, more rigorously adminis-
tered, more successful in the accomplishment of its objectives,"than 
any other activity. The victims of the "juke box, convertible coupe 
146 era" were fit examples to challenge the Axis. 
The NCAA meanwhile had voted at its Detroit convention in December 
of 1941 that colleges require at least three hours of compulsory physi-
1 d . 147 ca e ucat1on. This was followed by the Baltimore meeting of col-
lege presidents on January 4, 1942; they resolved that "all colleges and 
universities should take such steps as will be necessary to bring each 
oooStudent to his highest possible level of physical fitness." 
The NCAA convention at Detroit outlined its program as "Inter-
collegiate Athletics: Their Contribution in a Crises." John Griffith 
wielded statistics which showed that a high proportion of officers in 
the previous war had won their college letter, and Philip Badger key-
noted the meeting by pointing out that the primary contribution of col-
lege athletics was institutional loyalty and leadership qualities in-
eluding "self-sacrifice, team play ••• and respect for law and order." 
He pleaded to keep colleges open to develop these self-evident benefits. 
Thurstien Davies, President of Colorado College, noted that the college's 
chief bequeathment to the prospective draftee was a sense of "Pride," 
and a "zest for action," while Charles H. MeG loy dwelled on the "spirit-
148 ual 11 asset of "character." If the college were to be a place to 
physically condition the prospective soldier, then it was going to have 
something to say about his social outlook. 
In order to coordinate these programs, the Office of Education 
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Wartime Commission asked forty-seven representatives of colleges and 
professional organizations to form a committee on physical fitness. 
This group, which was organized on May 7, 1942, brought in its report 
on September 1. Unlike the Navy programs, the report did not deal with 
physical fitness as "hardening" but with physical fitness in terms of 
"health," which included the prevention of disease, correction of de-
fects, nutrition, mental health, morale, "basic motor skills", muscular 
strength, and endurance. However,the committee reported as far as pros-
pective draftees were concerned, "The competitive spirit developed in 
athletics is a contributing factor in the will to win which is so es-
sential in military service. Guidelines were practically the same as 
the versatile Navy program, conditioning and strength exercises, com-
batives, swimming, "obstacle relays," recreative sports, running, gym-
nastics, and reorganization of intramural and intercollegiate athletics 
to "full playing opportunities for all students." Colleges were asked 
to place health and fitness above other curriculur requirements and to 
d . . hl . h ld d . d. . . 149 a m1n1ster at et1c programs as t ey wou aca em1c l.Vl.SJ.ons. 
The University of Illinois plan, which had been set up before Pearl 
Harbor by Seward Staley and associates, was perceptive in regard to the 
committee recommendations. This rugged program included a "20 to 44" 
. 150 club draft regJ.strants~ The September report also found a scattering 
of other programs in the fall of 1942. The University of Michigan main-
tained a thrice weekly ninety-minute hardening unit. Every graduate and 
undergraduate student was organized into platoons for mass exercise and 
competitive games, and the notion of supremacy was constantly emphasized. 
P d d d U . . h d . "1 . . 151 ur ue an In iana n1vers1ty a s1m1 ar act1v1ty. Obstacle courses 
were widely utilized in college toughening courses and varsity football 
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d b h d f 1943 . d 1 d d. . 152 practices, an y t e en o were w1 e y use as a con 1t1oner. 
In many respects, high school athletics continued on a much more 
normal plane than did colleges with their manpower shortages. In some 
areas, such as eastern Ohio, high school football had a wider appeal 
than did some of the major colleges with crowds of over 15,000 not un-
153 common. Mass participation was stressed, and some high schools em-
phasized interscholastic competition with more than one team in a sport 
from each school. These plans were frustrated by a power shortage of 
another kind, that of physical education teachers and coaches. In 1944, 
the state high school athletic association in Oklahoma maintained that 
100 schools were planning to curtail athletics for the duration. 154 In 
December, 1942, William L. Hughes of Columbia Teacher's College suggested 
women teachers for boys' physical education, as well as student leaders, 
and the bringing of teachers from other disciplines into coaching. Many 
state associations dropped recuirements that only school district em-
1 ld h d d Volunteer help. l55 p oyees cou coac an accepte One high school in 
Salina, Pennsylvania, did indeed hire a twenty-two-year-old woman, 
156 Pauline Rugh, as head football coach. 
The Office of Education encouraged secondary schools to make their 
high school athletics programs part of the victory effort. Nine region-
al fitness institutes were held during the fall and winter of 1942-1943. 
The Boston institute, held on November 11 under the faculty leadership 
of armed services fitness leaders including Theodore Bank, James Pixlee, 
and two Navy representatives, initiated the "Victory Corps" hardening 
program. A pamphlet developed from this program, Physical Fitness 
through Physical Education for the Victory Corps, became the standard 
government advice on the preparation of high school boys for service. 
53 
The plan recommended the attendance in "one school period daily of in-
struction in physical education ••• supplemented by a participation pro-
gram including intramural ••• and interscholastic athletics ••• for at 
least ten hours each week." Activities for boys were developed from 
the training manuals of both major services, with aquatics, including 
swimming fully clothed for long distances, cross-country obstacle races, 
athletic sports, wrestling, and other combatives coming from the Navy 
experience. Running, "ranger exercises," "grass drills," apparatus work, 
conditioning, and response drills were representative of Army recommen-
dations. Many of these activities were recommended for women, including 
cross-country obstacle runs, soccer, speed ball, basketball, field 
157 hockey, and gymnastics. The Office of Education also recommended 
the establishment of a mass exercise field wherein one instructor on a 
platform could observe a melange of activities, including individual 
conditioning movements, strength and obstacle tests, gymnastics, ob-
stacle runs, track and field exercises, and grenade throwing. 158 One 
educator favored a program of "controlled school sports" which would 
supplement rrplay programs"· and develop "exercises that have a definite 
relation to body building ••• and obedience to orders, with its corollary 
respect for authority. 11159 Another plan for mass participation, de-
veloped in Rhode Island, was called "Quadromnium Competitive Track.rr 
Every able-bodied boy in school was required to participate. Standard 
track events were combined with a sprint-type obstacle run. Scoring 
was between classes and schools with each boy's performance affecting 
h • I 160 1s team s average. Ideas and problems in school conditioning were 
discussed at the first War Fitness Conference held in Cincinnati in 
April of 1943. 161 
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However, there was something less than unanimity for the school 
fitness activities. One educator warned that balance between militar-
ism and the elements of American democracy had to be preserved by 
identifying "patriotic loyalty with ••• basic elements of our tra-
d . . ,,162 1t1on. Another criticized "misguided school administrators" for 
imposing "hardening and toughening courses" on high school boys with the 
assumption "that they can be put in athletic condition ready for im-
d . . 1" d "163 me 1ate m1 1tary uty •••• The Victory Corps program, which designed 
the regimentation of many school activities behind the war effort, de-
creased in importance as the crises point of the war emergency passed. 
By 1944, obstacle courses were decreasingly emphasized, and the Office 
of Education expressed concern about "poorly taught" boxing instruction 
and the emphasis on inter-scholastic athletics over physical educa-
. 164 
t1on. 
Athletic games were an important part of the psychological, social, 
and physical conditioning of Americans during the war effort. Only the 
amount of emphasis marked differences in opinion. Were sports for pre-
paredness, or were they for play? The American and his government 
struggled for an answer. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE RETURN OF WONDERFUL NONSENSE 
SPORTS PROGRAMS IN 1942 
The continuance of sporting events was questioned. Which activi-
ties were seen as frivolity and which were valuable in their recreative 
aspect? How could sport, so highly visible, yet so abstract, be mo-
bilized? Who would decide? Many organizations decided for themselves, 
their limited appeal leading to suspended competition amidst an air of 
patriotic self-congratulation. Others like the Indianapolis Speedway 
closed "for the duration," being confronted with obvious logistical 
scarcity, although dirt track racing and motor boat continued into the 
1 . . 1 ate spr1ng 1n some areas. The military, especially on the West Coast, 
moved to limited activities where large crowds might gather, thus pro-
viding a security and transportation problem in case of air attack. 
Americans generally sought their government's guidelines in matters 
relating to recreation, physical fitness, and entertainment. When these 
criteria could be ascertained, the public followed them. The war re-
vealed, however, that sport, games, and athletics of all kinds were part 
of the institutional fabric of the United States, and any mobilization 
for war would have to accommodate them. 
Just after Pearl Harbor, Fourth Army Commander General John L. De-
Witt forced the altering of many sporting ev ents, much to the constern-
ation of promotional groups. The New Year's Day Rose Bowl was moved to 
65 
66 
Durham, North Carolina and the East-West football game to New Orleans. 
California Governor Culbert L. Olsen canceled the winter meeting of the 
Santa Anita race track, stranding 1,400 thoroughbreds in Californis when 
2 box cars were preempted. A bane on the West Coast, the Rose Bowl 
proved to be a boon to the East. One advertisement offered to "Combine 
the ROSE BOWL GAME with a WEEKEND AT PINEHURST," attracting the country 
club set to a holiday of golf and gridiron. 3 
Californians did not take DeWitt's limitations lightly. One Con-
gressman complained to President Franklin D. Roosevelt that the "re-
straints placed by the military upon the normal recreational activities 
of the people of the West Coast ••• are breaking down the morale of these 
people." Some observers noted the inconsistency of allowing large 
gatherings in the East and not in the West since "no military purpose" 
seemed to be served in DeWitt's prohibitions against large crowds, es-
pecially since such gatherings could be seen in shopping centers ''at 
. 114 almost anytime of the day or n1ght.... The Los Angeles County Council 
of the American Legion objected to the transfer of the Rose Bowl from 
Pasadena, and Congressman Leland Ford revepled in a letter to the Secre-
tary of War that California had been unfairly singled out since such 
events "go to the very existence and economics of our State." Moreover, 
he insisted that "these things are actually carried on in England under 
strenuous raiding,n prompting an observation that "California has been 
5 given a bad deal here." By spring, DeWitt had relented enough to al-
low the Pacific Coast League to have night baseball under a number of 
6 safeguards, but the war boom in the area continued to create tensions 
between authorities and the private sector. 
Prudence dictated that sporting entertainment continue as long as 
67 
games were not used for "bomb proofing" able-bodied athletes. Profes-
sional sports supposedly gave "relaxation" to war workers and inspira-
tion to young people. John Kieran obligingly wrote that any activity 
that did not contribute to the war effort should be stopped, but "hap-
pily few sports fall into such categories. 117 Morale was an elusive 
term, used for whatever rationale people needed to justify their ac-
tivity, leading sportswriters to demand that "morale be hanged!" They 
charged that the term was "misleading and irritating."8 One sports pro-
moter huffed, "This would be a hell of a country if we had to have 
fights and ball games and races to get us all worked about winning a 
war •••• " 9 Even in the darkest hour of the Pacific peril, after the fall 
of Bataan, the Gallup poll found only twenty-four percent of its re-
d d f . 1 d. . d 10 spon ents wante pro ess1ona sports 1scont1nue • 
Participation in sports was restricted more by such factors as a 
shortage of rubber (thereby limiting trips to games and eliminating the 
vital ingredients in tennis shoes and golf balls) than by governmental 
edicts. Sports represented normalcy, and despite a brief interdiction 
of West Coast activities professional and amateur athletics returned to 
normal. For those who did not want to decide what to do about it, the 
President was a convenient savant. Yet Roosevelt had no comprehensive 
policy independent of the war agencies that were growing more numerous 
by the month. Nevertheless, the Chief Executive had a steady trickle 
of mail asking him to make a pronouncement on the value of some activity 
or another to the war effort. One who got a reply was crochety Judge 
Keneshaw Mountain Landis, whose antiquity and authority as Commissioner 
of America's most revered game of baseball demanded an answer. This be-
came somehow symbolic as a "green light," which it was not. College and 
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amateur sport boosted "big-time" programs on the basis of "morale" and 
"fitness."· Baseball and other professional operations were concerned 
about morale and stability. 
College authorities insisted on the essentiality of their pro-
grams. Both Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of War Newton Baker had urged 
continuance of collegiate activities during World War I and the burning 
oil at Pearl Harbor was still smoldering when Asa Bushnell, Executive 
Director for Eastern Intercollegiate Athletics, wired FDR in hopes that 
he would urge colleges to "maintain and ••• intensify their programs •••• n11 
Retention of college athletics indicated the pace of the national mo-
bilization effort. Amos Alonzo Stagg, the seventy-nine-year-old coach 
at the College of Pacific, urged his college president to continue such 
student activity, reminding him of the importance of maintaining "the 
same tempo of life" as a "healthy, sane, and desirable thing for the 
individual, the family, and the community •••• 1112 All pre-war champion-
ship events were held, and out of the 559 schools listed as having foot-
ball squads, only fifty-two dropped the sport for the 1942 season. The 
trend to keep athletics was emphasized at the NCAA Convention of Decem-
ber 29 and 30, 1941; the Executive Committee, encouraged by the appear-
ance of Lieutenant Tom Hamilton of the United States Navy, felt duty-
bound to make the athletic training grounds a seminar for potential 
13 leaders. 
Although some institutions, through the loss of revenue from re-
duced student enrollment, were forced to abandon some phases of inter-
collegiate athletics, no general move to suspend activities was seen. 
Students at the University of Omaha boycotted classes because of the 
14 President's decision to suspend football, and a skirmish in the Georgia 
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Board of Regents to abandon the game at state institutions was success-
fully resisted. Governor Robert Talmadge used sports as an example of 
elitist privilege and threatened to put "debutantes to hoeing potatoes." 
However, University Chancellor S. F. Sanford supported athletics by ar-
guing, "Army and Navy officers ••• want young men trained in college so 
that they will be tough when they start training •••• 1115 The notion that 
football harbored such warlike qualities was an old one; Allison Danzig 
was inspired to call for coaches to "foster football as it has never 
been fostered before in order to get every possible boy in college on 
the football bandwagon." Stagg, noting that "every war has been a 
factor in stimulating sports," reminded that "martial strife has been 
the direct motivating factor in every impetus given to American ath-
letics.1116 By May, 1942, the NCAA had been given a tentative go-ahead 
by officials representing government policy on manpower and transporta-
. 17 d b h h . 1 d h 11 t1on, an y summer t e p ys1ca prepare ness t erne was we en-
trenched in the rationale of college athletics. 
Professional baseball sought means to save its game. The last 
month of the season had been suspended by government decree in 1918, 
and care was taken to place the activity on sound footing with Washing-
ton. As early as April, 1941, Washington Senators club owner Clark 
Griffith sqggested a presidential statement on the value of baseball in 
18 the defense effort. A drive launched soon after the war declaration 
to provide "bat and ball kits" for servicemen marked this effort. 
Griffith, who headed the initial drive, placed orders for 18,000 balls 
and 4,500 bats with the observation that the equipment was the "best we 
can get--none of that cheap stuff for the soldiers and sailors •••• " 19 
This cooperation led Baseball Commissioner Keneshaw Mountain Landis to 
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inquire in a letter to Roosevelt ''what you have in mind whether base-
ball should continue to operate?" Landis's scrawled, handwritten mis-
sive pled the professional game's intentions with simplicity and sin-
cerity, asking no special consideration for "individual members of this 
organization whose status in this emergency is fixed by law •••• rr 20 
Satisfied that baseball was in harmony with the war effort, the Presi-
dent hastily responded with a statement which was heartening to the 
sporting world, declaring, "I honestly feel that it would be best for 
the country to keep baseball going." Roosevelt looked favorably upon 
minor league ball, and urged the essentiality of night games to give 
"an opportunity to the day shift to see a game occasionally." The 
President clearly recognized the responsibility of individual players 
to enter military service and emphasized that skilled tradesmen "ought 
21 to serve the Government." After Landis wired the President his 
"grateful appreciation," the major leagues got on with their program to 
"justify" the action. 22 After being hosted by a sportswriters gala to 
bask in the sun of their newfound importance to the country, owners got 
down to the business of formulating a wartime welfare program which in-
eluded the expansion of nighttime contests and extension of the "bat 
and ball fund." This was financed through a second seasonal "All~Star 
Game" and the voluntary allotment of paychecks for the purchase of 
. b . d f 23 1nterest~ ear1ng e ense stamps. 
Representatives of other sports were anxious for the President to 
say their pursuits, too, were essential. One racing sheet writer was 
told by Presidential Secretary Stephen Early that the "whole subject of 
sports is now receiving careful consideration" and interpreted the 
statement to mean that horseracing would be considered a sport. 24 This 
led Foster Grant to cable the White House that "this is an insult to 
baseball •••• 1125 Such confusion led Early to request that Archibald 
MacLeish, of the Office of Facts and Figures, check with the morale 
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branches of the armed services and the Office of Civilian Defense in 
order to "formulate a statement of policy." 26 John Kelly pressed for a 
strong statement for the continuance of college athletics and, although 
the original draft of the statement contained references to the value 
of competitive athletics in building up "necessary physical develop-
ment," as well as "traits of self-reliance and leadership," that text 
was deleted and the White House stuck mainly with the major entertain-
ment spectacles and the morale issue. Sports were compared with dra-
matics, concerts, vacations, and other recreation and amusements. The 
brief, released on March 10,· 1942, noted the President's beliefs that 
"within reasonable limits, ••• the war effort will not be hampered but ac-
tually improved by sensible participation in healthy recreational pur-
suits," while warning that all activities except those concerned with 
27 the war effort must "be considered secondary." 
The presidential policy hardly covered the broad spectrum of ama-
teur sport, and jurisdiction by the Amateur Athletic Union over various 
e.vents caused some irritation. The AAU led in the promotion of the 
1942 Pan-American Games planned for Buenos Aires during November and 
December as a substitute for the canceled 1940 Olympiad. Avery Brund-
age, President of the United States Sports Federation, gave hope that 
the games would continue by proposing the airlife of two-hundred 
. 28 athletes to Argent1na. However, the State Department advised against 
the move, and the chairman of the federation's finance committee, 
Jeremiah Mahoney, appealed to the President, reasoning that the 
abandonment of the games would damage American relations with Latin 
29 America which would be "playing into the hands of Nazi Germany." 
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Roosevelt responded cautically on March 28, 1942, that "organizing and 
sending to Buenos Aires even a modest team of athletes" would not con-
tribute toward that end. "In fact," the President retorted, "reports 
reaching me from other American republics indicate that there is ques-
tion in the minds of many as to the reason why this Government has not 
recalled and put into the Service the young men of draft age already 
visiting those countries on sports of cultural projects if this country 
. . . . d . . 1130 1s ser1ous 1n 1ts eterm1nat1on •••• Brundage officially announced 
31 cancellation three weeks later. 
The AAU likewise did not help itself by suspending Army athle'tes 
for playing in post pickup games against professionals. This flap be-
gan over the amateur standing of a soldier based at the Aberdeen (Mary-
land) Proving Ground who was suspended from an AAU tournament in March, 
1942. The Morale Officer for the Third Corps Area charged that the 
"suspension smacks of Axis efforts by a fifth column ••• ," but AAU Pres-
ident Lawrence DiBenditto countered that the Army was not going to "get 
away with calling us Axis agents and fifth columnists." An Army Special 
Services Officer, connnenting that "the whole thing smells," threatened 
to pull Army boxers out of the amateur tournament so the Union wouldn't 
have anyone to "help swell their receipts •••• " 32 The controversy passed 
quietly when the Third Corps Commander proposed a freeze on eligibility 
of athletes entering the Service, unless the individual participated for 
profit. Both the AAU and the Connnanding General agreed to the neces-
. f 1" b 1" . 1 d . . 33 s1ty o 1 era 1z1ng ru es ur1ng w.art1me. The AAU Board of Governors 
soon restored the athlete in question and in June, 1942, the War 
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Department announced an agreement to freeze the competitive status of 
34 Army athletes. 
Actually, the Army and Navy soon had many of the erstwhile Amateur 
athletes, and control by the athletic group was a moot point. The AAU 
was able to continue its championship events in the United States 
through the cooperation of these branches in providing athletes. The 
first wartime national track and field games were laced with military 
entries. By 1944, eighty-five percent of the entrants were members of 
35 the armed services. The AAU continued to hold its national basket-
ball tournament, and from 1943 to 1945 six to eight military teams an-
11 . . d . h 36 nua y part1c1pate 1n t. e event. The Amateur Athletic Union did re-
lieve the services of the tactical problem of maintaining a stateside 
athletic program, thereby allowing them to concentrate on physical train-
ing and the utilizing of their recreation and athletic specialists in 
developing programs for war. 
The myriad activities revolving around athletes during the spring 
and summer of 1942 were reminiscent of sports' "Golden Age" during the 
1920s. Few moves were made to limit sporting activities by the govern-
ment, and many of those participating in civilian activities were not 
sought for induction. Fathers were deferred from the draft until the 
spring of 1943, and youths under twenty years were not required for con-
scription until November, 1942. Consequently supplies of manpower did 
not diminish rapidly. College students continued their activities. 
Many enlisted in the organized reserve or belonged to the ROTC. These 
enlistments were so frequent that the Selective Service moved to cut 
them off by the end of summer of 1942. However, other deferments were 
37 allowed for specialized majors in chemistry, engineering, and medicine. 
74 
"Fitness" had become such a popular morale term that all sorts of ath-
letic activity seemed to have a patriotic aura. Famous athletes called 
to the colors quickly found their way into benefit performances promoted 
by military or relief groups. With United States offensives stymied on 
the war fronts until mobilization could be completed, relief extrava-
ganzas were spectacular ways to capture public attention. If one were 
to take 1942 as a barometer of normalcy in the face of war, little change 
had actually taken place. Arnold G~ngrich, editor of Esquire magazine 
succinctly stated on April 22, 1942: 
•• ~a heavy responsibility has been placed on sports. Sports are now asked and expected not only to help 
maintain civilian morale, but also to occupy a major 
role in actual military training. Consequently, in-stead of spqrts damping off for the duration, there 
is every reason to believe that we are on the verje of a tremendous sports boom all over the country. 8 
Events devoted to Army or Navy relief began with the All-Navy Pearl Har-
39 bar Relief boxing show held on December 16, 1941. By the summer of 
1942, most athletic and sporting organizations had their war relief plan 
in operation. The Navy Relief Society activated a $5,000,000 campaign. 
Stanton Griffs, Chairman of the Board of Madison Square Garden, directed 
a Special Events Committee which included Grantland Rice, Gene Tunney, 
and boxing promoter Mike Jacobs. Coordinators for each major profes-
1 d 11 hl 1 . d 40 siona sport an co ege at etics were a so appo1nte • Sports "car-
nivals" promoted relief. One at the Polo Grounds in New York featured 
exhibitions by Joe Louis, a service baseball game featuring Bob Feller, 
d h f . 1 41 an ot er pro ess1ona sports. The service relief funds received huge 
sums from two Joe Louis title fights in the winter of 1942 and from 
horseracing throughout the year. One of the richest and perhaps the 
biggest spectacle was promoted by the Chicago Tribune through its 
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College All-Star football game. Nearly half the college representatives 
in the game were already in uniform and were given leave to participate. 
A crowd of over 101,000 at Soldiers Field netted $160,000 to Army and 
Navy Relief in the pageant, which featured a brilliant patriotic show 
including the card trick fortl\atfon of an American flag by 2, 500 sail_. 
42 
ors. 
Baseball's money raising attempts in behalf of war relief were 
both successful and erratic. The major leagues raised $613,000 in 
seventeen games, but they did not reach their goal and actually raised 
less than the lesser known National Football League, which accumulated 
$680,000 in fewer games. 43 Some fans did not take the baseball bene-
fits seriously, and criticism was directed at club officials fer not 
having benefit games on holidays, nights, or Sundays when large crowds 
44 could come. The minor leagues were anxious to aid in the war effort 
and preserve some semblance of organization. A letter from the presi-
dent of the National Association of Professional Baseball Leagues, w. G. 
Branham, reminded Senator James Mead of New York that they too had a 
"bat and ball" fund and allowed free admission to men in uniform. 45 
However, manpower and transportation problems hit the minors' ability to 
function, and fifteen of the forty-one leagues failed to open in 1942, 
46 seventeen others suspending operation before the end of the war. 
The war-enriched racetracks carefully returned an impressive amount 
to relief agencies. John Kieran suggested that promoters of gambling 
sports would have to come up with something sound as an essential indus-
try or a contribution to government revenue or face public outrage. The 
racing community was cognizant of this and by April of 1942 had formu-
lated a war plan through the unification of breeders, track owners, and 
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jockeys into the Turf Committee of America. This was directed by Her-
bert Bayard Swope, Chairman of the New York Racing Commission. 
Swope, a wealthy newspaperman, art patron, and Democrat campaign 
contributor, consolidated a mechanism through which war relief would re-
ceive an outright gift from racing, a percentage of the take, and the 
establishment of relief days when entire gate receipts would be turned 
over to Army and Navy Relief and United Service Organizations (USO). 
Receipts from the tracks ran from $100,000 to $300,000 on relief days, 
and promoters sought to stage munificent entertainment for their guests, 
47 which included generals, admirals, and politicians. War Relief con-
tributions assuaged the otherwise abrasive appearance of race track 
betting, especially in industrial areas where absenteeism was osten-
sibly affected. Tracks raised over $2,000,000 in the first year of the 
an amount that swelled to over $4,000,000 in 1943. 48 war, 
Swope was appointed in June, 1942, to a public relations job with 
the War Department, where until the suspension of racing in January, 
1945, it was possible for him to have a moderating effect on official 
opinion. The wealthy New Yorker argued that the races were an anti-
inflationary check on "explosive purchasing, 1149 and reminded the crip-
pled Roosevelt of the tracks' care in including polio contributions 
among its endowments. In March, 1944, he penned the President's per-
sonal secretary this message: 
When I saw The Boss a few weeks ago he told me he 
wanted to see the Infantile Paralysis Fund helped whenever 
possible •••• I shall see it is included in the Victory 
check that we give at the close of the season in New 
York •••• so 
So many "sports attractions" were added to the Army-Navy Relief 
bandwagon that the War Relief Control Board prohibited any further 
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solicitation after November 15, 1942. 51 The War Bond Drive replaced 
the Relief measures and proved to be popular among sports patrons. 
Baseball raised over one billion dollars in the Fourth War Loan, and 
b ff . h h . 52 su sequent e orts were met w1t even more ent us1asm. The War and 
Navy Department promoted some of the more spectacular relief engage-
ments through sporting events, and none captured more fanfare than the 
much publicized donations by World Heavyweight Boxing Champion Joe Louis. 
The "Brown Bomber" personified the public's belief in the unity of the 
. 53 races beh1nd the War, and his contribution of two title defense purses 
to Navy and Army Relief early in 1942 was amazingly unselfish. 
Prizefighting practically disappeared after the first few months 
of war& Almost all American champions, including Lous and Billy Conn, 
the Light Heavyweight Champion, were inducted. The military, especially 
the Navy, became a vast arena for competition as well as training. A 
sensation-hungry public was fed a final diet of Louis title defenses at 
the behest of the service relief agencies. In September, 1941, as 
citizen Joe Louis Barrow, the champion had been classified 1-A, eligi-
ble for immediate induction. William Hastie, Negro civilian aide to the 
War Department, desired to protect Barrow's interest by having him as-
signed to the Morale Branch (Special Services). Barrow had contracted 
for a January 9, 1942, title defense against Buddy Baer, so the trick 
was to hold the fight and acquire the purse before the champion could 
be drafted. Mike Jacobs, head of Twentieth Century Sports, promoted a 
"deal" with the War and Navy Departments to turn over part of the fight 
proceeds in return for deferring Barrow until after the bout. General 
Marshall found neither the Selective Service nor Secretary of War Stim-
son sympathetic to such a scheme. 54 Therefore the terms of the Louis-
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Baer fight, released on November 13, 1941, provided for Navy Relief to 
55 receive the net proceeds. 
Outrage erupted in the Negro press over the arrangements, since 
Barrow had to contribute his purse to an auxiliary of a branch that did 
not accept his race in positions other than messmen and other servile 
stations. It was speculated that Barrow had been bribed with the prom~ 
ise of a connnission as a physical instruction officer in the Navy by 
Gene Tunney. Barrow supposedly had turned this down because of the sea-
going branch's history of racial discrimination. The Pittsburgh Courier, 
which circulated this rumor, proposed that the champion had decided to 
56 use the bout as a means of "exposing the prejudice in the Navy." The 
Bureau of Navigation was compelled to deny the allegation and dis-
claimed motives of taking advantage of Barrow's draft status and abus-
ing his raceo Tunney ridiculed the mention of a connnission as "pre-
posterous." (Barrow, a draft-age young man, with no prior service, was 
. . 57 supposedly offered a L1eutenant Connnander's str1pes.) An official of 
the National Committee of the Patrons of the Negro offered to soothe 
ruffled feelings on the matter by offering guidelines to BuNav, whereby 
Tunney could praise Barrow's motives without referring to the young 
black's relations with the Navy. This steered attention clear of the 
connnandant of the Third Naval District, Adolpheus Andrews, who offered 
"controversial" explanations to the patrons regarding the fighter's re-
58 lations with the Navy. Pearl Harbor occurred in the meantime, and the 
Bureau of Navigation's draft for Tunney's signature was an appeal for 
solidarity. Joe Louis Barrow was praised in making the "greater sacri-
fice" in financial renumeration, through which he had "proven himself, 
first an American" and an "example ••• of his race." 59 
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Barrow's induction was staved off long enough for him to knock out 
Baer in the first round of their star-spangled engagement in New York 
City. He reported to the Army the next day after contributing $89,000 
toward Navy Relief. 60 This earned the champion the plaudits of an ad-
miring white public, Kieran noting Joe Louis 1 s "complete obedience" and 
"complete humility," the "supreme virtue of the warrior called to 
61 
duty." Barrow's first five months in the Army found him virtually at 
the disposal of the War Department. Public relations appearances, ex-
hibition boxing matches, and another title defense were included before 
the new draftee could even finish basic training. Hastie expressed 
concern in the handling of the Joe Louis matter. The War Department 
aide urged the Second Corps Commander to transfer Barrow to a Special 
Services detail rather than divert his recruit training to publicity 
ventures that could be damaging in the eyes of the public. Learning of 
Army Relief plans to set up a title match with Abe Simon, Hastie, while 
agreeing with the benefits, cautioned Second Corps Area Commander Irving 
J. Phillipson: "Much concern has been e·xpressed, lest private interests 
exploit this soldier. I have explained that you have assumed personal 
responsibility for avoiding any such consequences.rr 62 
Terms of the bout were announced on February 25, 1942. Private Joe 
Louis Barrow was detached for four weeks of intensive training at Fort 
Dix, New Jersey, for the fight which took place on March 27. Joe's 
sixth round knockout earned for Army Relief 100 percent of the cham-
pion's prize mone y and 87~ percent of Simon's, a total of nearly 
$65,000. The boxers' "contribution" amounted to less than fifty per-
cent of the total gate receipts, the rest of which went to promoters 
63 for expenses. 
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Billy Conn enlisted in the Army on March 7, and Barrow's money 
making activities in behalf of the government led to suggestions that 
he be allowed to contract another title fight to pay off his personal 
creditors, including the Department of Internal Revenue. Secretary of 
War Stimson temporarily altered these plans on June 18 by ordering the 
heavyweight champion to complete his basic training after a final money 
raising exhibition at Fort Upton, New York. War Department Civilian As-
sistant Truman Gibson arranged plans for the later Louis fight, which 
64 was set for October 12, 1942. 
The War Department had not discovered the wisdom of demanding the 
total receipts of any relief type engagement by men under its jurisdic-
tion. Consequently the proposed Louis-Conn bout turned into a fiasco 
of the first order. Misunderstandings occurred when the War Department 
agreed through its Welfare and Recreation advisor to allow the two 
fighters to have a moderate amount of their prize money for the October 
12 bout applied to debts. AER was to receive the rest. Apparently War 
Department liaison Alexander Surles thought this amounted to but 
$34,000. Contracting of the fight, however, was turned over to a group 
of New York sportswriters, chaired by Grantland Rice, known as War Box-
ing, Incorporated. This group agreed to provide a total of $135,451 to 
the creditors, three-fourths of which was to go to Jacob's Twentieth 
Century Sports and the rest to Joe Louis's handler John Roxborough. The 
Bureau of Internal Revenue was not included. Rice resigned from the 
group rather than be a party to the agreement wherein the committee, 
with John Kieran as chairman, unwisely went ahead with the promotion. 65 
Barrow and Conn were furloughed for training on September 9, 1942. On 
September 18, newspaper publicity noted that net proceeds would not go 
81 
1 . f 66 to re 1.e • By September 23, General Marshall had been aroused, and 
he advised both Surles and the director of AER of his opinion that ar-
rangements be called off, a procedure which was accomplished on Septem-
67 her 26. Leaves of both boxers were canceled, and Barrow dejectedly 
went back to the old cavalry remount station at Fort Riley, Kansas, 
68 where he lamented that his "fightin' days" were over. 
It was to be nearly a year before his unique talents were to be 
used for his country in any form of fighting. Jacobs' promotional 
schemes were not quelled. The fight promoter assured the chairman of 
the War Relief Control Board in February, 1943, of the Army's desire 
that he furnish ring equipment for the Service through the promotion of 
a series of boxing matches. This proved to be news to the War Depart-
ment and the offer was declined. 69 
The brouhaha created over the Louis-Conn fight was mild compared 
to another sad War Department error, War Football, Incorporated. 
Euphoric over the seeming success of the two Joe Louis bouts in January 
and March, 1942, General Surles embarked the Army on an ill-conceived 
professional football venture which diverted nearly two-hundred men 
from training duties for up to seven weeks for a net profit to Army Re-
lief of $241,000. Originated as a means of "glamorizing" the American 
soldier, War Football, Incorporated, in conjunction with relief of-
ficials, informed professional football club owners on March 28, 1942, 
of their intentions to promote an All-America team of Army talent to 
play a full schedule against National Football League teams the follow-
70 
ing fall. The scope of the plans then were reduced, and on June 15 
the War Department directed the assembling of two All-Star teams to 
71 play a series of games between August 28 and September 20. Details 
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of the Army maneuver were released on July 15 at a meeting of the Foot-
ball Writers Association, which was meeting with coaches and military 
officials in New York. Plans were announced for the formation of a 
western Army team, coached by Major Wallace Wade, formerly the coach of 
Duke University's Rose Bowl team, and an eastern squad, headed by 
Colonel Robert (Bob) Neyland, celebrated coach at the University of 
Tennessee. The War Department entrusted promotion to Grandland Rice 
and his sportswriters, the same group which had arranged the Joe Louis 
episode, and known as War Football, Incorporated. Rice announced an 
Army Emergency Relief goal of from $500,000 to $1,000,000 in a series 
72 of four games by each team. 
The two squads assembled early in August at Yale University in New 
Haven and at Camp Cooke, California. 73 As the coaches assembled their 
squads, training commands all over the country resisted tampering with 
their men. The Personnel Division in Services of Supply, out of de-
ference to the War emergency, requested permission of each commanding 
officer for the detachment of football players, rather than issue orders 
directly. Since commanders were reluctant to release men from training, 
the Chief of Staff was asked, with the exception of officers, to direct 
the assignment of personnel to the football project. 74 This created a 
bottleneck which threatened the cancellation of the entire operation. 
The Chief of Staff was flooded by protests from training commands on 
the assignment of essential men, particularly those involved in techni-
cal training. This problem and the insistence of a task-master such as 
Neyland that the Army team have the best material available, led to a 
constant turnover of men in the football camps. Henry H. Arnold, Com-
manding General of the Air Corps, recommended that the project be 
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dropped. Arnold's argument was based on the shortage of officers in 
all branches, the interruption of training continuity, endangering of 
men to injury, particularly student pilots, and the fact that the War 
Department operation was initiated "by the direct action of the War De-
partment Bureau of Public Relations without the knowledge or concurrence 
of the commanders concerned." Such junkets could not be fitted into the 
war picture. The General warned: 
This activity ••• if used by individuals hostile to, or 
dissatisfied with the progress of the War Department 
in the war effort, will place the War Department in 
an indefensible position. No military necessity can 
justify the employment of military personnel to play 
professional football while other members of the Army 
are fighting abroad.75 
As squad members had already been assembled at New Haven, the decision 
was reached on August 12 to continue the operation. Recognizing that 
"hasty action on the part of certain officers forced the War Department 
to go along with the project," a study recommended "a football team that 
"11 f . f "1 r 76 w1 per orm sat1s actor1 y.' 
Neyland had assembled a unit which could perform more than satis-
factorily. The Colonel shuttled nearly one-hundred players into his 
training camp before settling on a squad of fifty-three. The group 
was laden with talent. Twenty-three former professional football players 
were on the roster, which was eight more veterans than the New York 
Giants had in the Stars' second game. Wade had Chicago Bears Quarter-
back Norm Standlee and the entire "T" backfield from Texas A & M' s great 
1940 squad in the camp. The Army had been scoured for prospects. 
Representatives from forty-five camps were on the Eastern roster, in-
eluding seventeen privates, eleven corporals, two sergeants, twenty-
1 . d . 77 two 1eutenants, an a capta1n. Kieran, tongue in check, commented: 
This double barrelled All-Army football team is starting 
with good men who have been over the terrain •••• It wi 11 
not be surprising if more men of similar exp-erience are 
brought up for this military mission.78 
S 1 b d "Th w Sh . . h . 1 1" II 79 ur es ragge , e ar ow 1s tops 1n t e carn1va 1ne •••• 
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Results of the "Show," although good, were somewhat less than ex-
pected. The squads had to travel to four cities in two weeks to play 
with three weeks practice. Crowds were not great; the West team 
averaged only 24,000 per game, and the accelerated schedule took its 
80 toll, the Army boys losing three of their last four contests. Profits 
were discouraging. All receipts amounted to over $317,000 but team ex-
penses ran to more than $76,000. 81 The College All-Star game alone 
netted two-thirds of the amount raised by the eight Army contests. The 
War Department was disenchanted, and a warning was issued not to make 
82 the effort a precedent. The wartime Army off-duty athletic program 
was endangered by high level reactions to the mismanagement, and the Air 
Corps summarily canceled the 1942 football schedule at the Technical 
83 Training Schools. 
The Navy's emphasis on recruiting physical instructors and ath-
letically trained pilots led to a heavy concentration of college trained 
athletes in that branch. By December of 1942, when the Navy was or-
84 dered to procure enlistments through draft volunteers, the short sta-
tions had already been deluged with enough talent to have a formidable 
athletic program. Some NCAA districts had as many as two-thirds of their 
85 coaches go into Navy programs. This trend was further encouraged by 
the Bureau of Aeronautics athletic training and later by the V-12 col-
lege program. The Navy appealed to many professional athletes as well. 
In the spring of 1942 the Norfolk Physical Instructors School had a 
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baseball team equal to many major league teams. Professional football 
players tended to enlist in that service as well. Out of 511 players 
and officials from the National Football League who served the country, 
259 saw duty in the Navy or Marine Corps, 178 in the Army, and 56 in 
the Air Corps, despite the fact that the naval branches were much 
86 smaller. 
Gene Tunney was a persuasive recruiter and frequently was pic-
tured in the press surrounded by athletes who were products of his 
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searches. Since these efforts were not subtle, great leeway was 
opened to interpretations of the motives of these enlistments. Some in-
dividuals, disgruntled that they were not accepted into the Tunney pro-
gram, accused the Navy of recruiting "muscle bound" and "muscle brained" 
athletes while bypassing other men with advanced degrees in physical 
d . 88 e ucat1.on. One gentleman protested, "These young huskies ••• can do 
more for their country in the front line with other men •••• It's a dis-
grace, a farce, that most of the young athletes ••• are being taken in 
the Physical Fitness Department." John Kieran, a frequent booster of 
the contribution of athletes in service, shrugged that perhaps Commander 
Tunney could "come forward with a report to prove that the scheme is 
k . 1189 wor 1.ng •••• 
Actually the Navy program attracted extremely competent people, al-
though non-college-trained men with prominent reputations and character 
were frequently recruited for the morale and publicity value that ac-
crued. After basic training and physical instructor's school, these men 
often were set to work performing on base athletic squads before being 
shipped to combat zones. With the demand for instructors outstripping 
the supply, others remained to instruct new recruits. The requirement 
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that these teachers be college graduates majoring in physical education 
was changed in February, 1943, to the trainee's having had a minimum of 
two years and experience as a teacher in physical education or as a 
college varsity team member in at least one "highly competitive" sport. 
These requirements were waived in May of 1943, and potential leaders 
were selected on the basis of physical characteristics and graduation 
from high schoo1. 90 Thousands of these men were vocationally trained 
in athletics and physical training. 
Norfolk was loaded with good athletic teams despite attempts by the 
Bureau of Navigation to rotate prominent athletes to different sta-
tions.91 One recruiting product, who epitomized the recruiting bonanza 
for the Navy, was Bob Feller. The young Iowa "fireballer" was the sen-
sation of the American League and, being prime draft material, was 
wooed by all branches of the armed services. Feller's boss, Alva Brad-
ley, owner of the Cleveland Indians, was interested in seeing his prop-
erty in a Navy uniform and contacted Tunney about the twenty-two-year-
ld . h h d I • N h . 1 . . 92 F 11 o r~g t- an er s prospects ~n avy p ys~ca tra~n~ng. e er was 
sworn in by Tunney on December 10, 1941, 93 and his utilization became 
the source of much pride and confusion. Playing in his first game for 
Norfolk on April 3, Feller drew a crowd of nine-thousand fans to see 
94 him pitch three innings against the University of Richmond. After he 
broke his own strike-out record by "fanning" twenty-one batters from a 
minor 95 league team, he was requested for transfer to the sprawling 
training base at Great Lakes where former Connecticut Reds manager Gor-
don S. (Mickey) Cochrane had been commissioned to build a powerhouse 
baseball team. A struggle developed between the commandants of the two 
bases to keep the strikeout "ace." Assistant BuN av Chief L. E. Denfield 
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suggested that Feller had been "boasting" of his imminent transfer to 
96 
play ball. Great Lakes Commandant John Downes was insistent that he 
have Feller and the Director of Training justify the move in order to 
"give all stations the advantage of having stars of his type •••• 1197 
Denfield held firm, and Feller was transferred instead to Newport, 
Rhode Island. 
The Great Lakes program was lavishly promoted under Downes. The 
1941-42 basketball team won thirty-one and lost five against the best 
collegiate competition in the United States. The games, ostensibly 
played as Navy Relief charity, raised tittle for that fund and were ac-
tually used by Downes to boost recruiting in the Ninth Naval District 
and to re-establish a reputation in athletics at the giant base. The 
commandant claimed that such sports appearances "spurred" Navy enlist-
b h f . 98 b h" . d b ments y as muc as twenty ·to orty percent, ut t 1s was reJecte y 
the Chief of Naval Personnel who cynically noted that public interest 
in the war effort was more than likely the cause. Secretary Knox re-
ceived 11flak" from a member of Congress, and BuPers was getting in-
creasingly uneasy about the "practice of assigning athletes to permanent 
duties at a station for the purpose of strengthening the team on which 
they play •••• " Noting that the "primary responsibilities of all of-
ficers and personnel of the United States Navy is toward the successful 
prosecution of the war," the bureau insisted that "professional ath-
leticism in whatever cloak it adopts is never in the best interest of 
99 the Navy." 
Despite objection to such "barnstorming," Great Lakes continued to 
push its varsity program. The baseball team played a seventy-seven game 
schedule during the summer of 1942, posting sixty-three wins. Only 
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professional clubs could compete on equal terms against Cochrane's 
team. All service opposition was defeated. As late as June 16; base 
publicists were still claiming ten to thirty percent boosts in recruit-
ing everywhere the team appeared. On September 1, 1942, the Blue-
jackets announced a twelve-game football schedule which included eleven 
college teams, seven from the Big 10 plus Notre Dame, Missouri, and 
P . b h . . . 100 1tts urg un1vers1t1es. 
Remembering how the Army was to run into difficulty because of War 
Football and War Boxing, Inc., the Navy was determined to avoid such 
embarrassment. The Secretary of the Navy on May 30, 1942, requested 
wide leeway for the use of the service's extraordinary athletes for 
war relief functions. 101 However, pressure was building within BuPers 
Division of Training to put a cap on such activities. In early June the 
highly combative and virtually untouchable preflight program had thir-
f b 11 h d 1 d f the fall. l02 c ... teen-game oot a sc e u es announce or r1t1c1sm over 
this was matched by objection to the numerous promotion of athletes as 
non-commissioned physical training officers. Officials in BuPers re-
ceived "numerous letters from wives of regular enlisted men, making 
strenuous objections to the rating of these Specialists as Chiefs ••• •" 
Other commanding officers objeyted to Bob Feller and other athletes, 
protesting "that they are not in the Navy to do a job of work in the 
rating assigned, but to swell the coffers of Navy Relief •••• 11103 
Due to the hardships of the United States forces in the Pacific, 
strict clamps were placed on the transfer of men from training to 
special projects. On June 11, 1942, BuPers toughened its earlier stand 
on assignment of athletes to duty stations. It considered "extremely 
undesirable" commitments of individuals and teams "especially qualified 
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in a particular sport beyond their normal period of training or as-
signment.11104 The order served to threaten the Major League-Military 
All-Star game scheduled for July 7, 1942, at Cleveland, a public re-
lations attraction for War Relief promoted by professional baseball. 
The Navy's attitude wavered to the degree that Commissioner Landis in-
tervened by calling the Secretary of the Navy Knox "without letting 
Tunney know" to make "damn sure these fellows get to this place ••• ten 
d b f h d "105 ays e ore an •••• The game was publicized as a stellar attrac-
tion but was met with suspicion by the Navy. The Bureau of Personnel 
was chaffed that several players were solicited through the Navy Secre-
tary's office rather than through the Bureau of Personnel, which was 
contrary to the BuPers circular of May 30, 1942. The Bureau called 
participation in the game " ••• a comedy of errors from the beginning •••• 
The Bureau of Naval Personnel gave no such authorization to any officer 
h h b b 11 1 7 h "106 in connection wit t e ase a game on Ju y t •••• To make mat-
ters worse, the major league stars easily won, blasting Feller off the 
mound early in the game. 
Quickened by this insensitivity to authority, Bureau Chief Randall 
Jacobs moved to impose a forty-eight-hour limitation for absences as a 
guideline for any other athletic activity that removed men from train-
ing. This action threatened the cancellation of the highly successful 
College All-Star game of August 28, 1942. Jacobs refused to allow the 
assignment of men on duty to the required three weeks of drill needed 
to prepare for the game. Twenty Navy men, standouts of the 1941 college 
football season, were required to be diverted from various phases of 
training for the event. The matter was particularly sensitive because 
the civilian chairman of the Illinois Navy Relief Society had promised 
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as early as May 15 that Navy men could be used. Promoters of the event 
had gone so far as to sell 1,000 seats for $100 each in a grand display 
f . . 107 o patr1ot1sm. The Director of Training appealed to the BuPers 
Chief to allow men to arrive in time to prepare for the game. On 
August 7, the Bureau of Personnel invoked its forty-eight hour rule to 
"avoid any unnecessary delay in getting trained fighting men to the 
front 11'nes. 11108 Th' f 11 db t · B P d' t' 1s was o owe y an ex ens1ve u ers 1rec 1ve 
h . h 1 d 11 hl . d . d . . 109 w 1c p ace a at et1c an recreat1on programs un er tra1n1ng. 
Although the All-Star game compromised its requirements enough so 
that enough men were on hand to make the game a resounding success, it 
and other circumstances fairly unnerved Tunney, who was constantly prod-
ding BuPers to back away from such fanfare and get serious about train-
ing men for combat. The source of much of Tunney's antagonism lay in 
his pique toward preflight training, which had escaped his direction, 
but the former pugilist was genuinely concerned about the mood the pub-
lie attitude toward the war was taking. With Marines grimly holding on-
to a jungle airfield on Guadalcanal after eight months of almost un-
checked Japanese expansion and Nazi troops rolling up the Caucuses to-
ward Stalingrad, the American people were having their Armed Forces 
play games. On August 19, 1942, Tunney exploded: "You cannot win a 
war ••• by reviving the recreational sports of the 'era of wonderful non-
sense'." Requesting that the "sports world" refrain from its incessant 
demands on athletes in service, Tunney accused promoters and newspaper 
media of "athletic boondoggling," which he claimed not only diverted men 
from valuable training time but also did not correlate with the type of 
individual discipline for which sport was considered useful. He stormed, 
"If professional athleticism could win a war, we would have won this one 
by "110 now. 
Such an attack inflicted wounds in many directions, and sports-
91 
writers interpreted Tunney's offensive obliquely. Rice was astounded 
and infuriated that a sportsm?n would slash away at relief projects and 
accused Tunney of lack of "team play" in what Rice felt was an attack 
111 on War Football, Incorporated. Perhaps ignorant at that point of 
the terms in the Louis-Conn contract, Kieran suggested that Tunney was 
guilty of an unfair attempt to deprive Joe Louis Barrow a chance to pay 
h . . 112 1s 1ncome tax. In September, 1942, the Physical Training Director 
presented a position paper to the Bureau of Personnel, arguing that 
athletes involved in any phase of training not be permitted to partici-
pate in "public sports events." The physical training chief was pri-
marily concerned with the expeditious preparation for war. Alluding to 
the mounting allied war setbacks, Tunney insisted that Americans should 
make no less a commitment than the Germans and Japanese, who were send-
ing their famous athletes to the front. Tunney was fearful that allow-
ing "several thousand young officers and men, most of them the cream of 
our physical crop," to play games, would indicate that "we are not too 
deadly serious about this war." He also painted a spector of the break-
down of morale in military ranks because of the coddling of a "pet 
class," and in labor, which would not meet production schedules in the 
face of government lassitude. He concluded, "In an era of wonderful 
nonsense we were a happy, luxurious, time-consuming, sports minded na-
tion. 113 Now we must harden ourselves quickly." 
Tunney had mainly the preflight program in mind. Navy Relief had 
already met its quota for the year, and BuPers had already stifled the 
reassignment of personnel for sports contests. Tunney himself was in 
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direct control of the physical training curriculum, while welfare and 
recreation programs had been steadily drawn into unified physical train-
ing since January of 1942. Only one division had the "cream" of "sever-
al thousand young officers and men" engaged in spectator sport while in 
training, the Divisi.on of Aviation Training and its V-5 schools. Tunney 
had tried to get the preflight football schedules canceled since the 
previous year. Therefore with uproar of "boondoggling," he felt the 
time was ripe for another try. 
The struggle for control of aviation training between the Bureau 
of Aeronautics and the Bureau of Personnel caused the physical training 
programs of the two naval divisions to become the arena of contention. 
The functions of both bureaus had rapidly expanded after Pearl Harbor. 
The training problems of BuAero were infinitely more complex than Bu-
Pers, as were many other planning and operational procedures. The Navy 
Department's restructuring of the Bureaus' relations in October, 1941, 
in which Aviation Training operated independently of BuPers with only 
liaison responsibilities, had grown unwieldly. Aviation training had 
necessarily taken the initiative to become independent of the BuPers 
training function. Yet the Bureau of Personnel still maintained the re-
sponsibility for assigning billets to men already trained. Since Bu-
Aero was commissioning its own physical training cadre, BuPers insisted 
on having a voice in their assignment, as well as placing its own phys-
ical training specialists within the preflight schools. Both bureaus 
operated independently in respect to training, with aeronautics becom-
ing steadily more self-contained until October 15, 1943, when aviation 
training was placed under the command of the Deputy Chief of Naval Oper-
. (A' ) 114 at1.ons 1.r • The Bureau of Personnel was reduced to rendering 
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logistical support only. Through this time, Tunney's authority techni-
cally overlapped that of Tom Hamilton and his successors in the Bureau 
of Aeronautics' athletic training program. Much to Tunney's exaspera-
tion, the V-5 schools were beyond his reach. 
Actually, Commander Tunney's differences with the preflight train-
ing ran much deeper than questions of authority. The former AEF Marine 
had a different conception of the purpose of athletics in training than 
Hamilton had in aviation. Hamilton firmly believed that mental "tough-
ening" was achieved by participation in hard-hitting contact games. 
Students were urged to rid themselves of selfish inhibitions and so-
cially developed sanctions against aggression. The physical exercises 
concurrent with the mental conditioning involved in sport, especially 
team games, were a valuable incidental product leading to complete "fly-
ing fitness." Great emphasis was placed on the role of the team and the 
group reenforcement of roles, tasks, and outstanding performance. Al-
though great physical demands were placed on prospective pilots, will-
ingness to endure physiological stress proved to be a means of gaining 
status within the group. Hamilton's program was motivational training 
at its zenith, and external direction had to play a key part. More-
over, a fully trained combat pilot was equipped to spread destruction 
far greater than an ordinary seaman. His training and equipment were 
expensive, yet he had the latitude to interpret orders through a wide 
range of options. Since he had the opportunity to view a "bigger pic-
ture" of the effort of his efforts, the pilot had to be well indoctri-
nated on the necessity of his mission. Commander Hamilton held that 
placing an athlete on the field of varsity participation, with the pres-
sure of large crowds, was a crucible through which a man might sift out 
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the primary reasons for his effort. This, in turn, had carryover value 
in perceiving a mission. 
Although Tunney's physical training program was sports oriented, 
the athletics involved were emphasized more for the popular participa-
tion rather than the achievement of varsity teams. Although this was 
largely true in the preflight situation also, Hamilton was suspicious 
of the intramural concept as dangerously leveling, encouraging achieve-
ment without sacrifice, similar to socialism. Hamilton used the intra-
mural program of the V-5 schools as a means through which a cadet sought 
to attain higher levels of participation. In defense of the varsity 
concept, Hamilton wrote the Director of Aviation Training: 
••• a straight intra-mural program (while being excellent 
in theory) has never worked out satisfactorily in prac-
tice. Every college, which has eliminated outside com-
petition for intra-murals alone, has become a complete 
flop as far as athletic interest •••• The mental attitude 
of students at such schools has also followed a trend 
toward 'parlor pink' thought.ll5 
Tunney, on the other hand, was interested in getting men trained 
quickly. His philosophy of physical training was directed toward self-
discipline. He called this approach of internal motivation the "warrior 
psychology." His allusion to this attitude in an August 19, 1942, press 
interview was widely misinterpreted to mean that Tunney was against or-
ganized sport in wartime. Tunney actually supported a wide realm of 
such activity in training camps but did not feel that emphasis on these 
was necessary to build the psychology of the fighting man. Rather his 
leadership in the physical training section was directed toward institu-
ting a regime of activity toward which, if a man followed with complete 
obedience, a level of strength and self-confidence would be reached 
which could not be shaken. 
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No matter how important the group was in determining a man's ac-
tions, the former boxer felt that the key to a man's success in combat 
would be his ability to preserve himself. A man had to see himself 
within the mass, accept his role within it, then occupy himself with 
his own sense of duty. In 1941, Tunney wrote in ~ for Living: "Ad-
justment is a condition favorable to the development of self. Out of 
mass discipline, self-discipline. Out of mass action, individual ac-
tion.11116 The perfect statement for this self-denial was found in the 
writing of French Field Marshall Ferdinand Foch, which the commander of-
ten quoted and also attached to orders relating to physical fitness: 
"The first condition to obeying is ••• to visualize all the order re-
ceived and nothing else, then to find the means of complying with it, 
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irrespective of personal opinions, difficulties or obstacles." It 
was around this type of single direction that Tunney perceived his "war-
rior psychology." In a speech on February 17, 1942, he noted, " ••• I 
think that maybe we should now divert--or confine--our efforts to de-
veloping war psycho logy--the warrior psycho logy." He went on to say: 
••• physical fitness does not mean expertness on the base-
ball diamond nor unfailing skill and great courage on the 
gridiron. Nor does it mean outstanding qualities in any 
particular branch of athletics--including boxing. I think 
when we get men physically fit, it has to be done the hard 
way. There is no substitute for going through the daily 
grind ••• ~ When you are in a conflict where the stakes are 
mortal, there is the fundamental urge of self-preservation 
which guides your every act.llS 
Commander Tunney's views on physical development were reinforced 
by Dr. George Stienhaus, a critic of the athletics in training principle 
and a devotee of the "overload principle," which was the physiological 
cousin to Tunney's "warrior psychology." Stienhaus, with whom Tunney 
met after the Commander's early January joust with Hamilton, expounded 
96 
his theory of physical development as "the exercise of psychological 
sensibilities." Stienhaus taught that this conditioning could be 
achieved through bringing about a physiological overload in a short 
period of time, "providing the trainee was provided proper motivation 
119 through the encouragement of his group." 
Tunney and Hamilton ran head-on in this conflict of theory shortly 
after the New Year began in 1942. Following Hamilton's appeal for en-
listment of physical training instructors and administrators for the 
NCAA and American Football Coaches meeting in Detroit on December 29-30, 
1941, Admiral Radford was "swamped with applications."· Because no one 
had been assigned to handle that phase of training, Hamilton was trans-
ferred from his job as Operations Officer at the Anacostia Naval Air 
Station to BuAero headquarters to direct the program. Writing in 1974, 
he attenuated the circumstances of his meeting with the Navy Physical 
Director: 
I went over to meet Tunney, but discovered that he had greatly different ideas about running a physical train-program. This was unfortunate that the Navy had two programs but the aims of Admiral Radford could not be accomplished under Tunney's philosophy •••• Tunney wanted only mass exercise and recreational activities, and wanted to execute and man his activities mostly with enlisted specialists •••• We believed competitive sports could supply the qualities in the fighting men we were training, and we recruited the best coaches and physical educators available who were going to be teaching of-ficer candidates and they were well qualified in every respect for officer rank.120 
Radford made the decision to procure officers for the program 
through the Bureau of Aeronautics rather than through Tunney's Norfolk 
school despite the fact that on January 6, 1942, BuPers (then BuNav) 
had claimed "primary responsibility of administering and directing such 
1. . . . h . 1 f' 11121 po 1c1es perta1n1ng to ••• p ys1ca 1tness •••• · Meanwhile, Tunney 
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procured the record jackets of men whom the Physical Training Section 
found satisfactory for commissioning in the preflight program. However, 
on January 30, without BuNav's knowledge, representatives of Aviation 
Training proceeded to Norfolk to interview candidates independently, ap-
parently before requesting jackets from BuNav. Hamilton's plans for 
preflight had included the assignment of enlisted specialists from the 
Norfolk school as instructors in physical drill and other duties, and 
he interviewed a limited number of graduates for prospective commission 
11 122 as we • BuAero requested only two hundred physical instructors from 
BuNav. The Director of Training in BuNav, aware that people in Aviation 
Training were talking in terms of 1,200 instructors, was alarmed that 
BuAero intended to procure that number of officers' billets in physical 
training through its own initiative. The Director of Training insisted 
that only fifty chief specialists per school were necessary for the type 
of physical drill recommended by the Physical Training Section and prob-
123 ably was not aware of the scope of the preflight sports program. The 
matter reached the "boiling point" when on February 26, 1942, the Train-
ing Division directed a memorandum to the Chief of BuNav outlining its 
difficulties with the Bureau of Aeronautics in the matter of commission-
ing officers for V-5 instruction. The memo accused BuAero of bad faith 
in interviewing enlisted specialists without the knowledge of the Physi-
cal Training Section, of assigning men not properly trained for the job 
that was required, and for not giving Athletic Specialists a chance to 
be interviewed for commissioning on an equitable basis. The Director of 
Training demanded that BuAero communicate definite requirements for re-
. . 124 cruiting so that the former could ass~st ~n procurement. 
As BuAero went about the job of recruiting its own athletic 
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officers, Commander Tunney gradually became aware of the substance of 
the aviation physical conditioning program. His initial reaction was 
arbitrary. On February 3, 1942, he wrote Radford that "the qualities 
that you have outlined for development in the early training makes ex-
cellent reading." Tunney raised the issue of "flying fitness" by warn-
ing Radford against letting prospective pilots engage in hard contact 
sports, including football and boxing. The Director of Physical Train-
ing specifically referred to research advanced by the German physiolo-
gist, Ernst Jokl, which promoted the thesis that boxing could cause 
"pin-point hemorrhages" related to the condition of being "punch drunk." 
Tunney had reviewed Jokl's findings with Stienhaus in mid-January and 
concluded that the research was valid as an argument against football 
in training. Tunney insisted: 
••• it is the responsibility of those in charge of the 
training of those pilots to pause before giving the 
command to continue that sport •••• They cause pin-point 
hemorrhages which leave scar tissue on the brain. It 
is my honest belief that a warrior fl5er must not have 
had too many pin-point hemorrhages. 12 
Actually, no one exactly knew what "flying fitness" was. The con-
flict over physical training methods would have been fought out no mat-
ter what forum was used, for unknowingly, the correspondents in the im-
broglio had raised the old question of sports versus apparatus methods 
of training. On the one hand, the feeling that a man had to be moti-
vated to be trained and, on the other, that a man had to be trained, 
then motivated. Actually, both men believed in both methods but on a 
different scale of application. If Tunney felt that emphasis on sports 
during war was foolish, play advocates thought his methods archaic, 
smacking of totalitarian regimentation. Hamilton said of his own pro-
gram, "••eOur enemies have raised boys by regimentation and made them 
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126 tough~ ••• We hope to make our boys tough through sport." However, 
the issue of flying fitness was not so simply answered. 
On March 24, 1942, Dean John W. Bunn of Stanford University ques-
tioned the aviation training program in a letter to the Secretary of 
the Navy "because it has been considered essential in the development 
of superior flyers." Bunn challenged the use of "football fitness or 
basketball fitness" and the other demands that were to be made of V-5 
cadets because no one yet knew what "flying fitness" was. He argued for 
a scientific testing procedure at the preflight schools in which fit-
ness could be discovered in terms of "strength, endurance, agility, 
balance, bodily coordination and motor skills ••• •" Referring to Jokl 1 s 
studies for the South African Air Force, Bunn criticized football in 
training "because of the punishment about the head which some football 
1. . . "127 1nemen 1ncur. This latter theme was also expressed by the Chief 
of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery a few days earlier. The medical 
chief compounded the criticism through his understanding of preflight's 
motivational approach, which he understood was a "teaching of hate" 
128 comparable to "German methods." 
This medium of debate was also perplexing Air Corps training, 
though not on the adversary level. General Henry H. Arnold and General 
Ira C. Eaker had noted to prospective air cadets in 1936 that "no 
definite set of physical characteristics can be tabbed as truly charac-
teristic" of pilots. According to Arnold, the football player was not 
more likely "to possess the flying requisites than the tennis player 
or the track man •• &." No single body type fitted flying requirements 
"since the flying type is possessed of a particularly fine coordination 
of mind and muscle." Although both Hamilton and Tunney dwelled at 
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length on social and psychological qualities of the fighting man, the 
Air Corps generals gave no hint as to how these qualities might be at-
tained, although they did object to the "effeminate or unmanly" or those 
h II 11 • • • 1' 11129 w o were su en, morose, or antaton1st1c 1n persona 1ty •••• 
It was precisely those concerns of the "coordination of mind and 
muscle" that became the physiological rationale for the naval air ath-
letic program. As in the regular Navy physical discipline, Hamilton 
was interested in strength. Superficially the sport training method ap-
peared to be mostly motivation in nature, with strength accruing through 
the regimen of preparation. Like many coaches the commander believed 
that repetition of neuro-motor tasks under stress would lead to a re-
flexive conditioning of performance. He wrote to the Director of Avia-
tion Training that catching a punt in front of a crowd of 50,000 people 
was one type of training which would teach the aviation cadet to "de-
liver in the 'clutches'." To test this thesis the schools later set up 
tests of stimulus related to time of reaction down to hundreths of a 
second. To bridge the gap between motivation and activity, experimental 
130 courses in relaxation were also used. These latter concepts were of 
particular value to pilots in training and were a significant difference 
in the need of aviation for different approaches to combat preparation. 
On February 17, 1942, Tunney made his "war psycho logy speech" in 
Birmingham. His rhetoric was more antagonistic against varsity sports 
in training than his earlier letter to Radford. In it he ridiculed the 
idea that there was any psychological carry-over value in combat from 
playing team games. He proclaimed: 
You cannot transfer the courage and skill of the gridiron 
or the prize ring or the baseball diamond to the battle 
field.o •• In one place you are playing with the honor of 
the alma mater or playing for the highest title, •• but 
in the other place you are playing with mortal stakes. 
Therefore, all the training that 3ou get in competitive 
sports is absolutely of no help. 1 1 
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If anything, as far as student pilots were concerned, Tunney held that 
they did not need any more recklessness and courage than they already 
had. In his experience in physical training in his pre-war days at 
naval air stations, he had perceived an abundance of spirit and confi-
dence that detracted from the discipline that pilots needed to obtain 
f 1 . f. 132 y1ng 1tness. 
Because preflight schools had not yet opened, Hamilton could not 
defend his syllabus from an operational standpoint. The commander in-
stead suggested that journalistic reporting of his program had been mis-
leading, causing "some doubts as to the wise administration of all the 
problems involved in training pilots physically. 11133 The Navy carrier 
pilot continued to support the advisors in his program, and it was ap-
parent to some that a full blown struggle was abroad between the two 
systems of training. On April 3, 1942, Jesse Feiring Williams began a 
telegram and letter writing campaign to rally support for Hamilton's 
methods among physical educators. Marking the necessity of his desire 
to the "effort by Tunney to take over the Hamilton program," Williams 
sparked a series of laudatory messages regarding the sports training re-
gime to Secretary Knox and the Directors of Training in BuAero and Bu-
134 
Pers. Soon afterward, Williams was able to acquire unanimous passage 
of a supportive declaration in the American Association Health Physical 
Education and Recreation convention meeting in New Orleans. 
By late April, 1942, the first BuAero instructors had been schooled 
and assigned to preflight centers; yet the hiatus had widened between 
the two physical training sections. Williams had injected a derogation 
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of Tunney's ideas on posture training135 to which he had alluded in an 
earlier attack on the ex-champion. This focused attention on the person-
ality of Tunney rather than the strengths or weaknesses of the regular 
Navy physical training concept. 
The basic tenets of Tunney's promotion were basically sound, and 
the commander found one of his biggest supporters in C. H. McCloy, who 
was the most active individual in the early stages of the war in setting 
up physical training in all services. Although McCloy was a member of 
the Joint Army-Navy survey team which had issued the critical report on 
Navy physical training on March 31, 1942, the University of Iowa pro-
fessor defended the foundation of the training as fundamentally sound ex-
cept for its short length, the blame for which he laid to other figures 
in the training establishment. Tunney had continued to enlist some of 
the best administrative personnel in physical education that he could 
find for his rapidly expanding section. Of the Hamilton program, which 
still existed only on paper, McCloy had the darkest suspicions of its 
purpose, which he believed wasteful athletic adventurism. He wrote 
AAHPER official Jay Nash of the New York University: 
••• those who sing extravagant praises of the Naval aviation 
program know little concerning that program. So far as we 
can find out here, nobody knows anything about it, includ-
ing the men who are planning it. This much is known, how-
ever, that they are planning a series of glorified varsity 
teams ••• they expect to have ninety men on a football squad 
capable of playing Minnesota and other Big Ten teams. In 
my humble opinion, any man who is in good enough condition 
to play Minnesota has no business hanging around a training 
camp~ he should be at an aviation camp learning to fly. 
This diversion of manpower seems to me to be completely in-
excusable and smacks of the worst of athleticism grown 
wild.l36 
Despite McCloy's opposition, the V05 philosophy had captured the 
imagination of the American patriotic spirit, and its rhetoric seemed 
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about to eclipse the older Navy program. By early June, 1942, the 
schools were operational and the sports program was being organized at 
preflight centers. One syndicated columnist, Bill Cunningham, suggested 
that Tunney's authority had already been superseded by aviation training 
and that the fitness leader was "far from amused." 137 Stung, Tunney and 
the Bureau of Personnel were involved in a three month effort either to 
gain control over the personnel functions of aviation training or to 
interdict the varsity athletic schedules before they began. 
On June 3, 1942, the Vice Chief of Naval Operations directed BuAero 
138 to turn over all personnel functions to the Bureau of Personnel. 
Then on June 11, DuPers circulated its directive which indicated it would 
use its authority to break up concentrations of athletes at training 
stations as well as invoking the forty-eight _hour rule on travel. This 
was followed on June 29 with another directive that all stations were 
to coordinate their physical training program under the direction of an 
139 officer assigned through BuPers. Commander Tunney used his new-found 
power in a move to have the embryo varsity football schedules scrapped at 
140 the V-5 centers. The cadet selection board had been quite aggressive 
in seeing to it that the best athletic material available would enter the 
preflight centers at the beginning of football practice, and individual 
coaches had been active in procuring top flight players for their 
- 141 
bases. Any attempt by Tunney to interfere with this practice was 
blocked when the Chief of BuAero persuaded the Vice CNO to cancel his 
. . 142 d1rect1ve of June 3. Therefore the Director of Training, at Tunney's 
suggestion, moved to unify all physical activities under direction of the 
Assistant Drill Commander (Physical Trainer) at each base. Not only did 
this run counter to the training syllabus of the preflight schools, but 
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also it struck at the heart of the varsity program, for the Assistant 
Drill Commander was empowered to take control of the Welfare and Recrea-
. d h" h . d 143 t1on program un er w 1c vars1ty sports operate • The latter was un-
der an academic department in V-5 training, and the precedent of BuPers 
usurping an administrative function in aviation training was clear. 
As these plans were being embodied, Hamilton drafted a lengthy de-
fense to the Director of Aviation Training. The naval aviator argued 
that the honor of the air service was at stake. The foundation of the 
entire training syllabus had been laid on the athletic training idea, 
men had been recruited under the alleged premises of the program, and 
varsity games contracted. He reminded his superiors that any regression 
of principle would be misrepresentation to the students and instructors 
who had enrolled in the program, the colleges which had scheduled the 
games, and the public which had looked toward the air arm for leader-
ship in physical training. Affirming that "outside competition has been 
one of the pillars of the foundation on which the whole physical train-
ing program was built," Hamilton was steadfast in his belief that a high-
ly promoted varsity program would add unmeasured benefits to morale in 
naval air by reducing individualism and establishing loyalty to its in-
stitutions, thereby making "its atmosphere strong, virile and manly." 
The commander urged that the preflight varsity program be expanded to 
advanced bases and under certain conditions to operations bases. He 
hoped that an advantage in athletic sports and games could be reaped for 
the Navy, a benefit which he thought would help recruiting and could not 
144 be repeated. 
The "showdown" between the two divisions of training occurred dur-
ing August, 1942, the occasion being the lengthy BuPers directive of 
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August 15 in which the Bureau required that the "program of Welfare and 
Recreation and of Physical Training ••• must bear a direct relationship 
to the primary purpose of training men to do the job for which they 
were recruited." The directive recognized that sport, as recreation, 
played a distinct role in physical fitness. All duty-time physical 
training was limited to direction by enlisted specialists. However, it 
recognized the value of welfare and recreation programs in training, 
and conceded to individual stations the prerogative of the commanding 
officer to carry on physical activities in the form of athletic games 
during off-duty time. It was assumed by BuPers that many of these men 
would be available for duty as assistant coaches in the welfare and 
145 recreation athletic programs. Tunney was pessimistic about the re-
ception that such a plan would have in aviation training. He felt that 
the need for unification made it obligatory to eliminate all overlapping 
in function between physical training and athletics. To him the issue 
was clear; no yielding was justified on the matter. Nor did he expect 
BuAero to yield, noting "it is the belief that the Naval Aviation Train-
ing Stations will continue with their present programs" despite his ef-
146 forts to the contrary. 
Tunney was desirous of real unification rather than a conciliatory 
proposal by the Bureau of Personnel. Recalcitrant, he felt that the 
whole preflight idea was unnecessary and wasteful. He had broached this 
"problem" in a June, 1942, letter to Elwood Craig Davis of the Univer-
sity of Pittsburg physical education department. In it he proposed that 
technical training and physical training be combined in aviation train-
ing in order to reduce the time needed to prepare pilots for opera-
tion. 147 Two months later, after Davis's commissioning and appointment 
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as Physical Training Officer for the Third Naval District, Davis 
broadened Tunney's concept in the form of a memorandum for "Unifying 
the Navy's Program of Physical Training." In it Davis prepared for Tun-
ney a broadscale attack on the philosophy of the preflight concept. The 
thesis rested on the approach that there was no transfer of training 
between the "character" and skills displayed in a team contest and those 
needed in flying. Davis postulated that such an idea rested on a "false 
hypothesis" and a "connnon error," insisting instead that "modern psy-
chologists are in agreement ••• that such a trait as courage is specific 
not general." He insisted that football and boxing courage could not 
be equated with flying courage "because there are almost no identical 
elements between football and boxing on one hand, and flying on the 
other." The lieutenant insisted that the general coordination skills 
for which athletic preparation strove were vastly unlike those needed 
for flying, athletic skills requiring "explosive" action; flying on the 
other hand demanded a "fineness" of coordination which militated against 
the "-courage and recklessness" of sports training. Davis pointed out 
that only when there were one or more similar situations present to 
those problems encountered in training could courage be transferred to 
the conditions met. He doubted that this could be done through athletic 
. . 148 tra1.n1.ng. 
Without action of the Secretary of the Navy to change the relation-
ship of the Bureau of Personnel to the training function of aviation, 
all Tunney could do was vent his feelings on sport within the service. 
BuPers managed to separate train~ng funds from the preflight varsity · 
operation, which the schools accomplished through the "Athletic Associa-
tions,"· and on September 1 the Chief of BuPers demanded the submission 
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of all preflight football schedules from the Chief of the Bureau of 
Aeronautics. On September 11, 1942, the Navy Department finally acted 
to transfer the administration of its schools to BuPers, but to trans-
fer the administration of its schools to BuPers, but the transfer was a 
slow process and BuAero never turned over complete control of its train-
ing program. 149 On September 15, 1942, Tunney acknowledged that the two 
f . i ld . 150 systems o tra1n ng wou coex1st. 
The success of the preflight and other Navy athletic programs con-
tinued to cause consternation in the Bureau of Personnel. Such activi-
ties had to be kept within limits of propriety. Although Air Corps 
teams were allowed to compete in civilian "bowl" games, the Navy set the 
precedent of not allowing its men to participate when Athens Preflight 
151 was forbidden to play in the 1943 Cotton Bowl game. 
If there was misunderstanding in the Navy Department on the role of 
athletics in training, the situation was even more obscured in civilian 
circles. The colleges were anxious to help in the physical training ef-
fort, but the services resisted civilian attempts to dictate particular 
philosophies of training. Such had been the occasion of the Navy Depart-
ment's encounter with the Joint Army-Navy Committee research commission 
on Navy physical training, a prelude to another division between the two 
principals over the continuation of college athletics. During the sum-
mer of 1942, with the fine record being made by Navy athletes in relief 
benefits and the brilliant publicity over the preflight program, college 
athletic administrators saw the Navy as a guiding light for preserving 
college athletics. The subcommittee on athletics of the JANC on Welfare 
and Recreation, having fallen. short in its attempt to direct the philos-
ophy and methods of military fitness, redirected its efforts to persuade 
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the services to sanction intercollegiate sport as a vital tool in pre-
paring the prospective inductee. The Joint Committee moved on June 5, 
1942, to ask the Secretaries of the War and Navy Departments to issue 
declarations of support of spectator type activities in the schools as 
a means of ministering to "physical fitness and mental well being of 
servicemen and civilians." The NCAA that same month decided in its 
Executive Council to intensify and emphasize competitive athletics as a 
practical application of physical hardening programs, the military of-
fering guidelines, the college offering incentive and enthusiasm. Since 
the president and secretary of the NCAA, Badger and Griffith, were mem-
bers of the JANC subcommittee on athletics, efforts of the Joint Army-
Navy Committee to work with the services on the matter were representa-
tive of the National Collegiate Athletic Association. 
To implement this approach, the JANC requested that the War and 
Navy Departments issue a declaration commending "the continuance of 
inter-college and inter-camp athletics, if they constitute a proper part 
of a universal physical training and athletic program sic in college and 
. 152 in the serv1.ces." Badger asked that such activities be declared "an 
153 appropriate part of the war effort." Both departments returned glow-
ing endorsements. Naval Secretary Knox stipulated that such sports 
should be continued "where such athletics constitute a proper part of 
the universal physical training and athletic program of the nation." 
Although it was clear that Knox expected athletics to be continued on 
the basis of a war fitness rationale, Stimson was not as commital, 
casually commending the recreational aspects of such wartime activities 
in civilian life, and in military camps "whenever such activities do not 
f • h • 1 • • II 154 inter ere Wl.t essent1.a tra1.n1.ng. John Griffith viewed these 
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letters with an opportunity to accomplish his aims. On July 10, 1942, 
he contacted Committee Chairman Fowler Harper and proposed that the JANC 
offer guidance on the matter by circulating a letter among college 
presidents urging them to make physical training compulsory at their 
institutions. Major Griffith regarded this as a means for preserving 
college athletics and the role of higher education in maintaining the 
moral and social fiber of American life during the war. 155 On August 
7 the Joint Committee composed a letter to college heads seeking clear-
ance for its issue. The letter commended the continuance of intercol-
legiate sport and incorporated the Stimson and Knox statements in the 
156 text. 
By using this method of military authority, Badger seemed to be 
pushing for some sort of uniform physical "toughening" policy in train-
ing by the services so that the guidelines might prove useful to colleges 
and universities. The Navy had already threatened to take a separate 
road from such civilian advice in training technique, while the Army had 
remained unconvinced that such methods of athletic training recommended 
by JANC were useful. 
Representatives of the several services met with the Joint Army-
Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation on August 18, 1942, to settle 
differences. By the time the meeting was held, however, the influence 
of the Joint Army-Navy Committee on either civilian or military athletic 
training had disappeared. The athletic subcommittee of JANC had not met 
as a whole in a year and a half, and it became obvious that Badger was 
operating independently through his position of subcommittee chairman. 
On August 14, 1942, Executive Director of the JANC E. M. Crocker re-
vealed that the Morale and Recreation Branch of Army Special Services 
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opposed Badger's involvement in its planning. 157 Tunney also went ahead 
with plans to reorganize a Civilian Advisory Committee outside the Joint 
Army-Navy Board's cooperation. 158 These moves spelled the end of any 
independently conceived physical training projects by the Joint Commit-
tee on Welfare and Recreation quickly diminished in importance. On 
August 31, 1942, the Navy Department rejected the Committee's request 
to circulate Knox's strong statement on athletics, insisting that the 
July 14 release "was not intended for publication," 159 and on September 
21, Crocker decided to drop the project rather than carry Stimson's 
160 statement alone. 
Tunney carried out plans for his own advis·ory committee. Crocker, 
who had tried to mediate the deteriorating situation, was alarmed over 
Tunney's bypassing the athletic subcommittee. On September 11, 1942, he 
observed, "I, believe that Gene is making a great mistake and may stick 
his neck out permanently. After all, this Committee, and the subcom-
mittees connected with it, are appointees of the Secretary of War." 
Nevertheless, Tunney convened his committee on September 15. The com-
mander initially ignored Griffith and Badger, two of the best men on the 
JANC Committee most interested in physical training, claiming that the 
Navy was "to busy fighting a war to bother with civilians." Tunney 
eventually compromised on Badger, who was invited as an advisory member 
but eliminated Griffith, the start of a running verbal battle between 
the two. Tunney's other "civilians" included Dr. McCloy, whom the com-
mander installed as chairman, Dr. Stienhaus, Dr. Nielson, and Dr. 
Crocker, who was made an honorary member. The committee, Tunney's out-
burst on "civilians" not withstanding, voted full membership to Badger 
at the first meeting. 
111 
Navy physical training was in desperate need of reduction. The 
August 15 BuPers directive swept the whole realm of off-duty athletic 
games under the control of that section. Tunney, having recognized 
BuAero's prominence in training its own people, reorganized his divi-
sion around a distinctive philosophy of leadership. By the fall of 
1942, both the administrative section and its trained personnel had 
grown beyond the ability of Tunney and other non-professional physical 
educators to handle it. Almost 4,000 physical instructors had been 
trained at Norfolk, but the lack of trained administrators had kept the 
Navy from incorporating the philosophy of physical training and main-
tenance programs to all its branches. 
One of the ironies of Tunney's leadership in the Navy fitness 
program was the ability of the Bureau of Aeronautics to "out recruit" 
him in the matter of commissioning civilians. Tunney, the innovator, 
was outmaneuvered by Aviation Training, which offered commissions on a 
highly competitive basis to nearly 2,500 trained educators. Commander 
Tunney, caught up in the philosophy of conservative "black shoe" Navy, 
held back, relying on enlisted specialists until nearly too late. 161 
Only after the September 15, 1942, meeting, in which he acknowledged 
that "we have a serious problem," did the BuPers program literalize its 
recruiting campaign to attract top-flight talent. Most of the admini-
strators of the Navy program turned out to be men with athletic figures, 
c. Max Farrington, Athletic Director at George Washington University as 
Chief of Administration and Instruction, and c. E. Forsythe, State High 
School Athletic Director from Michigan, Director of the Physical Main-
tenance Program. One early appointee, Ray Flaherty, Head Football Coach 
for the Washington Redskins, escaped the BuAero net and became the 
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Assistant Drill Officer and Football Coach at the Farragut, Idaho, 
T . . s . 162 ra1n1ng tat1on. A BuPers order of September 23, 1942, also as-
signed physical training assistants to each Naval District and brought 
other top-flight men into the Tunney program. 163 
The Civilian Advisory Committee, along with a competent profes-
sional staff of officers, expanded the Navy training curriculum. An 
extensive stress-load testing series was begun, the physical training 
regime was increased through all phases of training (already undertaken 
by BuAero) one hour per day, a physical mairt~enance program was launched 
for operations bases, and a program was begun for the Women's Re-
164 serve. The latter was developed under the direction of Mary J. 
165 Shelley of Bennington College. In November, 1942, testing standards 
were modified and incorporated into the Physical Fitness Manual for the 
U.S. Navy, which was ready for distribution on September 23, 1943. Al-
though interdepartmental rivalry and civilian suspicion had delayed its 
publication for a year, the Navy circular was the most comprehensive 
athletic and physical training document published by the government dur-
ing the war. 
The "nature" of the fitness program included freedom from disease, 
muscular endurance, strength, cardio-respiratory efficiency, agility, 
flexibility, and speed. The document associated all these needs for 
modern war with those "skills developed through the continued practice 
of sports and athletic games," which were related to the "ability to re-
spond quickly to combat situations; with poise and alertness; with ag-
gressiveness, initiative, and resourcefulness; with teamwork ••• and group 
morale." The importance of athletics in training was signified by the 
suggestion that sports and games be utilized to the "utmost," and that 
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they "be so organized that they will be available to all men in train-
ing.". Swinnning and boxing were featured in the publication, and both 
these sports were expanded to great length in the Navy. The pledge, 
"every man a swinnner," was not an idle one, and the service's achieve-
ments in this area were exceptionally good. A full chapter on boxing 
began with the rudimentary illustrations on how to make a fist, advanc-
ing to mass drills, maneuvers, and stances. The acceleration in train-
ing of large numbers of men at the recruit depots had necessarily re-
duced Tunney's original interest in recreational sports as a part of 
training, but sports were unified with training. One chapter of the 
manual was devoted to these activities, which were largely recognized 
as part of the maintenance and morale program of established posts and 
bases. 
races, 
Wrestling, combatives, running, including obstacle and relay 
and weight lifting rounded out the athletic emphasis. 166 
Little had been done within the Physical Training Branch to change 
the traditional Navy approach to the Negro seaman, which had led to the 
assignment of these sailors to the more servile ratings, and, although 
400 men per month were being graduated from the Norfolk facility by the 
sunnner of 1943, none were black. Requests by Negro enlistees for train-
ing as Athletic Specialists had to be channeled through the Navy Depart-
167 ment. Inquiries to the Bureau of Personnel about qualified black en-
listments received the standard polite reference to apply for "general 
service.11168 Negro Congressman Arthur W. Mitchell of Chicago, who was 
alerted of the reluctance of the Navy to enlist members of his race as 
Athletic Specialists, protested this discrimination on July 22, 1942, in 
a letter to Secretary Knox: 
I am frank to tell you that the morale among the Negro 
civilian population, and many of the enlisted men with 
whom I have talked, is very low. This is because of 
these rank racial discriminations practiced by our 
government, and in which the Navy takes the lead.l69 
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170 This indictment was brought to President Roosevelt, who deferred to 
171 Knox, signing a prepared response sent to him by the Navy Secretary. 
The President 1 s reply was evasive to the question ofwhy Negroes were 
not accepted for physical training billets. The Knox proxy simply read 
that the "same basic training, including physical and vocational train-
• • ff d d 11 • II 172 1ng, 1s a or e a recru1ts. - This policy continued until February 
of 1944 when the first Negro specialists were brought through the Bain-
bridge training school for the establishment of a "colored" training 
173 program. 
The women's program in the Navy existed only through guidance 
rather than directive, and male specialists were initially given duty in 
the training function for the women's physical maintenance program. 
Initially twelve men were assigned to this activity, but by August, 
1943, this number had increased to thirty-three. 174 The Training Di-
vision made participation mandatory through a circular issued on October 
2, 1943, and the operation was placed under the supervision of a trained 
physical educator, Jenny E. Turnbull of George Washington University. 
The "aims" of the WAVE regime were not as versatile as those of 
the regular Navy, maintenance recognizing "needs of women as contrasted 
to the demands made upon men." The provision of "endurance and strength 
to meet the demands of the routine jobs and ••• additional duties," were 
the criteria for the Women's Reserve. Conditioning exercises, swim-
ming and "games" were outlined for the mandatory three hour per week 
tasks. Participation in folk and modern dance and "stunts" accompanied 
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mass games, such as push ball, and regular athletics, including dual 
sports. As these guidelines were incorporated into the training pro-
gram, the female personnel faced an implementation of athletic training 
from games of low skill, endurance and coordination to those of a higher 
development of movement. Running was introduced in the first week of 
training, volleyball in the second, and softball and basketball in weeks 
three through nine. The maintenance program also included field hockey 
and soccer. 
The Physical Training Section issued guidelines for women's sports 
in March of 1944 which were taken directly from the conservative stand-
ards as established by a committee on women's athletics in the American 
Association of Health Physical Education and Recreation. The outline 
established play days, sports days, and telegraphic meets as ideal for 
women's competition. 175 By late 1944 the maintenance program was no 
longer regarded as essential for women, and WAVE participation on the 
176 staff of the Physical Training Section was dropped. 
In the summer of 1943 the Bureau of Personnel submitted to disparate 
activities of all naval posts to regulations designed to standardize ath-
letic procedure. The BuAero conflict forced BuPers to request that the 
Secretary of the Navy issue a directive designed to channel all requi-
sitions for athletic equipment through the personnel division, a measure 
that was accomplished in July of that year. That month also saw the 
issuance of a letter ordering stations to confine their athletic com-
petition within established NCAA districts. The order included a re-
iteration of the forty-eight hour travel rule, a prohibition against air 
travel for athletic contests, the disallowance of competition against 
professional teams, and limiting of contests to the home fields of 
116 
177 competing squads. These regulations brought the Navy into coopera-
tion with Office of Defense Transportation guidelines on civilian tra-
vel while also correcting another confrontation of "barnstorming." The 
Bureau Chief insisted upon "a program that provides athletics for all 
of the men on the station and utilizes station team athletics only for 
h f "d" . "178 t e purpose o prov1 1ng enterta1nment •••• 
The Bureau of Personnel, however, could never control the utiliza-
tion of men that the Naval Air Stations sought to fill billets at their 
posts. On December 14, 1942, the Bureau objected, without success, the 
awarding of a commission to a professional football coach, George Halas 
of the Chicago Bears, for an assignment in athletics at the Norman 
(Oklahoma) Air Station. 179 Some air station commanders frustrated the 
duties of physical training specialists assigned through the Bureau of 
Personnel with a multitude of irrelevent tasks, which the assistant of-
ficer in charge of physical training characterized as everything from 
180 "glorified janitors to elevator operators." 
The first year of World War II for the United States was one of 
drama, vulnerability, and crises. Yet America did not suffer extensively 
nor did its people know the grip of real sacrifice or hardship. Except 
for the military reverses in the Pacific, which involved comparatively 
few men of the Armed Forces, there was little real extensive fighting. 
The economy of the United States boomed. Socially, except for the trama 
of divided homes, most of 1942 differed little from the last year of 
peace. In a sense, the American sporting scene represented the glimmer 
of hope that the world would be as it once was: conflict reduced to the 
level of team play, values exhibited and exchanged on the symbolic levels 
of high ideals, people still in control of their cherished institutions, 
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and governments, both foreign and domestic, conceived in terms of 
ideology, rather than of commitment, demand, and sacrifice. Sport was 
not changed greatly by war in 1942, quality of civilian play being di-
minished marginally. By November, however, this facade of "wonderful 
nonsense" was over, the reality of war was to bring,to an end for at 
least three years the sporting normalcy that helped soothe the shock of 
world disordero 
Force of arms and the demands for support had brought people face 
to face with what real physical wage such conflict demanded. The Amer-
ican invasion and the British counter-attack in North Africa, the waste 
of Stalingrad, naval battles in the Solomon Sea, the fight for Guadal-
canal~~all had their demands: rationing, full industrial capacity, 
regulation, and the eighteen-year-old draft. Organized athletics were 
changed by these events largely through a rationale and exposure to 
countless numbers of men. The physical and social reorganization of 
American sport, sparked by the government on foundations of long 
cherished principle, was a development that took its place among other 
circumstances that would mark World War II as a dividing point between 
the old and the new in American life. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE NAVY SAVES COLLEGIATE SPORT 
THE 1943 DEBATE OVER 
COLLEGE ATHLETICS 
As American college athletics entered the war years, there existed 
a simple faith in American institutions to overcome the threat of 
foreign peril or alien ideologies. The nation's colleges and univer-
sities accelerated their academic schedules in order to speed techni-
cally trained graduates into service and industry. The best character-
istics of voluntary effort were ascribed to the sporting community, 
which was expected to turn competitive skills from the playing field to 
the battleground. Writing in the Journal of the American Association 
for Health, Physical Education and Recreation, athletic director George 
Venker of Iowa State College saw the opportunity to impart these pros-
pective soldiers the "qualities which may tend to bring them back to 
us," which included the standard catch-phrases of "initiative, quick 
thinking, courage of the highest order, calmness and coolness in a 
. . d 1 1 111 cr1s1s, an oya ty •••• 
Hard contact sports were glorified as the zenith in. forcing a psy-
chological orientation toward the denial of physical comforts. Lou 
Little, the Head Fbotball Coach at Columbia University, established the 
format for a war rationale for which he expounded an emphasis on contact 
games because they bolstered the ability to take "physical punishment. 112 
129 
130 
He urged that a combative character be associated with football, which 
would have to played "hard and intensively with even more savage will 
to win" than in peacetime. The analogy of football as a "combat game" 
did not escape its supporters, and its usefulness in teaching "the de-
termination not to lose no matter how tough the going" as well as the 
knowledge of enemy strategy and tactics were commonly attributed to it. 3 
Coaches were urged to make their programs as physically demanding 
as possible, and the closer a sport could be shown to the martial skills, 
the more beneficial it was considered. This hardening psychology also 
was revealed in the image of the Spartan mother whose example of con-
ditioning would instill in her children the desire for competition. 
Amateur Athletic Union official Fred L. Steers observed in a treatise 
entitled "The Hand that Rocks the Cradle": 
Women's athletics should be encouraged and extended, 
not only for the physical, moral and mental advantages 
to be gained ••• but also to the mothers ••• from the time 
of the dawn of reasoning of their offspring, to instruct 
and encourage them in the technioue and spirit of com-
petitive sports, to the end that in their dealings with 
their fellows, they may be aggressive in the promotion 
of their ideals, tempored always with consideration, 
graciousness in defeat, and humbleness in victory. 
Then we will always be physically fit to meet aggres-
sors, and morally equipped to carry out our American 
traditions.4 
In the fall of 1943 the NCAA Wrestling Guide published an article 
from a preflight coach teaching "what bone breaking wrestling holds 
should be included in physical fitness programs for prospective draf-
5 
tees," and at the University of Nebraska, fundamentals of hand to hand 
combat were included in the regular wrestling program to such a degree 
that its coach recognized a "disturbing factor" which would require that 
men "reject many uncouth habits if they are to get back into the spirit 
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of amateur wrestling." 6 This emphasis of a warrior's code became so 
common that cries to cease the teaching of materials that had "values 
for war onl~' were heard. Even so steadfast a supporter of the sport 
training concept as Major John Griffith cautioned against letting a war 
psychology cause rules and sportsmanship to be "shoved aside for the 
duration. 117 
Another principle popularly estimated as inherent in athletic con-
ditioning was the characteristic of "teamwork." This was a reference 
in terms of loyalty to the group, willingness to accept responsibili-
ties, and the sublimating of self within a broadly conceived plan. 
This was the foundation on which the preflight concept was based, and 
the building of such strong group ties and emotional support was em-
phasized as the undercurrent for civilian physical training as well. 8 
D. o. (Tuss) McLaughry, a Marine Corps major, insisted that some troops 
felt a "competitive urge" following the initial uneasiness of combat, 
similar to waiting on the "opening whistle of a football game."9 Marine 
Colonel Emery E. (Swede) Larson described the assault on a Pacific 
atoll as the coordination of signals between the Fleet Admiral, the 
"Quarterback," and the members of his Marine team. To Larson, the mes-
sage "signals on" was a "beautiful" illustration of teamwork for troops 
to "hit that beach right on the ticket." He declared, "• •• All move-
ments show that teamwork is essential--teamwork with the ability to 
think, with ability to do, with ability to understand what is coming, 
and with ability to hold up or to go ahead as the situation demands." 
In this respect the former Naval Academy coach was grateful for boys 
"who were ready to play when the ball game started ••• , who had been in 
the hands of the coaches ••• boys who knew something about teamwork •••• " 10 
Grantland Rice stirred this emotion of cooperation with the rallying 
call~ 
'Come on, Team!-' 
Here were the words they knew, and understood, 
The final answer to a captain's dream, 
Suiting the moment and the fighting mood, 
ooees0eeo•••eeCioe•••••o•••••••••e•••a•• 
A call far-echoed from remembered ways 
That had no part of foxhole, tank or ship. 
•eoeeCIG&e•••e••o••••••m•••••••••••••••• 
When it was one for all, and all for one, 
Lifting them high above all doubts and fears 11 
Until the game was over and the fight was won. 
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Henry Steele Commager saw this spirit of athletic leaders stirred 
to war as the finest' example of ethics, which was "almost an Anglo-
American invention." Commager insisted that sports competition was re-
hearsal for defending the principles upon which the American civiliza-
tion was built. These principles included sympathy for the underdog, 
refusal to quit when behind, playing by the rules, and punishing vio-
12 lators. To John Griffith these virtues traditionally set the United 
States apart from "Socialist'' thought which lacked the content needed 
13 to protect freedoms when they were threatened. Those that opposed 
athletic games were the same levelers whom Griffith equated with so-
cialism and pacifism, which was the "philosophy of the people who felt 
14 that combat games should be abandoned." 
Fred Steers expressed suspicion of "so called liberals which have 
infiltrated many of our public institutions," and who wished to bring 
about a condition of equality "as a principle of communism" through the 
"suppression of athletics." Calling for "this crowd to be driven from 
the place they infest," Steers asked that "we take stock of competitive 
sport for what it is" and "use our equipment and manpower to make youth 
strong and conscious that the will to win brings the reward of 
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1 . hm 1115 accomp ~s ent •••• Representative LaVern Dilweg, a former Marquette 
University football star and a member of Congress from Wisconsim, de-
clared it was "patriotic to play." In a warmly received speech on the 
House floor, Dilweg pit"aised sport for giving "our American boys plus 
values that make them the best soldiers and sailors in the world." 
Calling football "warfare on a friendly scale," the Congressman credited 
combative and team sports with developing an appreciation of the com-
ponents of strategy, which included teamwork, initiative, discipline 
and perserverance. A success oriented ethic, desirable in American so-
ciety, was stressed by which youngsters learned leadership, the follow-
16 
ing of orders and the inspiration to individual excellence. 
Egalitarianism subject to authority, freedom with discipline, 
equality without leveling--all were attributes attached to the need to 
emphasize sport within the great crusade against authoritarianism. To 
Robert McCormick these attributes of athletics made the American soldier 
'~superior to the fighting men of other countries •11 This publisher of 
the Chicago Tribune assumed that "the player of games has learned t:he 
necessity of discipline--that some one must direct the games and the 
others must obey," .. yet he insisted that "here no sense of inferiority 
exists.1117 Within this context sport alone was regarded as crucial in 
the creedal struggle of gaining the peace. The benefits of sport, ac-
cording to Grantland Rice, were important enough to serve as a motive 
for "enforced athletic training, nation wide from the ages of twelve, 
sixteen, or eighteen," whichwould include a "rough body contact 
sport ••• before fifteen or sixteen. 1118 
Thus colleges were encouraged to continue athletics for the pre-
induction benefits such activities afforded. This was one of the themes 
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at the National Institute on War and Education, which opened in Washing-
ton on August 28, 1942, shortly after the beginning of the accelerated 
fall semester. ..J?.~an ;:Jos.ep:h"w. Barker~ .. ()f,,Qolumbia University, Special 
• .. 
Edu~ational Assistant in the Navy Department, -urged the five hundred 
secondary and higher education representatives to provide "precondition-
ing" in physical fitness for "especially those students who must antici-
. . h d . 1119 pate go1ng to t e arme serv1ces. This offered a chance for ath-
letics to prove its worth in higher education. One coach at a state 
institution, Dewey (Snorter) Luster of the University of Oklahoma, 
planned to organize a special one hundred man "Junior Varsity" football 
squad composed of students who ordinarily would not have played "to 
ready additional fighting men for war. 1120 
So popular was the belief th,at athletics had something mystical in 
defining the American purpose that few serious debates were fostered 
over it. Yet with the increasing exigencies of war leading to govern-
ment controls over the individual, a dialectic occurred during the 
winter of 1942-1943 which was important in the approach of colleges in 
continuing athleticsa This was the struggle between the advocates of 
institutional team athletics and those supporters of mass games, cales-
thenics, intramurals, and the like, which appealed, supposedly, to 
people who desired to place controls on team games because of the abuses 
they represented. An October, 1942, report of college administrators, 
urging intramurals instead of athletics, the Victory Corps and college 
fitness programs of the Office of Education, which emphasized intra-
murals over interschool contests, the ongoing debate in the Navy over 
athletics, and the failure of the Army to utilize athletics in training, 
made this an emotional issue. A defender of the capitalist order in 
135 
America, John Griffith, feared the impact of new deal social experi-
mentation in physical training, noting: "Just as certain bureaucrats 
are using the war as a pretext for promoting social and economic changes 
in our national life which they plan to make permanent, so are advocates 
of mass athletics attempting to destroy interscholastic and inter-
collegiate sport, one of the few things we have left of the old order 
in America. n 21 
The conflict between aviation training and regular Navy physical 
training became central to the issue. Sportswriters, who were chauvi-
nistic advocates of the Preflight program, were quick in the criticism 
of Gene Tunney, whom they considered one of the major spokesmen in op-
posing organized athletics in wartime, often at the expense of complete-
ly misinterpreting his views. Coaches, convinced that team play was 
necessary for the ideal balance between strength and motivation in phys-
ical conditioning, scoffed at the commander, whom they felt believed 
only in calesthenics. ·"Sports versus calesthenics" indeed became the 
paramount issue in determining the necessity for continuing normal 
sporting activitieso One football coach, Bob Zuppke, of the University 
of Illinois, exposited the paradigm simply by saying, "I bet football 
players, who don't know how to twist their bodies and count one, two, 
22 three, four, still would wipe out a lot of Japs." 
In September of 1942 Griffith accused Tunney of raising the 
calesthenic-athletics question. On the one hand, according to Major 
Griffith, stood team play, with its "social qualities," which included 
"courage, reliability, special adaptibility, intelligent thinking under 
stress," "individualism" and "freedom." On the other side stood mass 
calesthenics, which included "muscle flexers" and "dumbbell swingers," 
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who believed in the "soft life of regimentation," "collectivism," or 
23 
worse. Tom Hamilton, the doctrinaire planner of sport in training, 
spoke in terms of "incentive to excel," which he was sure could not come 
from "calesthenics or jogging." 24 Tunney's methods were widely and 
popularly used for the training of large numbers of troops in all 
branches of service, but there was wide misinterpretation and inter-
changing of the terms used to describe mass physical drill. Tunney was 
accused of emphasizing "setting up exercises," a type of manual of arms 
in calesthenics popularized in Scandanavia and associated with regimen-
. 25 
tat~on. Griffith warned the NCAA .Executive Committee in December of 
1942 that high-placed people in the military and the government were 
trying to promote methods of the German Turnverein, a cultural mechanism 
largely associated with mass gymnastics, thus opening a political sus-
. 26 picion associated with World War I type hyster~a. ''Would it not be 
the irony of fate," he queried in his Athletic Journal, "if Germany gave 
up her regimented calesthenics as a basic program and substituted 
27 sports ••• and we made our sports secondary and voluntary ••• ?" · 
In December, 1942, a private query proposed that Griffith and Tun-
ney debate the sports issue in print. Tunney replied with the accusa-
tion that Griffith "is confusing varsity football with the term com-
petitive sports." Denying any feeling for stopping college sport, Tun-
ney insisted instead that he was opposed to the holding over of 
"athletes in uniform ••• at training stations to be part of a glamour 
football team, while the poorer conditioned youngsters are sent to the 
28 front.'' For Tunney such activity was representative of privilege and 
elitism. With the United States at war, he felt that the purpose of 
physical training was to prepare men as quickly as possible under the 
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same general conditions. Born the son of poor Irish immigrants, the 
commander sypathized with the nameless mass whose menial talents, al-
though intensely valuable in their own right, were not well recognized. 
In two lengthy letters to Griffith he defended and broadened this stand. 
Charging that the use of spectator sports in training was a ruse to 
"give exercise to the few and neglect the many," Tunney charged that 
the entire spectator sports establishment was designed to aid people in 
. 29 pursuing their civilian occupations in the guise of military serv1ce. 
The athletic training concept was considered deviationist in principle, 
and those officers engaging in athletics were considered to be using 
that philosophy as an "excuse" to unnecessarily delay their training. 
Tunney observed in a letter to Griffith: 
It would assist our country immeasurably if a great 
sports authority like you were to encourage athletic 
idols to get out and face death for their homeland. 
We have too many sports promoters desirous of carrying 
on box-office sports-as-usual--too many sports writers 
who wish to fight off any encroachment on their domain, 
too many headline coaches unwilling to submerge them-
selves in the anonymity of actual combat.30 
Tunney also took issue with the argument of the psychological con-
ditioning afforded by rugged type sports. In a letter to Dr. McCloy, 
he defended his "warrior psychology" around this principle, "all the 
Hamiltons and semimorons in the world, whether they be sports writers 
31 or amateur psychologists" to the contrary. "Sports writers and foot-
ball coaches refuse to be logical," he wrote Boy Scout executive, E. B. 
DeGroot: 
Training an Army of 7,500,000 and a Navy of 2,500,000 
for ten hours a day, six teams scrimmaging simultaneously 
for one hour on an indestructible gridiron would require 
the armed services to erect 15,150 gridirons for foot-
ball. 32 
138 
Tunney was called to account on the merits of his beliefs by no 
less a figure than Captain Arthur Radford, the Bureau of Aeronautics 
Chief. Commander Tunney had made a speech to the Touchdown Club of New 
York City on December 16, 1942, in which he exposited at length on his 
"war psychology." Reports in the press, which he attributed to a 
drunken "pie eyed" reporter, had endowed his speech as an attack against 
the aviation training program, which Tunney was compelled to deny in a 
letter to Radford. 33 
Caught in the "cross-fire'' of debate on the athletics-calesthenics 
issue, the physical training director was an easy target for sports 
writers because of the eloquence of beliefs, his image of fitness, and 
his reluctance to defend himself publically because of Navy ties. To 
Tunney then, the sports writer, a greedy, manipulative, alcoholic liar,· 
became the image of wasteful athleticism, detrimental to the war effort. 
He saw the writer as part of a broad conspiracy of corporate greed, 
feeding off the tragedy of war. In this "Sports Trust," he included 
"sports writers, coaches, athletic goods manufacturers, radio sports-
34 casters and newspapers," but representative of this group was always 
the sports writer, "these hateful parasitic scribes" who "never had 
. 35 much logic and ••• cannot understand the exigencies of war." Isolated 
in his belief by "press agent coaches," the sagacious Tunney accused 
the hated writers of supporting unsound philosophies and provoking 
"false issues" because "material to write about is slipping from them." 
Defining himself a "war symbo 1" who was "born a warrior," the pugnacious 
Horatio felt he represented "the monstrosity that it is taking from them 
their living."36 
Notwithstanding Commander Tunney's prosaic defense of stoic self-
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discipline, the opinion was well formed by January, 1943, that a con-
spiracy to eliminate college athletics was joined, the correspondents 
being the Army and Navy advocates of mass physical training, the United 
Office of Education, and after the October, 1942, Philadelphia meeting, 
college presidents. The leading advisors to the Education branch 
through the Office of Civilian Defense were the same men who either ad-
vised or served highly in the Navy Physical Training Section, most not-
ably Charles McCloy, George Stienhaus, Na P. Neilson, Nelson Metcalf, 
and Tunney, who attended numerous conferences on fitness. Most of these 
men were affiliated with the physical education arm of the National Ed-
ucation Association (the AAHPER)o The other element of physical educa-
tion leader, athletic coaches, largely identified themselves with the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association or the various state high 
school coaching groups. 
To Gilbert Obertauffer of Ohio State University, the Victory Corps 
and college advisory manuals for fitness were suspect from the start. 
Accusing the Office of Education of promoting "unusable" guidelines, the 
professor viewed the Victory Corps plan with disgust because it recom-
mended a compulsory hour of organized mass drill and only a voluntary 
period of organized athletics. "The damage done," cried Obertauffer, 
nto school and college programs by the free and compulsory use of cal-
esthenics and phony 'conditioning' exercises will take years to re-
pair.1137 Outraged at the circulars and guidelines for fitness, he 
called them "sterile and stupid," an attempt to "imitate the axis."38 
Spokesman, however, abounded for the mass discipline as well. Edwin 
Henderson, lone Negro member of the JANC subcommittee on athletics, was 
not fearful of voicing admiration for the training techniques of an 
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authoritarian nature. Complimenting Tunney, who "has encourage [sic] 
participation of thousands who previously had received their hardening 
exercises vicariously," .. Henderson also voiced admiration for Soviet 
Russia's model of training wherein "physical training indulged in on a 
family basis" helped explain that abused nation's ability to resist Ger-
man aggression. 39 E. B. DeGroot concluded that "price tagged ••• heroic 
public entertainment," such as football, had "glaring limitations" as a 
conditioner for masses. Although missing the point of group discipline 
so highly emphasized in the preflight schools, DeGroot was skeptical of 
the benefit of football for developing "abandon and intrepidity," which 
he feared would lead to a "false belief" for the athletically trained 
soldier ''that all they need to win out in this war is participation in 
football and gun in hand." Warning Americans of Kipling's lament in 
World War I over the "flannel fools at the wicket" while a generation 
of English youth died, DeGroot forewarned of "Pigskin Chasers at the 
40 Trough." 
Professional educators were interested in the rapid development of 
strength. Since the colleges were asked, at a time of reduced enroll-
ments and funds, to train all men for potential service, they asked 
which was most efficient: varsity sports or mass physical drill and in-
tramural games? Many of those who desired the varsity sport concept 
urged one hundred percent participation. The question hinged on the de-
velopment of muscular efficiency. '~hat is the least common denominator 
of physical condition?" posed Charles McCloy. Was it 
Strength? Muscular endurance? Cardio-respiratory endur-
ance? Agility? Speed? Flexibility? ••• This war has 
caught the American people far off base ••• the responsi-
bility for this rests with those ••• who have been solely 
concerned with ••• training everyone for skills in sports 
eooWhile finding no place in the program for physical 
training.41 
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It is a "straw man," responded Obertauffer to the McCloy state-
ment, "to imply a separation between the athletic group and the physi-
cal educators." Accusing Dr. McCloy of "scoffing at 'social develop-
ment, ' 1 character,' 1 psycho logical values'--," Obert auf fer protested 
his concern for "the educational values in education," and equated 
sports with "the development of the extroverted objective type of 
mind," which would "save" young people "from calesthenics and gymnas-
tics aimed only at their muscles. 1142 Jesse Feiring Williams, Tunney's 
old nemesis, concluded that such "division in the ranks" was a false 
issue and blamed such deviant thinking on Tunney, "who began his 
'leadership' in physical education by announcing that he had invested 
1 a new principle of corrective suction' by means of which he could 
'create a new hinge in the back'," and the Office of Civilian Defense, 
43 which 11 lead us into a most unfriendly mess." The athletics-
calesthenics debate prompted research by Dr. Ernest Wilbur of the City 
College of New York, who discovered in findings published in October, 
1943, that sports methods of training were superior for developing 
strength indices of fitness in four of the seven indices of measurement 
44 and were found to be equal in the other three. 
Neither physical education nor athletic advocates could be ac-
cused of mindless insensitivity to social needs. The editor of Scholas-
tic Coach concluded that the men who framed the Victory Corps program 
were "the most sports conscious educators in the nation." Despite cri-
ticism, he noted: 
The v. c. embraces the broadest, most intensified physi-
cal fitness program in the history of education. Sports, 
gymnastics, rough and tumble activities, calesthenics, 
and other basic conditioners all have their place in this 
program. 45 
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Educators welcomed the chance to reach a compromise between the 
theoretical poles of fitness and the convening of the War Fitness Con-
ference of April 16, 1943, partially healed the rift between the two 
groups. The Army's Theodore (Ted) Bank struck a moderating note be-
tween the two schools of thought. Bank accused the public schools and 
colleges of doing too little in promoting "rugged" programs of training 
of all types in both sports and mass curriculum outlines. Perceiving 
that dogmatic fears of various training methods had attracted educators 
away from the real job of preparing young people for military service, 
he stated, "There is no desire or tendency on the part of organized 
physical education to abandon emphasis on 'competitive games, sports, 
and combat activities.'" Colonel Bank insisted that if anything, both 
"instructional" and "after~school" physical training was at the "point 
f . 1. "46 o un1versa 1ty. 
By the fall of 1943, contention had subsided. The Victory Corps 
program failed to receive funding to have more than a mere advisory role 
in developing school programs, thus removing suspicion that the govern-
ment would regiment play activity out of you~h programs. The Armed 
Services had also grown so large that compulsory game activities for 
troops in training was patently unfeasible, and civilians went back to 
worrying over how best to administer their own programs in the presence 
of wartime exigencies. Charles McCloy loyally defended Tunney as a 
long suffering, innovating administrator who had been maligned far too 
much in respect to the training job which he was achieving. "Connnander 
Tunney has been ••• misinterpreted by newspaper writers as badly as any 
physical educator of our time," McCloy wrote. Tunney was credited with 
establishing shipboard training programs, inaugurating the first 
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physical training school, instituting a testing program, and recruiting 
thousands of specialists. McCloy could not think of any difference. in 
values of the type of mass physical training used in the Navy and "the 
preparation for a sport like football," which consisted of "monotonous 
over and over rehearsal of details." The only difference was that one 
type of preparation was identified as "educational" and the other was 
47 
nota 
Despite the draft, little impact was made on college athletic 
rosters until the fall of 1943. The 1941 season went smoothly, and the 
1942 schedule was carried out under near normal conditions except for a 
drastic reduction in attendance due to the lack of replacement rubber 
for tires. Until November, men under the age of twenty years were not 
liable for conscription~ This protected most freshman and sophomore 
students and some juniors from induction. Military policy, especially 
that of the Navy, encouraged enlistment into Reserve training programs 
for college students in order to guarantee a supply of trained tech-
nicians and officers for induction. These enlisted reservists were not 
called to service until early 1943 while certain officer candidates were 
allowed to complete spring semesters as well. Civilian athletes were 
not swept off the campuses until the summer of 1943. This left only 
seventeen-year-a ld and a very few eighteen-year-o·ld students, plus a 
scattering of deferred medical and engineering trainees or "4-F" regis-
48 
trants. 
The Navy Vel and V-7 training programs were particularly influen-
tial in keeping young men in college long enough to guarantee the rela-
tive stability of the sport for 1942. The Navy Department supplemented 
its regular Reserve Officer's Training Corps with the V-1 program, 
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inaugurated in June of 1940. The V-1 permitted the student to finish 
a prescribed group of studies providing he enlisted in the organized Re-
serve. Induction was postponed until after graduation. After the 
United States entered the war, the V-1 Reserve program was modified by 
the "V-7" system. Colleges and universities approved by the Navy De-
partment were allowed to train seventeen-to twenty-year-old applicants 
through their sophomore year for subsequent induction into the Reserve 
programo Examinations for placement into the V-7 or the V-5 (aviation 
cadet) course of study were approved, which allowed the student to com-
plete requirements for graduation before induction. The Marine Corps 
followed similar guidelines. Both the Army and Air Corps were author-
ized to accept limited number of enlisted reservists for deferred duty 
under direction by the War Department. The Navy plans were popular be-
cause of the guarantee that upperclassmen would have an opportunity to 
finish studies at their schools of matriculation. Underclassmen making 
satisfactory progress were promised continued training either with their 
current college of enrollment or transfer to other campuses designated 
49 by the Navy Department. 
Rosters of the 1942 football season were influenced by these 
various enlisted Reserve policies. Twenty members of the forty-nine 
Northwestern University squad were enrolled in Reserve programs, in-
50 eluding ROTC, V~7, and Marine Reserve, and other colleges had similar 
situations. Of Oklahoma A & M's forty-five-man game roster, seventeen 
were under twenty years old, sixteen were in Army ROTC, five were in 
the Marine Reserves, while only five were draft eligible. Another was 
d f d . . d 51 a e erre eng1neer1ng stu ent. A similar situation existed at 
Oklahoma University where fifteen were ROTC or reservists, mainly Marine 
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and V-7. Eighteen others on the forty-three man squad were under 
draft age. In answer to public inquiries, OU publicist Harold Keith 
replied, "We doubt if we will hurt this fall. Next fall is the danger 
year unless they find a substitute for tires." Noting that Oklahoma 
lost only five men from its 1942 team to the military, and the Univer-
sity 1 s proximity to a metropolitan area and to seven new air bases, 
Keith expected good crowds and foretold "no difference in the caliber 
of play." Although some opponents (notably Fordham and Kansas State 
University) had been depleted in personnel by mass enlistments, Keith 
noticed that "every team has be·en hurt so that proportion won 1 t be 
. bl "53 not1cea e ..... 
Steps were taken during the summer of 1942 to bring more college 
students into the armed forced. On August 20, 1942, the Navy ceased to 
k 1 · · · R 54 d th W D t ta e en 1stments 1nto 1ts eserve programs, an e ar epartmen . 
announced plans on September 10 to induct its enlisted reservists upon 
55 completion of the fall semester. The draft age was lowered to 
eighteen years by Congress on November 16, 1942. 56 The result was a 
drastic curtailment in college athletics. One basketball team on Decem-
ber 12 listed only eleven Army ROTC and three enlisted Reserve students 
57 as prospects~ By May, 1943, even these were gone after the Army called 
its ROTC students to active duty, a process that was completed in all 
58 colleges by the following September. 
Suddenly normalcy had yielded to the demands of war, and college 
coaches and administrators were perplexed at the war role that they 
would be able to play. Hundreds of coaches followed their students into 
the Navy, many as enlisted physical training specialists or as aviation 
DV(s)--Deck Volunteer (Specialists)--in aviation physical training. One 
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major university that nonmally had over one hundred candidates for 
spring football had only thirty-six in 1943, and almost all of them did 
not expect to be there for the fall. The track coach at the same 
school issued a call for volunteers and found only fourteen men who 
59 
would respond. Spring activities were the first to feel the effect 
of broad curtailment. Only thirty-one major outdoor collegiate invita-
tional track and field meets were held, compared to forty-seven in 
1942 and sixty-two in 1941. 6° College baseball was practically elimi-
nated. 
Other traditional events including the football bowl games and the 
Army-Navy gridiron classic appeared on the way out. In September, 1942, 
the Pasadena Business Men's Association expressed opposition to con-
61 tinuing the Rose Bowl, and in December all managers of such pageants 
were urged by the Office of Defense Transportation to limit sale of 
62 their tickets to the areas where the games were played. Noting in-
creasing austerity, the New Orleans ~ suggested that the local Sugar 
1 b d . . d 63 Bow game e 1scont1nue • On August 18, 1942, Brehon Somervell, 
commanding Army Services of Supply, also tagged the Army-Navy game a 
drain on essential transportation needs for the service and requested 
that General Marshall suspend the game for 1942. This was to be fol-
. 64 
lowed by canceling the entire 1943 service academy football schedule. 
Although the 1942 contest was played, it was clear that the War Depart-
ment did not exactly favor its continuance. The affray was moved from 
Philadelphia, where it normally drew crowds of nearly 100,000, to An-
napolis, where attendance was held to 12,000. Except for three cheer-
leaders, no cadets were allowed to make the trip from West Point. The 
Office of Price Administration forbade attendance to any but midshipmen 
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and residents of the immediate Annapolis area, and OPA officials 
checked license tags on cars at the stadium parking lot to apprehend 
violators. Several "Middies" were forced by such circumstances to rent 
a truck to bring their dates from Washington, which, according to Jack 
Clary, was "reminiscent of a scene from a Russian movie." 65 
Speculation held that all college athletics would be abandoned 
during the war. Despite the urging of athletic administrators that 
football and other "combative" sports be incorporated as a toughening 
regime for men awaiting the draft, a special meeting of the Association 
of American Colleges resolved on October 29, 1942, for the suspension 
of intercollegiate athletics in exchange for a system of "intramural 
games" as a "general rule for the duration of the war." The Philadel-
phia meeting of college presidents, deans, and professors was held in 
an emergency move to find answers for the increasing problems of sur-
. 1 f h A . . . 66 v1va o t e mer1can campus 1n wart1me. Enrollment had dropped 
steadily since the national emergency began in 1940. With the lowering 
of the draft age and the call up of Army enlisted reservists, the col-
leges, faced with economic starvation, were forced to place their hopes 
on continuation of the Navy training plans. Austerity was hard to com-
municate with the continuation of "unnessential" programs such as var-
sity athletics. Some higher learning centers had practically ceased to 
exist. One state university, Wyoming, had more military students (698) 
than civilians (637). Even with this infusion, the institution suffered 
a one-third drop in enrollment. A private college, Muhlenburg, en-
rolled only 142 non-military students for the 1943 fall semester and had 
. 67 an 1nflux of 440 Navy men. 
Football was on loose footing. The game was subject to critical 
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evaluation in the professional journal School and Society. Doubt was 
expressed that such rugged games prepared men for the Armed Services, 
regarding them instead as a wasteful diversion from accelerated academic 
d h d d f '1' d . 68 programs an t e eman s o m1 1tary reserve ut1es. On January 11, 
1943, the Louisiana State Board of Regents banned intercollegiate ath-
letics, recommending that coaching staffs devote all their energies to 
69 "well-balanced" physical education courses. The students themselves 
probably preferred the continuance of sports. Respondents to one poll 
at the University of Oklahoma favored the maintenance of such activities 
by a two to one margin; only twenty-seven percent of those favoring 
abolishment held such views on account of "more important things to do" 
or "loss of time." Most opponents objected to the expense or transpor-
70 tation difficulties involved and some merely to "mediocre football." 
The main question was over who was to be served by the programs. 
By June of 1943, every varsity athlete at Oklahoma A & M had been in-
ducted or had left school for war work. The college, which had sixty 
freshman football players alone in the fall of 1941, dropped its re-
strictions against freshman participation in 1942 and maintained its 
football with that same number of varsity participants. Thirty-seven 
of this group were gone by January of 1943, and the remaining athletes 
on campus left with the induction en masse of the ROTC Cadet Corps in 
d h 11 f . . 71 May an t e ca -up o Mar1ne Reserves 1n June. Coaches were forced 
to adopt a rationale for operating intercollegiate athletics without 
the presence of highly skilled recruits. 
The NCAA, the main representative for intercollegiate athletics, 
was never on solid footing with those officials primarily responsible 
for orchestrating the wartime approach to higher education. A committee 
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from the athletic group had moved in January of 1942 to impress the 
national meeting of college and university presidents of the unique 
qualities that sports offered to education in a crises but had re-
ceived a decidedly "cool" if not impatient reception, 72 an attitude 
that changed little by the time of the October conference of presidents 
and deans. Neither had the NCAA taken part in any unified way to de-
velop the Office of Education guidelines for physical training in the 
college. Advice to the colleges came primarily from the Office of 
Civilian Defense, the American Association of Health, Physical Educa-
tion and Recreation, and the War Department. A government report which 
appeared in February of 1943 made a weak stand for the maintenance of 
athletics in the fitness plan. 73 
The football issue was central to the survival of intercollegiate 
athletics. Its coaches' group was more active, its economic impact more 
profound, its participants more numerous, and its organizational makeup 
more sophisticated than other team sports. Football's survival had 
greater impact on the philosophical approach to the war. Measures taken 
to save football were indicative of the interest in saving the values 
which had marked its evolution. With manpower dwindling, its advocates, 
who were some of the most patriotic of citizens, dared not justify any 
diversion from the war effort in either men or material. Therefore they 
were forced to put the ideal of "athletics for all" into operation to 
save their games. The game had barely survived in World War I at the 
sufferance of the War and Navy Department because it had sprung from an 
era of the noble sportsman. This philosophy continued to guide organ-
ized sport in the Second World War. In 1917 Secretary of War Newton 
Baker had demanded that "the gospel of college athletics should be 
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athletics for al1, 1174 and in a remarkable speech at the NCAA convention, 
President William H. P. Faunce of Brown University laid down a creed 
which is similar to the philosophy stressed duzing World War II: 
Now under the stress of the urgent mobilization of 
all the powers and resources of the people, we are 
asking of every institution and every method: 'Can 
it, does it serve the nation?' Unless college sports 
can demonstrate today that they are more than trifles, 
more than costly advertisement, more than a pedestal 
for individual notoriety, uniess they can be shown to 
make better citizens and so better soldiers, unless 
they can produce men capable of demo·cratic, whole-
souled cooperation in devotion to the ideals of the 
nation, they will be sent to the scrap heap by an 
indignant people. If they are the costly luxuries 
of a leisure class, we will fling them aside during 
the war and long years after. If they are essential 
to the building of a democratic and justice-loving 
nation, they are more needed in a long and 'desperate 
struggle than in all the piping times of peace. Do 
they produce men resourceful and self-reliant, 
courageous yet restrained, virile yet courteous, 
aggressive yet patient--do they make a man captain 
of his soul?75 
It was within this heritage that the executive committee of the 
Football Coaches Association resolved on November 25, 1942, to "extend 
the values of competitive football to all physically qualified male 
students in the schools and colleges ••• for the training of young men for 
"1" . ,,76 m1 1tary serv1ce. This was followed on December 9 by a similar meas-
ure by the members of the Eastern Intercollegiate Football Association, 
who proposed that "an extensive program of intercollegiate competition 
in combat sports should be maintained as an essential contribution in 
• • f I 77 tra1n1ng or war ••• •' · This was echoed three days later by members of 
. 78 the collegiate Lacrosse group, whose keynote was "f1ght for Lacro.sse." 
The NCAA convention, which met on December 29, 1942, was saddled 
with the responsibility of developing a concrete plan to keep athletics 
going. The NCAA was not in unanimity over its exact stance. One 
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faction wanted to promote a war program aggressively; others wanted to 
wait for advice from the Office of Education. One representative demon-
strated the group's perplexity by observing the need for having ''some-
thing in writing from our government officials, because in times of war, 
we are all accustomed to taking orders. 1179 Recriminative discussions 
were aimed at the Army and the u. s. Office of Education for their lack 
of positive leadership in the field of athletic training. War Department 
representatives at the meeting chastised the collegiate representatives 
for not fighting for their own needs. Air Corps athletic officer James 
Pixlee argued that the colleges should enlarge without apologies on any 
guidelines, and he criticized the attitude of waiting for someone in 
80 Washington to tell them what to do. Another Army delegate urged the 
NCAA "to get in there and fight" for a War Department directive on ath-
1 . f d . 81 et1cs or stu ent tra1nees. John Griffith warned those who favored 
a moratorium on athletics that there were those who would use the oc-
casion to "end the administration we have of our intercollegiate ath-
letics." Griffith reflected the mood of the meeting by insisting, "T;f 
we do not fight for it, nobody else will. We cannot expect the fellows 
that are engaged in the other courses of education to come out and battle 
f h b 1 . ,82 or w at we e 1eve •••• The response was a twofold attraction to 
encourage the participation in athletics of Army and Navy trainees, who 
were to be assigned to college campuses. The main feature was a resolu-
tion aimed at the government and alluding to "statements of officers on 
the armed forces," which indicated that "competitive sports ••• have 
developed in our college athletes, qualities which have made them better 
leaders and fighters." The resolution asked member institutions to 
"preserve the values to the armed services already demonstrated in 
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competitive sport, by continuing programs ••• wherever the facilities and 
equipment permit, and wherever such competition is consistent with the 
83 limitation imposed by the war effort." The group also waived its one-
year residence rule for eligibility to accommodate the new students. 84 
An NCAA committee led by Marine Lieutenant Colonel Thurstien L. 
Davies, who was on leave from the presidency of Colorado College, met 
with Army and Navy officials early in January, 1943, to promote the 
resolutions. Although not receiving definite assurances of cooperation, 
85 the envoys were encouraged by both branches. Although some colleges 
were deciding to abandon their programs, others optimistically went 
ahead, aiming to use athletics as part of their war readiness programs. 
Athletic Director Dale Arbuckle of the University of Oklahoma announced 
OU's perserverance in wartime football with the admonition that it en-
abled prospective soldiers to acquire "an instinctive combativeness that 
86 is difficult to teach soldiers who haven't been in sports." Coaches 
at most midwestern universities invited all interested students out for 
. 87 spring football as preparation for military serv1ce. Some held drills 
even though anticipating the suspension of football in the fall. Of the 
eighty candidates at the University of Oregon, fifty did not even con-
88 template attendance for the following academic year. 
On February 12, 1943, the War Department crushed hopes of the 
athletic enthusiasts when it announced that students in its Army Spe-
cialized Training Program (ASTP) could not participate in inter-
collegiate contests because of an intense training schedule. This was 
later attributed by Secretary Stimson to advice given to the War Depart-
f d f . . h 1 89 ment rom eans o eng1neer1ng sc oo s. The announcement was inter-
90 preted by one writer as "a knockout blow to college football," and 
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Arthur Daley remarked that the prospect for intercollegiate sports 
" h d bl k 1 k " 91 never a so ea an out oo •••• 
The ASTP had been approved in September, 1942, in anticipation of 
the lowering of the draft age. Its operation supposedly guaranteed a 
continuous flow of technically and professionally trained men for the 
prosecution of the war. However, after its formal establishment in De-
cember and the contracting with colleges for facilities, General Leslie 
McNair, director of combat training for the Army, objected to it because 
92 
of the plan to direct men already in training into college courses. 
According to General Marshall, the situation aggravated an already 
critical situation in combat arms, for prime "physically fit men, cap-
able of rapidly absorbing training for combat," would be diverted into 
a not too convincing civilian type training exercise. 93 The ASTP was 
also a political arrangement which struck a compromise between civilian 
college administrators, the War Manpower Commission, and the War Depart-
ment. The result was an austere program by which the War Department 
had its men gain the most benefit in the shortest amount of time, and 
the WMC avoided criticism for an unnecessary diversion of physically 
fit young men from the war effort while it drafted married men with 
children. The ASTP college advisory board had no choice except to go 
along with an accelerated and highly regimented program, which left no 
room for "frills," such as participating in collegiate activities 
separate from the Army curriculum. McNair still made one last attempt 
to stop the training program on January 25, 1943, shortly before its 
announcement to the public. 94 
Not being privy to Army personnel needs, Griffith was sure the 
culprits in the disappointment to college athletics were college 
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presidents who had helped draft the ASTP curriculum. He suspected that 
they had advised Army officials to take a stand against college ath-
. 95 
let~cs. He accused the presidents of an educational theory which in-
sidiously used military training to strip students of their home-
induced values. Griffith's conservative bent made him suspicious of 
social experimentation in the guise of national emergency, and he ex-
claimed, 
••• is it better for the schools to conduct a satis-
factory physical training program for all of the 
students thus leaving the boy in the home and under 
the influence of the church and the school, or is 
it better to send him to a military camp where a 
great deal of time will be spent building him up 
physically? 96 
The Big Ten Commissioner was certain that the ASTP was a facade for the 
government to inaugurate a type of universal military training for 
seventeen to nineteen year-old youths which could be easily manipulated 
into a peacetime program at the war's end. Its "anti-athleticism" was 
seen as a means for stifling free expression, and he blamed it on the 
educationist leadership of the "liberal" presidents of several univer-
sities, including those from Johns Hopkins, Harverford, Stanford, 
. 97 Florida, Fordham, Wisconsin, Penn State, and Carneg~e Tech. 
Physical drill for students in the Army schools included competi-
tive team sports, as well as body building exercises. Although not 
meeting collegiate sport advocates' wishes for Army participation in 
regular campus varsity play, it was a significant departure from pre-
vious Army policy, which had denied sports participation in training 
and allowed it at advanced bases only on off-duty time. The program 
included several contact type games and was justified for the same 
"social" reasons so often emphasized by Griffith and others. 98 
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Fortunately for college athletics and the boosters of training in 
"social" qualities, the Navy took a far different approach in launching 
its V-12 schools outline. Its announcement, on February 21, 1943, took 
place only days after the Army declaration and allowed Navy students to 
participate in a wide range of campus activities, including such extra-
curriculars as fraternities and varsity athletics. The V-12 plan was a 
continuation of the Navy's "V" programs, replacing the earlier plans 
with the pool of enlisted reservists still in college under the old 
V-1, V-7 and V-5 curriculum, as well as the enlistment for active duty 
of college-age youth between seventeen and twenty-three years of age. 
Following the suspension of Navy enlistments in February, 1943, the 
draft made heavy inroads into the potential supply of Naval Reserve of-
ficers. It was circumvented by the V-12 plan which filled the Navy's 
need for men for replacement into the Reserve midshipmen's schools and 
for direct commissions. Most of the 84,016 commissioned officers in the 
Navy as of December 31, 1944, had come through the V-12 related col-
99 leges. These so-called "ninety day wonders" trained at the contract-
ing institutions for periods ranging from four months to two years, de-
pending on their subject speciality. 
Although the V-12 subjects were uniformed Naval personnel drawing 
pay and allowances, their presence was an absolute boon to college ath-
letics. Although some form of physical training was required daily, 
students were "permitted to take part in all college athletics and other 
activities of the campus on the same basis as civilian students." Other 
military drill was kept at a minimum, and the Navy students were al~ 
lowed to enter their college of preference. Although this selection was 
limited to the colleges which held V-12 contracts or courses of study 
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and billets open to the individual schools, it allowed certain students, 
. 1 d' thl . h 11 f h . . 1 . 100 ~nc u ~ng a etes, to stay ~n t e co ege o t e~r matr~cu at~on. 
The waiver by the Bureau of Personnel of its compulsory daily physical 
training for men who participated in varsity sports was a major victory 
for proponents of the V-5 system of sports conditioning. If the com-
bined military schools operation had saved higher education in World 
War II from economic disaster, then surely the Navy saved college ath-
letics. 
Member schools of the NCAA, eager for the recognition and finan-
cial remuneration that would come from attracting military students, 
dropped all pretense of maintaining eligibility standards. Prohibitions 
against professionalism was the only exception. Freshmen had been 
eligible since 1942, and in the spring of 1943 other barriers were 
dropped, including regulations restricting transfers, the residence 
rule, minimum enrollment hours, and grade requirements. These had been 
part of long years of reform. Eligibility for military personnel with 
101 only a casual relationship to the college was urged. Although the 
latter was resisted, there was generous bending of the rules in some 
cases, all in the name of keeping athletics alive. Even non-students 
participated, if, as in the Big Ten, they could show their intent to en-
roll for the October semester under the wartime acceleration of summer 
registration. 102 This "patriotic" move prompted Gene Tunney to wryly 
observe: " ••• The trouble with the Big Ten ••• is the fear of losing 
revenue. h f 11 . . . . d 1 "103 T ese e ows ~ns~st upon rema~n~ng a o escents. By late 
August, 1943, even the academically rigid Southern Conference yielded to 
104 the suspension of the rules by a narrow vote. This type of indul-
gence was too much for some staid eastern institutions such as Harvard 
and Yale, which severed their relationship from intercollegiate ath-
letics, allowing teams only to operate on a club basis. 
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By July, 1943, at least 374 colleges had been selected for mili-
tary training, only 131 of which were Navy. 105 It was obvious that 
these with Navy programs would be able to keep athletics, while those 
with purely Army students would not, and this question was the cause of 
a lively effort to persuade a change in Army policy. Griffith feared 
that the Army's failure in this regard would kill college sport. An 
advertisement in the May, 1943, issue of his Journal, placed by the 
"Athletic Institute" of Chicago, was headed by the admonition that 
"Gremlins Must Not Sabotage Our American System of Sports." The "in-
stitute" proclaimed, "Today our American sports machine is a 'war rna-
chine' ••• physically trained ••• and mentally schooled ••• to make victorious 
decisions ••• in major campaigns or hand to hand combat." 106 
The lobbying directed at the ASTP program kept the athletic con-
troversy alive, and struggle over ASTP athletics lasted well into Sep-
tember, 1943. The ASTP program had already engendered enough appear-
ances of wasted effort without attaching the issue of sport, and 
Congressional efforts to get the War Department to rescind the pro-
hibition reached a surprisingly high pitch. Representative Samuel 
Weiss of Pennsylvania, a former star college player and a game official 
for the National Football League, protested the decision in a letter to 
Stimson on May 4, 1943, pointing out the inconsistency of the Depart-
ment 1 s policy in respect to that of the Navy. Weiss promoted the fa-
miliar theme that sports would "bring about a greater degree of develop-
ment in our soldier boys because of physical combat and competition." 
The Congressman was also concerned about an intriguing element in the 
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ability of the United States Government to influence the American 
psyche through the control of institutions. Weiss pointed to letters 
from American soldiers stationed in England who expressed surprise in 
the broad number of normal athletic events, including soccer matches 
with crowds ranging up to 105,000, despite that country's nearness to 
107 the war zoneo 
Stimson 1 s "categoric denial" to the Weiss request for ASTP ath-
letics pointed out that the Army was not collegiate in character, col-
leges being used to train such military units "only because military 
facilities are insufficient •••• " Taking note of the large number of 
colleges reducing their programs due to transportation exigencies, the 
Secretary questioned the propriety of military excesses in that area 
d . . h . d f f" h . 108 u an 1ts 1mpact on t e att1tu e o troops 1g t1ng overseas. n-
daunted, Weiss was joined in his protest by fellow Representative 
Lawrence Dilweg of Wisconsin and A. S. (Mike) Monroney of Oklahoma, who 
petitioned the Assistant Chief of Staff and Under Secretary Robert Pat-
h f II A . hl . "109 terson in t e interest o saving our merican way 1n at et1cs. 
Meanwhile the Secretary of War left for a tour of American military 
bases in England and, having attended a football game between American 
units there, was thought to have had enough of a first~hand knowledge 
of the morale issue to influence Marshall's ideas on physical training 
requirements for the ASTP. The issue was raised again in mid-summer 
when some schools made known their intention for proceeding with fall 
football schedules by relying on the Army students since no "official" 
1. h d b d . . 110 ru 1ng a een rna e aga1nst 1t. 
A committee headed by Weiss, and including Di lweg, Monroney, F. 
Edward Hebert of Louisiana, and c. w. Bishop of Illinois, circulated a 
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petition among the House membership for submission to Stimson upon his 
return. Weiss, in another letter charged the Army with inconsistency 
both in the matter of its own off=duty time practices at other posts 
and comparisons with Navy training. This letter and a later telegram 
to President Roosevelt on July 15, 1943, was accompanied by the pe~ 
tit ion, for which Weiss claimed two hundred names. 111 In it the Penn~ 
sylvania democrat observed the "present discrimination existing between 
112 the A-12 and V-12 Army and Navy athletic programs." The more pro-
tests directed against the operation of the ASTP plan, the more muddled 
it became. Scheduled to begin on college campuses as early as March 1, 
1943, it bogged down due to manpower deficiencies in combat training 
caused by reduction of spring induction quotas and the discharge of 
h d f d 1 ' . d d . 113 t ousan o overage an 1m1te uty serv1ce men. By late May it was 
114 sti 11 "struggling to get s~arted." Whenever the co 11ege training did 
begin in July, public opposition to boys in uniform attending classes 
on college campuses while fathers were being drafted "created a situa-
tion" in some college communities, according to Selective Service Di-
. 115 rector Lewis Hershey as "difficult to descr1be." 
Driving on to a finish in the matter, eastern athletic directors 
moved down the Army chain of command to present their case. On July 28, 
1943, they conferred with the director of the Army schools program, who 
argued that the Army curriculum would have to be redrawn completely to 
accommodate the requests of athletic promoters. Support for the ath-
letic directors continued to pour in to the War Department. John B. 
K 11 1 ff · ' 1 · h · · 1· de a, 116 and one 
e y ent o 1c1a sanct1on to t e reorgan1zat1on 
member of Congress described the situation as "working against the Army 
in that many fine young prospects for the service are choosing the 
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Navy" for the reason of college athletics alone. 117 
Roosevelt did not answer Weiss's communication of July 15, pre-
ferring to let Stimson make the final disposition. A friend of or-
ganized athletics in the War Department, New York baseball executive 
Larry MacPhail held out hope that the President might reopen the ASTP 
. . . 118 b s d 1 h " 1 1 h tra1.n1.ng quest1.on, ut timson e ivered t e fina b ow to t e foot-
ball and athletic question in a letter to Weiss on August 11. In it 
Stimson relayed responsibility for the physical training decision on to 
the committee of deans and presidents which devised the curriculum 
around intramural traininge Stimson was particularly concerned that 
competitive athletics in the program would cause the disruption of the 
entire curriculum to satisfy "simply the 3 or 4 percent who might qual-
ify for intercollegiate athletics," thereby detracting from the War 
Department's serious concerns on obstacles to training men in the least 
f 0 119 amount o t 1.me o 
The Stimson fiat loosed a flood of decisions by college officials 
not to have their institutions continue in college football, the stand-
ard bearer of college sporto This was an indication of the austerity 
that the American people would have to admit on the social front if 
they were to adopt a 11war psychology&" The colleges with the 70,000 
V =12 trainees continued football. For the most part, those with the 
140,000 11A-12 11 students did not. Michigan State, one of the major col-
leges to suspend the sport, had only one of 135 students remaining who 
had played freshman or varsity football in 1942. 120 They were joined 
by the universities of Alabama and Tennessee, both major "Bowl" schools, 
as well as the majority of colleges in the Southeastern and Pacific 
Coast conferencese Altogether, 321 of the 360 schools to suspend 
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football in World War II made the decision in 1943. 121 A total of 356 
teams had been suspended by that fall. This included but 20 of the 124 
122 Navy colleges. The remaining 336 were those with Army or purely 
civilian constituency. 
Despite directives against it, several "A~l2" complements engaged 
in varsity games of one sort or another, usually disguised as intra-
mural or club activities, and the controversy over bringing the men into 
the regular college activities never really abated. On September 13, 
1943, War Mobilization Director James Byrnes suggested to Stimson that 
it "would be a wise thing if the Army and Navy could get together and 
1 11 hl . y 123 agree upon a po icy as to interco egiate at et1cs.' Stimson was 
bemused that such a "gigantic subject" could have such wide range of 
interest without a final answer, even to the point of cabinet level dis-
cussions with the President, and he implored Byrnes not to "shake his 
gory locks" about it. 124 In October, Stimson promised action on the 
subject through the Army-Navy Personnel Board before the following 
. 125 spn.ng. Army acceptance of the ASTP function itself, however, was 
waning. McNair was not able to resolve his difficulties in the training 
of enough combat infantrymen for the spring invasion of German~held 
France, and he placed increasing pressure on Marshall to raid the ASTP 
f . 126 or troopso The War Department on February 18, 1944, ordered the 
colleges swept clean of "A-l2 1 s" except for a few students in dentistry, 
medicine, and engineering. They were replaced by seventeen year old 
127 pre~induction reservists, with a complement not to exceed 35,000 men. 
Although the ASTP remained, the question of their participation in var-
sity sport on college campuses was largely a moot one, and, according to 
School and Socie!..Y., their reduction "posed ••• the most serious problem 
162 
128 that the higher institutions have had to face since Pearl Harbor." 
Army units assigned to the campuses were intensely trained in both 
academic and physical subjects, leaving little time for intercollegiate 
games despite civilian protests to the contrary. Organized study and 
h . 1 . . k f.f . h k 129 . dd" . p ys1ca tra1n1ng too up 1 ty-n1ne ours per wee , 1n a 1t1on to 
other military duties, leading one trainee to complain that only an hour 
and fifteen minutes free time daily was left6 130 The rugged physical 
training program was designed for six hours per week plus intramural 
sportso Unlike the Navy schools, this was handled by mostly civilian 
college instructors, many of whom were coaches without regular teams to 
direct. 131 One such program included two hours of swinnning instruction 
per week plus ju jitsu, wrestling, boxing, and "alley fighting," as 
well as intramural basketball and football. Another student speculated 
that two and a half years of college were crammed into forty-eight 
132 weeks. 
That college football did carry on in a limited fashion in 1943 
was a credit to the V~l2 innovators as well as to ideologists of com-
petitive sport such as Tom Hamilton, John Griffith, and Columbia's Lou 
Little. Little keynoted the 1943 effort in an article which appeared 
in that year's ~NCAA Guide entitled "College Football Is at War." 
With almost all ccd.legiate athletes of that season destined to be either 
V-12 or pre=inductees, their paragons-had managed to build football into 
little short of idealogical and combat training. Little, writing in 
such a vein, called 1943 the "most important year the sport has ever 
had"- and foresaw an end to the brand of physical education philosophy 
h f 1 d 1 h d . 133 t at ai e to uti ize competition in a ar en1ng program. 
However, problems associated with manpower continued to harass 
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athletic programso Many schools revised their game contracts to call 
for holding games in nearby population centers rather than tax trans-
. f "1" . 134 portat1on ac1 1t1es. Although overall attendance was reduced 18.4 
percent by transportation restrictions, the 1943 football season was 
hardly affected by disinterest. In well-populated areas, such as the 
East and West Coasts, attendance remained relatively normal despite the 
decreased caliber of play. 135 The University of Pennsylvania averaged 
136 43,475 spectators for eight home games. It, along with Michigan, 
Army, Navy, Notre Dame, and Southern California, played to crowds rang-
ing from 70,000 to 90,000 people. 
Athletic participation at the Navy schools enjoyed a veritable 
boom. A record 113 football players reported at Purdue, 105 came out 
for Harvard's club team, eighty of them V-12's, as were sixty of Prince-
'137 ton's one hundred man squad. Colleges waited with apprehension for 
the number of trainees each service allotted to them. The academic 
specialt;ies of the student determined how much extracurricular activity \ 
would be in the offing. The University of Oklahoma was assigned 1,013 
Army and 695 Navy trainees, but 465 of the Navy men were engineers or 
pre=medical trainees, an indication of little time for the frivolity of 
varsity games. 138 Only thirty=four "Sooners" reported for football, 
including twenty-six V-1.2's, three seventeen-year=olds, and four de-
139 ferred students. Notre Dame, on the other hand, was assigned 1,851 
Navy trainees, more than any other college except Dartmouth, which had 
2, 000. 140 In this number was .a huge complement of Marines, which in-
eluded most of the returning players and a n~ber of transfers from 
other schools. Needless to say, the "Irish" enjoyed a successful sea-
son, and their Marine quarterback, Angelo Bartelli, won the Reisman 
trophy. 
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The Navy also enlarged facilities and equipment inventories, bring-
ing numerous well-trained physical training staffs to assist with the 
athletic programsQ With the deficiency in civilian staffs, the col-
leges, although contracting with the Navy to furnish physical education 
I 
and coaching personnel separate from the Navy, were forced to rely on 
Naval people. Villanova. University could muster but one civilian coach 
for its 578 V~12 students, whereupon six physical specialists served as 
assistant football coaches~ 141 Other civilian employees in athletics 
took a back seat to the Navy leadership in such circumstancese The As-
sistant Navy Director for Physical Training wrote that this practice 
amounted to a "pension" for some contracted instructors. 142 
Some universities almost took on the identity of the Navy, and, 
for all practical purposes, the V-12 connnandant ran the athletic pro-
gramso Practices were limited to one hour per day by Navy authorities, 
inasmuch as duty time physical conditioning had already prepared men 
for peak effort. The commandant also dictated academic eligibility 
rules for his troops, determined how long they could be absent from 
base and whether or not they could play when injured. The University 
of Oklahoma was not allowed to play its star halfback in an important 
Big Six conference game because he had a bad cold. After much wrangling 
with the commandant, Coach Dewey (Snorter) Luster managed to forge an 
agreement allowing the boy to play two plays, one in each half. Subse-
quently, the "Sooners'v got the ball down to the one yard line on those 
occasions, and the lad obligingly scored two touchdowns. 143 This type 
of contention led Luster to refer to the Navy official not so affection-
144 ately as "old Gold Almightyo 11 More often than not, however, a great 
deal of pride was attached to the institutional affinity with the Navy, 
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d h d II • h d f· .• h '' 145 an t e men -were urge to g:tve t em a goo Navy :tg t. 
Other schools placed their programs under austerity discipline. 
Princeton allowed a seven-game schedule, but the dean of the college 
limited practices to one hour per day, allowed no games during examina~ 
146 
tions 1 and to l.erated no absences to follow the team~ These £actors 
extremely U.roited the 1. 943 schedule. Only 197 of the prewar 560 teams 
played, and they averaged but six games each, compared to nine games in 
l.941 and eight in 1942o 1.!~ 7 
Without the V~12 men, there would have been no athletic schedules. 
As 1.942 was the year of the V=5, 1943 was the "year of the V~12. 11 
There were three ways colleges could libeef up'' their rosters: with 
V=l2 1 s, as was the case for Notre Dame, Georgia Tech, Purdue, Duke, 
Michigan, Northwestern, Dartmouth, Texas, College of Pacific, Southern 
California and Oklahoma; with seventeen~year~olds, the situation that 
existed wi t.h Texas A & M, Louisiana State, and Indiana; or with the 
4- .. F's, the most notable example being Tulsa. 148 The futility of oper~ 
at:.ing programs without Navy boys can readily be seen in their dominance 
on rosters where they were matched against the civilian talent avail-
able. In the Big Ten, 236 V~12's saturated rosters, compared to 268 
" "1. 149 b . . d. . d 1 h 1 h . f 1 C.lVI .. 1.ans, ut :tn 1n 1 v1 ua sc oo s, t e :tn uence was more pre~ 
ponderant. Duke University had a huge Navy-Marine contingent of over 
1, 500 men, 150 and 118 reported for the football team, the largest in 
the school's history. The squad was divided for two separate schedules. 
Marine representation led to the holdover of "Blue Devil" talent plus 
numerous transfers from over the South, including representatives from 
Auburn, Mississippi State, Wake Forest, Tennessee, Georgia, and South 
C 1 . . . . 151 .aro :tna un1vers1t1es. 
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Men were transferred from school to school and wound up playing 
for erstwhile bitter rivalsQ Colleges without Navy programs found their 
former stars making spectacular plays against their own war~weakened 
teams on Saturday afternoon. Dartmouth had representatives of fifteen 
other colleges on its varsity, including half the 1942 Fordham team, 
which had to drop football when its enrollment decreased to 450 civil= 
ians and 850 ASTP's. 152 Such "lend-lease" players showed up everywhere. 
Michigan enjoyed the services of Bill Daley of Minnesota, who made All-
American, and Elroy 11Crazy Legs" Hirsch of Wisconsin. 153 Ten former 
Wisconsin students helped Michigan give the Badgers a terrible beat~ 
. 154 1ng. All Big Ten, Fullback Tony Butkovich and five other Purdue 
players were from Illinois, 155 and Georgia Tech's Sugar Bowl team had 
starting players from Tech, Alabama, Vanderbilt, and Texas A & M. 156 
The star halfback for the University of Oklahoma's Big Six Champions 
was a V=12 physical instructor, Bob Brumley, who enrolled in some grad-
uate courses following a successful career at Rice Institute. He gained 
f 1 . "b. 1" . d 1 . 1 157 an extra year o e 1g1 1 1ty un er oose wart1me ru es. 
The v~12 course lasted but for months for most cadets, and gradua-
tion took place the last of October, resulting in the transfer of men 
in the latter stages of the season., What the V -12 gave, it could also 
take awayo Texas Christian University lost eighteen players and 
158 finished the season with twenty-one men. Undefeated Southern Cali~ 
fornia had its season spoiled by another seagoing outfit, the San Diego 
159 Navy, the week after a number of the USC troops were transferred. 
Another oddity saw the University of Pennsylvania's team captain trans-
160 ferred to Cornell the week before Penn was to play there. 
Some small colleges became "over-night" football powerhouses as a 
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result of Navy policy. Marine Corps V=l2 units were often isolated in 
small schools. Since the nLeathernecks" attracted the "cream" of col-
lege athletes, these tiny institutions wound up with outstanding foot-
ball squads. Colorado College, Rochester University, Southwestern 
Louisiana Institute, and Southwestern University of Texas had two years 
of fame under the service athletic policy. Colorado Springs, whose 
president was a Marine Lieutenant Colonel, served as a bastion of foot-
ball in the Rocky Mountain region where most schools abandoned sports 
due to manpower and travel difficulties. The "Tigers" had former 
players from Brigham Young, California, Utah State, Utah, Colorado, and 
Stanford universities, and eight of them were listed on the eleven-man 
All Rocky Mountain team. 161 The "student body" was made up of 384 
M 0 d 225 . "1" 162 ar1nes an. c1v1 1ans. Southwestern Institute had a collection 
of seventeen former Rice men, plus star LSU halfback Alvin Dark and 
h f . . . . 163 S h f G many ot ers rom maJor un1vers1t1es; out western o eorgetown, 
Texas, defeated Southwest Conference Champion Texas University by using 
164 many members of the 1942 11Longhornru team. 
None of these schools received national recognition for wartime 
athletic exploits. The Navy forty=eight-hour rule excluded a bowl ap-
pearance for Colorado College, and no major bowl would invite the 
others. The Georgetown school got into the Sun Bowl and defeated the 
University of New Mexico, and the Oil Bowl in Houston was initiated to 
"showcase" the SLI talent from Rice. 165 Southwestern Louisiana, since 
d f d h - rvp· 11 d · d Randolph F1"eld, 166 one of 
it e eate t e Georgetown 1rates an t1e 
the nation's best military clubs, could have laid claim to the National 
Championship, if it had played more 11known" teamso However, as one 
coach said, 11 Big name teams don't like the idea of getting licked by a 
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little college, even in wartime. 11167 The two Southwestern schools 
later played their own "mythical" collegiate championship game with 
SLI and the "mysterious Marines" of Georgetown playing to a 6-6 tie in 
the 1945 Oil Bow1. 168 
The "real" championship of 1943, at least in the eyes of the 
Associated Press, was won by the Marines of Notre Dame, which had more 
material than any other college team, including the military academies. 
The "Irish" were able to retain much of their 1942 squad and won handily 
169 over the Naval Academy before 82,000 at Cleveland, the last game be-
fore Bartelli 1 s transfer to boot camp. They easily beat Army and upset 
powerful Iowa Preflight after his departure. Ironically the "Fighting 
Irish" were edged in their last game by Creak Lakes Navy, a game in 
which a Notre Dame player of the previous year, Emil Sitko, played a 
. 170 key role for the "BlueJackets." 
The dominance of the Navy in collegiate sport was displayed in the 
Reisman football trophy voting. Eight of the top nine candidates were 
171 Navy trainees, and the other was an Annapolis student. Eight of the 
eleven Associated Press All-Americans were also V-12 or V-5 under-
graduates, one was an Academy midshipman, and another was an Army Ca-
d 172 et. Every ranked team in the final football poll was associated 
173 with the Navy. 
Other clubs trusted that the Selective Service would allow their 
seventeen-year-old freshmen to become eighteen-year-old sophomores. 
Ohio State had sixty of the tender youngsters and another five "4-F's" 
174 as their sole entry into intercollegiate football, and Oklahoma A & 
M coach Jim Lookabaugh invited every seventeen-year-old player in the 
. 175 state to the 11Aggies 111 accelerated sunnner pract1.ces. Such teams 
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could hardly compete with the Navy teams, and many refused to play the 
V~l2 powered schoolso Some who could were Texas A & M and LSU, which 
played each other in the Orange Bowl, and Tulsa University, which was 
barely beaten in the Sugar Bowl by V~l2 Georgia Tech. 
The Tulsa story is one of the most remarkable of wartime sport. 
The nHurricanesn relied on twenty~four men who were unable 'physically 
to meet the requirements for active duty. They were all n4-F's. 11176 
The city was a petroleum center and, during the war, became a leading 
aircraft production center for McDonnell-Douglas Corporation. Leading 
business men and boosters of the University saw the war as an oppor-
tunity to gain recognition for the rapidly growing young city through 
. 11 0 hl 0 177 wart1me exce ence 1n at et1cs. The tiny university attained its 
first national recognition during the 1942 season by nearly beating the 
University of Tennessee in the 1943 Sugar Bowl. Whereas Tennessee 
abandoned interco llegiates, Tulsa took the opportunity to recruiting 
physically deferred boys from neglected football programs all over the 
countryo 
Many of the younger men wanted war industry work, and the team's 
coach, Henry Frnka, solicited married men with family deferments to 
work in local war plants and also attend college part-time. Other de~ 
ferred students, including the star quarterback, were brought into the 
11 f 1 . . . 178 co ege o petro .eum eng1neer1ngo The "baling wire boys" arrived 
from at least ten other colleges, as well as high schools from all over 
the Southwest. 179 The maladies of the 11 4~F's" included that of a one-
armed guard, Ellis Jones, who made some All-American teams. The team's 
star fullback had a severed Achilles tendon, another back had osteomy-
elitis, a tackle had one lung, and others had ailments including a 
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withered arm, perforated eardrums, and bad eyesight. The Tulsans also 
used some of the best seventeen=year-old freshmen around and an over-
weight 290 pound eighteen-year-old. The roster also included some dis-
h d . 180 c arge serv~ce men. This unit was good enough to outclass Big Six 
Champion Oklahoma and tie the Georgetown Marines enroute to an unde-
181 feated season, drawing the awed admiration of the nationally syndi-
cated press and the boosterism of local writers. 
Much criticism was directed at the synthetic nature and the war-
time propriety of such campaigning. Forrest 11Phog11 Allen, Athletic Di-
rector at the University of Kansas, claimed that such efforts took ad-
182 vantage of lax wartime eligibility codes. A Tulsa writer answered 
barbs with ''so long as the revised rules are obeyed no one will look 
d · · . · b d 1 11183 h"l S 1 F k f h N 
goo cr1t~c~z~ng any o y e se ••• , w ~ e tan ey ran o t e ew 
York Post was quoted as saying that "Tulsa probably deserves recogni-
tion as the No. 1 college team of the year because it is one of the 
very few teams that really belongs in that category." Frank gouged 
some of the more prosperous universities for their timidity, claiming 
that some 11football powers ••• ran for cover at the first hint of danger 
to big box office receipts. 11 He condemned the hypocrisy of those who 
pointed to the rvideali.stic fervor11 · which college sports engendered only 
to junk games "w·hen their students never were in greater need of such 
benefits~rr 184 Another writer, Ed Danforth, was quoted after the Sugar 
Bow·l as saying, 11 lf those Tulsans were 4~F, then the Army has been 
sound asleep o 185 They'would make ideal commando troops." 
Financial support for higher education among Negro schools, al-
186 ready marginal, was particularly difficult with reduced enrollments, 
and all but a few colleges suspended intercollegiate activity. 
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Thirty-six of the fifty black college football squads suspended play 
during the war. Only fifteen opened the dismal 1943 season, and three 
of them were unable to finish their schedules. Unlike white schools, 
Negro colleges were not assigned V-12 units, and the few ASTP outfits 
could not offer much help for extracurriculars. 187 Black colleges used 
the same incentives to continue as did their white counterparts. Paul 
W. Jones, Superintendent of Cincinnati's Colored Industrial School, de-
clared that the 11 great war boosted football morale and fighting spirit." 
Victory was the "obligation of all teams. 11188 Tuskegee Institute of 
Alabama and Wilburforce College of Ohio, early in the war, played in a 
189 special game for Army Relief at the huge Soldier's Field in Chicago, 
an enterprise that white colleges avoided except on the 11All Star" 
level. 
The scarcity of opponents forced black athletes to contest other 
colleges two and three times per season as well as engaging a number of 
11 colored11 military units. Some of these bases, located on or near col-
lege campuses, became surrogates for the Negro's need for identity with 
college teams and the war effort. The two most prominent were Hampton 
Naval Training Station and Tuskegee Army Air Base. 190 The Colored In-
tercollegiate Track Meet attracted only six teams in 1944, and officials 
combined it as an invitational for the outstanding Negro military 
191 
bases. The paucity of schedules gave opportunity to develop friend-
ly rivalries with willing white schools, a barrier that was overcome by 
Delaware State College as early as the 1943 football season. 192 How-
ever, only Morgan State College of Baltimore developed anything close 
to normal collegiate activity in 1943, remaining a strong leader among 
193 black schools throughout the war. 
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The Winter of 1943~44 was a drought for sport, and intercollegiate 
basketball was submerged by military and industrial play. Forty~one 
percent of the colleges dropped basketball, despite its low demand on 
manpower, and many of those who continued had to be satisfied with a 
liberal scheduling of non-college teams. Oklahoma A & M' s National In~ 
vitational Tournament squad lost its only regular season games to Naval 
Air Station teams, which had almost all the good material. Some clubs, 
notably the universities of Loyola at New Orleans, San Francisco, and 
Arizona, played their entire schedules against service or factory 
194 clubs. Universities with V-12 units had superior talent among the 
school boys, and one state institution had over one hundred young men 
195 report for the squad. Army schools again had to get by with student 
volunteers, a difficult situation since the seventeen-year-olds often 
qualified for the draft by turning eighteen before the second semester. 
One small college, Rider of Trenton, New Jersey, found only six boys to 
make up a team, and five of them were inducted before the season was 
196 over. Oklahoma A & M utilized eligibility of an Air Force captain, 
a part time enrollee, and a freshman too tall for the draft to build a 
197 strong team. 
Little Gonzaga College defeated every Pacific Coast rival with an 
all V=l2 team, and unknown Muhlenburg reached the NIT with an all Navy 
d M . . 198 an ar1ne un1t. Iowa State College successfully mixed six V-12's, 
four V-5' s, a 4-F, and three boys aged sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen 
199 to reach the NCAA Championships. Dependency on the V -12 basketeers 
proved hectic. One mentor confessed to feeling like "a youngster who 
has found a bag of candy and is afraid someone will take it away from 
him at any minute." Complaints were also heard that the Navy boys were 
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drained from lack of sleep in this strenuous academic and physical re-
gime.200 It seemed to an athletic director in the Great Plains that 
the forty-eight=hour rule was keeping basketball players "on the train 
all the time,' 1 and the track teams in that spacious area often were re-
quired to ride in cars all night enroute to or returning from meets in 
order to return students under the deadline. 201 
With educational institutions having trouble maintaining amateur 
leadership in the rou;ndball game, attention was focused on the rising 
strength of m:ilitary=aid AAU programs. Many war-related industries 
sponsored semi~professional teams to participate in the national amateur 
tourney. The Phillips "66 1 ers" of Bartlesville, Oklahoma, and the Vul= 
tee Aircraft 11 Brakettes' 1 of Nashville, Tennessee, dominated men 1 s and 
1 d . h 202 women's p ay u.n.ng t e war. The Dunkel collegiate rating system 
proclaimed Great Lakes and Norfolk Naval Training Centers as the first-
and third=best Hfives" in the United States. In addition, fifteen Navy 
and six Army facilities were ranked in the top fifty. 203 
The interest of the military in the survival of collegiate sport 
was indicated by the continuance of the Chicago Tribune All=Star foot= 
ball game. For all practical purposes, the game should not have been 
able to continue past 1942. Manpower from recent college graduates was 
practically nil. There were not enough 4-F's to contend a good pro-
fessional champion, and the Navy, after 1943, forbade trainees to play 
in any contest not on a military reservation. The Office of Defense 
Transportation, distressed over the 101,000 who had shown up for the 
Army=Navy Relief game of 1942, forced its removal from Soldier's Field 
. 204 to Dyche Stadium 1n suburbun Evanston. Starting in 1943, the game 1 s 
sponsors had to reply on leaves for troops selected to play in the War 
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Bond exhibitions. Initially undergraduates played, many of them V-5 and 
V-12 men with college eligibility remaining. As the Navy phased its men 
out, the Army, despite its unhappy experience with War Football, Inc., 
filtered more men into the program to guarantee its successD By 1945, 
the game's sponsors were borrowing liberally from the Air Corps. Some 
of the ex-collegians played in as many as three of the wartime games on 
the "college" side. 205 By 1943, the "college". stars were able to rout 
the draft-riddled National Football Champion Washington Redskins. 206 
By the Fall of 1943 programs of off-duty time varsity athletics 
held sway at large military bases in the United States, and representa-
tives of the camps sat in on collegiate athletic meetings in order to 
solicit games. The Big Ten acconnnodated them by allowing member insti= 
tutions to play extra contents against Army and Navy clubs. Such games 
were often scheduled as on-base entertainment for troops, the colleges 
. . d 207 receLv1ng goo expense contracts. The 1943 preflight teams again 
were superior, especially Iowa City, which had six former professional 
players, its only loss coming to the Notre Dame V-12's by one point. 
However, the Navy's decision to strictly enforce its forty-eight-hour 
rule made it impossible for the V=5' s to play intersectional contests. 
The Chief of Primary Air Training also kept the preflight teams from 
using officers or ships company on their squads. This practice had been 
connnon in 1942. Tom Hamilton argued that this limitation would endanger 
the superiority of cadet.athletic programs in their competition with the 
colleges as well as detract from the practice of having officer= 
instructors engage with their men on an equitable basis in the training 
field. Hamilton pled for the allowance of at least five officers to 
serve with cadets during the varsity games. Restricting play to one or 
17 5 
two officers at a time would have allowed preflight teams "to meet their 
2-08 
schedules with an equal change for success." Although the request 
was denied, the schools continued their social and psychological train-
ing through athletics. The Bureau of Aeronautics consolidated other 
training into the V=5 system, lengthening the syllabus to one of twenty= 
six weeks and restricting entrants to men who had shown proficiency in 
civilian air training programs. Hamilton was detached from physical 
training position on June 1, 1943, after a brilliant term of ideological 
and organizational leadership. He was succeeded by a former academy 
football teammate, Frank Wickhorst, who served until 1945. 
Navy facilities dominated military football play in 1943. Great 
Lakes, after defeating Notre Dame, was conceded the top spot among ser-
vice teams. 209 Recreational programs benefited from the branch s physi= 
cal training and college activities. The normal run of participation 
ran from the undergraduate Reserve programs through the V-12, often from 
there to preflight, and then to base recreational activities. This was 
followed by overseas all=star or corrnnand teams, often in Hawaii, which 
was the recreation center-between combat engagements. The Bureau of 
Personnel adamantly opposed this activity. Its Assistant Chief, Captain 
1. E. Denfeld, was so incensed at this practice during the 1943 football 
season that he ordered Great Lakes and Norfolk to report the names of 
all "first string'v players to the Bureau for transfer to combat zones in 
the Pacific. The two big Naval bases at Norfolk had engaged in a so= 
called "Navy World Series" the previous September, leading Denfeld to 
wonder about the necessity of having "professional or near-professional 
h 1 . " h ld 1 . . . . 210 at et1c teams e so ong at one 1nst1tut1on. 
The success of Navy and Marine recruiting is easily seen in the 
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athletic rosters of some of its teams. Twenty-seven of the thirty-two 
men on the 1942 Bainbridge team had been college football players, 
. f h ld b 1 . f . d " . " . . 2ll n1neteen o w om cou e c ass1 1e as maJor un1vers1ty. Thirty-
four of the Camp Lejeune Marine team had college experience, including 
. 212 twenty-five from the "maJor" ranks. Camp Lejeune was in its first 
year of "bigtime" competition, yet it had no less than 175 men report 
for the base football squad. The Marine facility embarked on a major 
athletic expansion program, which by the fall of 1943 included three 
football fields, nine baseball and eleven softball diamonds, eighteen 
213 tennis courts, twenty-six volleyball courts, and four swimming pools. 
Marine athletes also made up a large part of the athletic rosters at 
Navy facilities, the Jacksonville NATTC listing thirty-one on a squad 
214 of forty-three. 
The Air Corps, relenting from its 1942 decision, allowed training 
commands to participate in football during 1943. Although prospective 
flyers were forbidden to take part in contact sports, enough material 
was on hand to have several outstanding teams. Randolph Field of San 
Antonio and March Field of California were the most prominent. Randolph 
played a tie game against the University of Texas in the 1944 Cotton 
Bowl on New Year's Day. Seventeen men on the thirty-five man roster 
had played major college football, some of whom had already partici-
215 pated in the Cotton Bowl while in college. Its leading player, 
Glenn Dobbs, had played for Tulsa University in the 1942 Sun Bowl and 
1943 Sugar Bowl, Randolph Field in the 1944 Cotton Bowl, with the Third 
Air Force in the "Bond Bowl" in New York City in December of 1944, and 
in the Army Air Corps-Navy "Poi Bowl" at Honolulu in 1945. Dobbs com~ 
pleted his circuit by becoming an outstanding professional player for 
1.77 
the Brooklyn Dodgers in 1946. The Fourth Air Force at March Field de-
cisively defeated both Southern California and College of the Pacific, 
reigning as the outstanding team of the West Coast. The COP game in 
behalf of the All=Pacific Recreation Fund was matched to determine this 
216 
superiority. 
The continuance of collegiate programs under wartime conditions 
drew mixed reactions. Griffith sensed their value as a contribution to 
the war effort because it proved "that seventeen and eighteen year~old 
217 
youths were men." In a highly charged article Johnny Lackner, the 
football coach at Hamline University, proclaimed that sports no longer 
needed "apologists, but clear thinking expounders." Attacking "'die= 
hard' enemies of intercollegiate sport," who had denied "the idea that 
competitive sport adds anything of value to the make~up of the American 
soldier," Coach Lackner presented the idea that the "virile doctrine" 
of wartime athletics was correcting the abuse of peacetime years, when 
American youth were rapidly becoming "lounge lizards, 11 "clanging to the 
latest jazz band, 11 and creating the fashion "to frequent the speakeasy 
rather than the church." Lackner emphasized the "spirit values," which 
he insisted were lacking in "formal physical education," because that 
philosophy did not teach "group thinking ••• and the subordination of 
individual interests to the welfare of the group." Referring to the 
intangible assets of spiritual commitment in the life of St. Paul~ the 
coach portrayed the American Army as "permeated by a great competitive 
spirit." Perceiving a decadent society which would be revived by a re-
turn to the virtues of the open field, he wrote: 
This zest for winning was not obtained by drinking sodas 
in the corner drug store or by observing Hollywood leg 
art in the latest movie. It came from only one place=~ 
the fields of competitive sport! Sports have always taught 
that honest ideals were worth fighting for; that victory 
on the gridiron or hardwood were worth the physical sacrifices 
associated with them.218 
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Other collegiate representatives had reservations about the free 
pursuit of athletics. A. W. Hobbs, NCAA district representative from 
the University of North Carolina, expressed doubt that "residence in a 
play camp for four years" contributed to the understanding of 11 the com~ 
plex matters of national policy.11219 Other athletic leaders, who had 
rushed into continuing programs for the students, were disappointed with 
the inequity of competition and the abuse of recruiting rules. One col~ 
legiate spokesman found no glory in pitting seventeen-year-old boys 
against service trainees, some of whom had been professional and col-
220 legiate stars. Hobbs questioned the V-12 programs as 11 hardly to be 
. 221 considered a student activity at the present t1me. 11 A New England 
representative to the NCAA Convention in 1943 disdained the holding of 
a regional conference on athletics and proposed that the Army decision 
f b "d . . . . . d. . 222 to or 1 1ts tra1nees to part1c1pate was JU 1c1ous. In July, 1944, 
the wizened Forrest Al.len assai led the motives of those who wished to 
keep sports at any price. The Kansas basketball coach suggested that 
the nationwide "proselyting" of 4-F 's and seventeen-year-olds was ir~ 
regular and dishonest. Some coaches, he noted, "are indulging in 
frantic flag-waving while posing as developers of young men, aiding the 
war effort through physical conditioning programs of athletic games," 
and he charged them with "playing for huge financial stakes, 'Bowl' 
223 games and tournament money.rv 
The University of Georgia was fined by the Southeastern Conference 
for using five transfer students whose colleges had suspended football. 
Ironically, Georgia, which did not use Navy trainees, could not have 
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. 224 had a team otherwJ.se. The Southern Conference rectified its late 
August lapse and reimposed a ban on civilian transfers as soon as the 
1943 football season ended, and the Big Ten forbade its undergraduates 
to participate in the college All=Star game against professionals. 225 
Navy administrators, increasingly sensitive about its spectator sports 
philosophy, moved to crack down on abuses of the V=l2 forty=eight~hour 
226 rule before the 1944 football season. 
Many major colleges, which had hastily aborted their sports pro~ 
grams in 1943, retrieved them as war news improved. By 1944, the num= 
ber of teams rose to 325 compared to 197 in 1943. 227 Hobbs, however, 
was skeptical that such a move would really help the United States with 
its physical or moral commitments. Speaking in the January, 1945, NCAA 
meeting, he rebutted the claim of "athletes'taking a leading part in 
the war" being related to their physical and mental training through 
sport. He held such a. claim to be spurious because "physical coordina-
tion is very likely an accident of birth, and the fighting spirit is a 
result of an inherited mental attitude, fortified by environment and 
. . 11228 tra.J.nJ.ngo 
Had sports taken a. turn, contributing only to the expediency of 
the moment'? This was a question asked late in the war, and it was 
queried as one of propriety. The determination, however, of American 
college and military athletic leaders to maintain the values attributed 
to the competition during the war years was remarkable. Their reason-
ing and methods captured the organization epic which had sparked in= 
dustrial America to give use to such activities, a reminder of the sur= 
vival of the group in a simpler day. The Navy had, indeed, saved 
180 
collegiate sport. But had this zeal, as reflected by Hobbs, '1allowed 
athletics to distort'' the purpose of education? 
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CHAPTER V 
A MATTER OF PROPRIETY: BIG TIME 
ATHLETICS 1943-1944 
Despite the restrictions which hampered the younger collegians, 
professional sports managed to continue with some success. Professional 
football and baseball operated at something approaching normalcy until 
mid-summer of 1943, at which point manpower and transportation strict-
ures reduced their appeal. Attendance remained high for professional 
contests, largely due to their location in metropolitan centers where 
war workers spent inflated earnings. Although attendance figures for 
the 1943 baseball season decreased by 13.4 percent, this figure can 
largely be attributed to the decline shown by the three New York clubs. 
In other cities where industrial and military facilities were located, 
attendance was up. Detroit led both professional leagues in crowd at-
traction, while Philadelphia and Washington, with their shipping and 
bureaucratic nerve~centers, showed the greatest increase. 1 Chicago and 
Pittsburgh showed large advances. Professional football actually in-
creased the average attendance for 1943 after a six percent drop in 
1942. 2 
The Office of Defense Transportation was anxious to see profes-
sional sports reduce the amount of passenger miles traveled, and pro-
posals to divide the professional baseball leagues into eastern and 
western divisions reached the talking stage in December of 1942. 3 
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Baseball Connnissioner K. Mountain Landis sta(Ved off drastic curtailment 
of travel by proposing his own plan to save mileage through rearrange-
ment of schedules~ Meeting with Office of Defense Transportation Di~ 
rector Joseph Eastman in late December of 1942, and with professional 
owners a few days later, the venerable Judge Landis developed a solu-
tion which satisfied the government for the duration. The two~point 
policy included limiting spring training to points north of the Ohio and 
Potomac rivers and east of the Mississippi (the Landis-Eastman line), 
which was made easier by postponing the opening of baseball season until 
the fourth week of April. Each team also agreed to limit travel. 4 
There was much grumbling about this Landis-Eastman dictate. Sports-
writers and owners talked as if Landis was submitting the league to be 
"pushed around" by the ODT, that savings in transportation was "nil," 
and that Landis had submitted the proposal unilaterally without ODT 
prodding. 5 By March of 1943, even Senate friends of wartime sport were 
. 6 proposing more drastic measures such as suspending the World Ser1es, 
and it is doubtful if Landis, who took his response to Roosevelt's 
earlier "green light" edict seriously, could have come up with a more 
politically pragmatic plan. 
The key to baseball's survival, however, was manpower. Most pro~ 
fessional owners waited expectantly for their rosters to be denuded when 
7 the Selective Service moved in April of 1943 to draft fathers, a com-
modity on whom clubs almost exclusively relied to keep parks open. Only 
the occupation of such men in deferred war work during the off-season 
was considered a viable reason to exclude them from induction. A number 
of non-deferrable activities were listed by Selective Service for pre-
vious January, a list that included auxiliary personnel for the 
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maintenance of sport facilities. 8 A Selective Service decision declar-
ing the non~essentiality of ball players was considered likely, thus 
forcing all such men into year-around war industry. During the winter 
of 1942-1943, the likelihood of baseball opening the 1943 season was 
considered remote by many. Babe Ruth indicated that even if the clubs 
d h ld f o 0 h 9 opene t ey cou not 1n1s • Followers of the sport expected a ''work 
or fight" directive, thus leaving the activity to youthful or older par-
·ticipants. Some sources indicated a desire for McNutt to declare base-
ball unessential so that Commissioner Landis would "freeze" player con-
tracts for the duration, thereby staving off massive post-war reor-
ganization• This seemed the only course open to minor league clubs 
which were being forced out in droves. Georgia Senator Richard Russell 
suggested the move in a letter to presidential assistant Marvin Mcintyre 
on February 12, 1943, as a possible answer to the w·artime problems of 
h 1 10 t e minor eagueso 
It seemed the only way for baseball to continue a normal course 
otherwise was for the game to be declared an "essential" industry, a move 
that Federal Security Administrator Paul McNutt was unwilling to make. 
This forced each individual participant to stand on his own merit in 
contributing to the war effort. Since Roosevelt's so called "green 
light," a feeling had developed among some baseball men that such morale= 
building professions enjoyed a sort of exclusiveness for the national 
interest. The President's reply to Landis in January of 1942 had clearly 
indicated that baseball's interest would be usbordinate to manpower 
policy, a guideline conveniently lost on those officials following the 
confused path of the "green light" in the winter of 1942=1943. Many 
baseball officials were adamantly opposed to the industry being given 
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favored treatment, but others, while espousing sacrifice, waffled on 
the nature of such "sacrifice." Leo J. Bundy, president of the New 
York Giants organization, although insisting that "baseball ••• has never 
maintained that it is an essential industry," nevertheless contended 
11 that "we would not say baseball was absolutely unessential." This 
logic attracted Brooklyn's Branch Rickey who considered "essentiality 
a relative term." The question was, reasoned Rickey, "where can the 
player~ •• do the most good," and he insisted that "we need to hold on to 
all such diversions~ •• to reduce us from the increasing sorrows of war. 1112 
Arthur Daley of the New York Times was more militant, arguing that the 
sport could not exist by "mere suffrance," and he encouraged the owners 
to grasp the "entire loaf" rather than a few "crumbs," by forcing 
government officials to reveal "how green" the light was. 13 This "suf~ 
france" kept the game alive, a condition quite noticeable when McNutt, 
a former college baseball pitcher, agreed to substitute for Roosevelt 
in throwing out the first ball for the 1943 season. 14 
Chances were that the ball McNutt heaved did not bounce high, if 
at allo Civilian sporting goods were patched up versions of the "real 
thing.rv By 1943, most sport hardware was being produced for military 
sources. Steel for golf clubs, rubber interiors and leather for balls, 
and yarn for uniforms was increasingly difficult to obtain for civilian 
needs. The War Production Board allowed only twenty tons of scrap rub-
ber to be used in construction of new baseballss Added to the surplus 
rubber cores of used golf balls, this amount was not enough to last the 
professional game through the 1943 season, leading to the experimenta-
tion with a ground cork and balata centered product. 15 This "baloney" 
ball had "as much ••• resiliency to it as a grapefruit falling off the 
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16 kitchen table," and was roundly condemned. The spheroid was soon 
scrapped for a livlier ball, but this and other problems had already 
led to demand for some federal agency to regulate wartime sport. 
Few moves had been made in that direction. In June of 1942, the 
Office of Defense Transportation moved to prohibit intercity bus charter 
service from serving athletic fans. This directive was enlarged in Sep~ 
tember, and the policy was extended to school buses by December, 1942. 17 
Widespread misunderstanding about the "green light" had led to a feel-
ing that just about anything, the objective of which was to maintain 
public "morale," was not objectional as a diversion. The White House 
was reluctant to issue a policy statement beyond the general guidelines 
issued to Landis in 1942. Instead presidential assistant Stephen Early 
maintained that "the individual conscience of the individual members of 
every community must 'be one determining factor," rather than having the 
President 11 lay down any general policy.1118 The American people appar-
ently had no overwhelming objection to the continuance of certain ac~ 
tivities, and any interference with private sporting pursuits would 
likely have been met with suspiciono Only twenty-eight percent of the 
respondents of a Gallup Poll released in April, 1943, indicated that 
professional baseball should be discontinued, 19 and the "Spokane Ath-
letic Club" claimed that its survey, taken mostly among Navy men, 
showed ninety-five percent approval for the national pastime's con-
tinuance. 20 The White House ran a survey on English sport which indi-
cated that the British had not placed severe restrictions on its 
practice. Horse-racing ran almost unchecked there, as well as the hold-
ing of traditional rugby, soccer, and cricket matches. The British 
took advantage of sports' natural qualified to organize national 
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fitness clubs which emphasized all kinds of games as part of the de-
fense effort for pre-military training. The limiting of games to week-
ends and holidays and the maintenance of "spotter'' wardens were the 
1 1. . . 21 on y 1m1tat1ons. This English example led McNutt to qualify the 
government's position on sport by asking "when do men play and what do 
h d • b ?II 22 t ey 0 1n etweenoos. 
An effort was made to fit sporting activities into the national 
bureaucracy on war planning. McNutt, recognizing that "comfortable and 
contented workers are more efficient workers," held recreation as "vi-
23 tal to the war program." The Office of Economic Stabilization in-
eluded outdoor sports in its planning on minimum civilian needs. Pro-
fessional baseball and football were projected for operation of seventy 
percent of their economic vitality. This was more than college foot;-
ball, which was estimated to be cut to twenty percent and race tracks 
24 to teno Representative Samuel Weiss was the leading advocate for 
sanctioning athletics, and he constantly prodded various branches of 
government to make positive decisions on sport throughout the war. His 
efforts to preserve the Army-Navy gridirion classic and the use of Army 
trainees in intercollegiate athletics were accompanied by his enthusiasm 
for a uniform sports policy~ On March 1, 1943, remarking through the 
Congressional Reco.rd, he demanded that the "government permit spectator 
sports to cont;tnue for .the duration.," Weiss cli:iimed that ninety per.cent 
of the industrial workers in his congressional district and soldiers 
whom he had interviewed overseas favored the continuation of baseball 
and football. The "daring courage, initiative, and fighting spirit" 
displayed by participants in those games, insisted the Congressman, 
were the "same invaluable qualities now displayed by our fighting men 
and can be attributed as one of the major reasons success of our 
25 soldiers, sailors, and mari.nes on the battlefronts •••• " Weiss ac-
companied his remarks with a letter to the President asking that the 
f . . 1 ° 'b d f d. . 26 matter o c1v1 1an sports e opene or 1scuss1on. Roosevelt re-
27 ferred the matter to Byrnes, but the matter became backlogged and 
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Weiss was forced to write another letter on April 7. Pointing out the 
efforts by both the British and Russians to make sports part of their 
war program, Congressman Weiss called for more coordination between man-
power and civilian sports needs. 
Although Weiss was interested in keeping the ballparks open, he .. 
also was disturbed at the prospect of professional sport laboring under 
the false impression that government sources desired that they operate, 
while "flounderingrv beneath increasing manpower and travel restrictions 
28 at a great economic loss. Minor league officials were alarmed that 
unless the President suspended the leagues' operation, player contracts 
would be voided from the inability of the "folded" organizations to meet 
h . bl 0 0 'k. 'h f 29 t e1r o 1gat1ons, ma 1ng t e men ree agents. ~inor le.ague of-
ficials were by no means unanimous in, their desire to shut the activity 
down for the duratione The president of the National Association of 
Professional Baseball Leagues, W~ G. Branham, struck at "gloomy pre~ 
30 dictions" for the fame, and Rogers Hornsby, president of the Fort 
Worth "Cats" of the Texas League, accused some owners of "talking about 
manpower" while having their "eye on money.," He charged that the owners 
were not "willing to fight and take a loss in order to keep the game 
. 31 
go1ng~" 
By the opening of the baseball season, little serious consideration 
had been given to the problems of organized sport. Presidential 
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assistant Johnathon Daniels exchanged notes with Mcintyre on the neces-
sity of a Federal Sports Coordinator& National Baseball League Presi- -~ 
dent Ford Frick captured Daniels' ear and apparently suggested base-
ball 1 s willingness to consider the expansion of major league operations 
into war impacted urban areas. Daniels was particularly impressed with 
Frick's lobbying efforts, which included a claim that baseball had made 
over $1.3 million in "cash contributions to various war causes .... " 
Daniels was uncertain exactly what organized baseball,._actually wanted 
outside of a "statement of national policy" on the value of spectator 
sports, which he laid to their desire "to continue the industry on some 
sort of profit basise 1132 The White House deferred a decision to McNutt, 
whose Federal Security Agency coordinated the need for essential govern-
ment services& John Kelly, serving under the Indiana d~ocrat, was an-
xious to expand the power of his Physical Fitness Division from a mere 
advisory role to one of real authority, and he claimed the coordinator's 
role for himselfa 33 This move, although favored by FDR, was opposed by 
McNutt and Marvin Mcintyre. Mayor LaGuardia, Kelly's former Chief in 
the Office of Civilian Defense, favored the appointment of General Phil-
lip B. Fleming, a former official in the Public Works Administration, 
for the job. 34 Unwilling to commit himself to a political decision on 
the matter, the President submitted to the informal advice of Mcintyre 
and Daniels in liaison with appropriate war agencies and the military. 
Washington Senators owner Clark Griffith proposed a format close to the 
one eventually adopted by the Whit;e House. The Griffith measure called 
for a committee headed by a civilian coordinator with sub-coordinators 
to carry out government policy for each sport. 35 
On May 18, 1943, the President announced plans to appoint a three-
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36 
man connnittee for the regulatory task, a move which was acca,mpanied 
by uneasy stirrings among sports enthusiasts as to the purpose of the 
connnittee. Wisconsin Representative Laverne Dilweg, suspicious of the 
regulatory motive, warned that athletics were "so much a part of Ameri-
can way of doing things that to abandon them now." .would mark a serious 
set back in our drive to victory." 37 New Jersey Congressman Frank Sund-
strom objected to the coordinator proposal, seeing it as an unwarranted 
interference in private and local affairs. "Leave farming to the far-
mers, business to the businessmen, and spotts to the sportsmen," the 
38 
former Cornell athlete protested. He charged that the government 
would use its authority to "create an agency for the regimentation of 
youth, 11 and an unwelcome addition to an increasing federal bureau-
39 
cracy. 
The issue was finally left to Daniels, who collected an extensive 
list of precedents and guidelines as developed by the Army, the Office 
of Defense Transportation, the War Manpower Connnission, the Office of 
Price Administration, and the Rubber Directoro This list offered a 
general guideline for the presidential connnittee, which was headed by 
George E. Allen, and offered no significant departure from established 
40 
policy. The exaggerated "Coordinator of Sports11 scheme fell by the 
wayside, becoming the subject of oocasional humorous jibes between 
government officers. 
Baseball was temporarily mollified by the government's position. 
The Army Special Services, represented in the policy decision by Alex-
ander Surles, was especially grateful for baseball's well-publicized 
equipment donations, charity games, and gratis entertainment for ser-
vicemen.41 The Selective Service stood temporarily on the premise that 
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professional athletics was a ''usefuV' occupation, though non-deferrable, 
and allowed those men with family dependents to engage in sports with-
42 
out penalty6 
Professional baseball, thanks to McNutt's suffrance in war man-
power, made it through 1943., Enough men throughout the leagues were 
allowed to leave war jobs for the summer without losing their draft 
proof status; making the quality of entertainment passableo 43 Although 
Selective Service issued new regulations allowing only occupational or 
physical deferments, men were not required to report for war jobs until 
October 1, a date which coincided with the end of baseball seasone 44 
By the end of the 1943 season, the game was only a shell of its pre-war 
image, nearly all the good men having been inducted. The minor leagues 
alone reported nearly 3,700 men in service or in war industry retire-
45 
mento Veteran observe.r Allison Danzig dolefully predicted in May 
that "if the Allies do not bring Germany to her knees by the end of sum-
mer, the baseball owners will probably abandon plans for a 1944 sea-
46 
sono 11 
It became obvious that, unless baseball served an extra dosage of 
war service accompanied by an intense lobbying campaign by its friends, 
it would fold for the duration, wreaking havoc with its hopes for post-
war reorganization. 
With the future of the game in question, promoters pressed the 
contributions of the game to official attentionD On May 17, 1943, 
Clark Griffith wrote a bombastic letter to Mcintyre, declaring the ab-
solute essentiality of baseball in the war effort. Offering the dubious 
claim that "professional baseball is Number One" in the public demand 
for "outdoor recreational sports, 11 Griffith assumed "that our Government 
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and Army and Navy heads realize that true value of baseball as a morale 
asset to our citizens.1147 Listing an array of baseball contributions in 
the war, the assertive official pled for baseball s continuance through 
the use of "older men with families of children." Griffith claimed that 
ninety percent of the players then participating were of this class and 
could perform a "double duty" of sunnner baseball and winter war produc-
tion. Baseball's reserve list for 1944 enumerated no more than twenty 
percent of these "older men"; by the end of 1943, it was obvious that 
baseball would have to use a more reasonable approach. Illinois Senator 
Sc.ott Lucas presented baseball's case in Congress, listing the "Part of 
Baseball in Promoting the War Effort." This impressive assortment in-
eluded c.ontributions to all relief and service agencies as well as War 
Bond sales, the equipment fund, a breakdown of admissions tax revenue, 
the collection of scrap metal, rubber, and fats, the gratis admission 
of servicemen, and blood and scrap drive donors. 48 
National League President Ford Frick proposed a scheme to Mcintyre 
and Daniels 11with an idea for a year-round sports program that would en~ 
. 49 able us to put sports into the war." This developed into a proposed 
overseas tour of players and officials, an ambitious enterprise consider-
ing the restrictions being placed on domestic operations and the war's 
increasing transportation demands. In September, 1943, the War Depart-
ment announced its approval of a Pacific tour, 5° but it soon backed down 
51 when political opposition referred to it as a "new deal trip." Base-
ball scaled down its earlier plan and accepted a five-man Christmas tour 
52 of Alaskan bases under the auspices of the USO. The precedent es-
tablished, baseball sent twenty-eight more players and officials to war 
zones in the fall of 1944. 53 
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The issue of "essentiality" led to a demand for draft deferments 
from a few people associated with baseball. In January of 1944, J. 
Taylor Spink, editor of The Sportin_g__ News, requested that President 
Roosevelt classify baseball as an essential industry in order to re-
lieve players employed in war plants for surruner play without penalty. 54 
Although Spink did not ask deferment for able~bodied men of prime draft 
age, his query produced a tempest among the game's leaders. In a pub~ 
lically released letter to Selective Service Director Lewis Hershey, 
Landis denied any association with any "scheme for the exemption ••• or 
. 55 spec1.al treatment of baseball players.' 1 Griffith stormed at the be-
trayal of the national pastime's honor, denying that Spink had any 
"prerogative" in "speaking for baseba11." 56 Spink was probably doing 
the big league moguls a favor by bringing the issue into the open. De-
fending himself from knee~jerk jealo1,1sy of "prerogative," the editor 
opened an issue to which the commissioner and others were unwilling to 
admit publically, that if professional athletes "jumped" defense work 
for the upcoming season they would be drafted. 57 
Spink was perceptiveo Early denied the necessity for the President 
to make a ' 1 supplemental statementn on baseball, asserting that "we have 
traveled a long way since the President wrote to Judge Landis more than 
two years ago," and pronounced the Chief Executive's intention of follow-
ing Selective Service guidelines on the matter. 58 These guidelines, ac-
cording to the Daniels' brief of the previous June, made professional 
sports only as valuable as the demands of the next draft call. So while 
Landis at the New York baseball writers conference earnestly insisted 
that his industry wanted 11 no preferential treatments," Senator Lucas 
assured those same writers that if baseball w·as declared non-essential, 
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II f h • 11 b [ ' .] f .b 1 ' C II 59 supporters o sue a move w1 e 1n ·or a att e 1n ongress •••• · 
By the spring of 1944 baseball was in a delicate position. Al-
though its political support was such that there was little chance that 
the sport would be shut down, there was the possibility that the leagues 
would have to close their gates due to manpower losses or repel public 
opinion through an inferior product or by keeping able-bodied service-
age men in the lineups. A War Manpower Commission decision in October, 
1943, relating to professional football and hockey helped clarify the 
manpower picture. The WMC ruled that athletes on professional teams in 
Chicago could not be prosecuted for "job jumping" by leaving defense 
60 
plants in order to join clubs to which they were under contract. How-
ever, the Selective Service stayed clear of any outright declaration of 
essentiality, and baseball ppened the 1944 schedules with much trepida-
tion. The game received a sushion several weeks after the season 
opened when a Philadelphia draft board handed St. Louis Cardinal out-
fielder Danny Litwhiler what amounted to an essential job deferment. 
The administrator, perceiving that: nbaseball as a whole gave a sizeable 
sum to Army Athletic funds," concluded that professional ball playing 
contributed to 11public welf,are, health and interest," thereby qualifying ·. 
certain registrants a 11 2~A!' classification. 61 Although this decision 
62 
was rescinded three months later by a presidential appeals board, it 
was bailed as a deliverance to the major leagues and produced momentum 
to aid the profession through the 1944 season. 63 
It is doubtful if the rv low fo.rm of comedy" which passed for base-
ball in 1944 could have been aided materially by the decision, for game 
days found few familiar faces in the lineups. The defending world 
champion Yankees were decimated when nine of its players were drafted 
2f)6 
d . . d f . . . 64 ur1ng a n1.ne= ay span o spr1ng tra1n1ng. By April the entire pre-
war starting team was in service, and only three 1943 regulars were 
65 
lefto By the year's end, there were more active players in the mili-
tary than on the playing fields. The 1945 reserve list contained only 
1,753 men compared to 5,298 in 1941. 66 A few young stars remained un-
drafted by obtaining work in defense plants during the off~season, Stan 
Musial being the leading example; but mostly the game got along with 
4~F's and over-age 11 re-treads. 11 Although some of these men were very 
good, there were hardly enough of them to ensure a passable form of en-
tertainments Good military clubs, such as Great Lakes, beat the best 
of them, and an assortment of soldiers from Ft. Custer and "sandlot" 
players from the Ford Motor Plant defeated Detroit in mid-season. 67 
The 4=F reigned supreme. Hal Newhouser of the Detroit "Tigers" had 
a heart murmur, which kept him at home and at the top of pitching 
charts. Epileptics, men with ulcerated stomachs, mangled throwing arms 
or oversized feet found new life in the professional game. This led to 
unpredictable if not skillful pennant races •. "Sluggers" dominated the 
. 68 heavy=footed defenders, and a record number of errors were connnitted. 
Teams walloped each other by astpunding scores, and managers went to all 
lengths to find better players, thereby opening postwar play to new 
talent. Roosevelt's desire for night baseball was finally fulfilled, 
the 11 pros11 agreeing to unlimited nocturnal contests midway through the 
1944 69 season .. 
Landis had to take steps early in March, 1944, to protect sixteen-
year-old American Legion players from professional scouts. 70 This did 
not prevent the New York "Giants" from holding tryouts for fifty young-
sters between the ages of fifteen and eighteen. 71 A desperate manager 
207 
from the Cincinnati club even inserted a fifteen~year-old high school 
boy, Joe Nuxhall, into a game with the Cardinals. 72 The temptestuous 
Griffith found a loophole in the draft law and recruited twelve Latin 
Americans on travel visas. Selective Service regulations required all 
aliens of ninety days residency to register for the draft; and when 
73 this article was enforced, all but one of the men left. 
The season had a poetic ending. The downtrodden St. Louis "Browns" 
won their only American League pennant with a holdover cast of defer-
red men, ten of whom were over thirty years old. They later acquired a 
one~armed short-stop, Pete Gray, who had been named the 11most valuable 
1 I ' • h S h A . . 74 payer· 1n t e out ern ssoc1at1on. The 1944 "trolley car series" 
between the Browns and the Cardinals w·as made to order for the ODT, 
75 which ruled that only bonafide city residents could attend. 
The poor quality of play in the major leagues contributed to the 
growth of interest in amateur and Negro baseball. The scarcity of white 
ball players led some observers to call for integration of the major 
leagues, while the influx of workers into metropolitan areas led to the 
creation of well~financed semi=professional teams. The public, hungry 
for superb entertainment, turned out in record numbers to see such Negro 
teams as the Homestead "Grays" and the Kansas City ' 1Monarchs," which 
their legendary pitcher Leroy ''SatcheV' Paige. The National Baseball 
Congress, which had begun a tournament for amateur players in 1935, held 
its festivities in the aircraft center of Wichita, Kansas, attracting 
military and sandlot clubs from across the United States. 
. 76 Military clubs initially entered the NBC~tourney 1n 1941. In 
1942 six of the top eight finishers were from aircraft industry or Army 
posts, Boeing Aircraft of Wichita winning the title. For the first time, 
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a majority of the sponsors represented industrial firms rather than town 
or community organizations. 77 The sandlot character of the tournament 
was lost when former "pro" players serving in the armed forces were al-
78 
lowed to participate under military eligibility rules. All nineteen 
representatives of the Camp Campbell, Kentucky, team in the 1943 tourna-
79 
ment had been major or minor league players. A public relations ser= 
geant claimed the 1944 classic had more major leaguers playing in 
Wichita than in the "big leagues." 80 Record· crowds resulted, and profits 
for the enterprise cl1imbed.~ 1 Service clubs dominated the national 
tournament as the war lengthened. Out of twenty-six entries in the 
1943 elimination, twelve were military, and this number swelled to nine-
teen in 1944., 82 Boeing Aircraft of Wichita, Northrup Aviation of Haw-
thorne, California, Camp Wheeler, Georgia, and Sherman Air Field of 
Kansas, won championships of. the first four war-influenced tournaments. 
The Negro sports· spectacles had become fixed in the public eye in 
1941, and World War II accelerated public demand for performances. ·The 
Negro all-star game was a record~setting affair in 1941, 83 but Brooklyn 
"Dodger" president Larry MacPhail predicted that the boom itself would 
84 
keep white clubs from signing star black players. The plentitude of 
wartime funds led several groups of performers to strike out on their 
own. George Herman (Dizzy) Dean organized a team of "ba.rstormers," 
playing the IVMonarchs" and other colored notables; and in 1943, the St. 
Louis "Stars" were suspended from the National Negro League for this 
practice. 85 The granfte-like Landis· was offended by the popularity of 
games operating beyond his control and ordered major and minor league 
organizations not to lease their parks to groups promoting games "al-
l dl 1 ° f 1" f b 11 ° 1 ° n 86 ege y p ay1ng or re 1e ut actua y a commerc1a enterpr1se. 
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The black leagues were vulnerable to government transportation 
edicts because of their dependence on chartered bus service. Office of 
Defense Transportation Chief Joseph Eastman informed league officials in 
87 March, 1943, that such conveyances could not be used. Popularity for 
Negro baseball continued to soar. The 1943 East-West game, held at 
Chicago's_Comiskey Park, established an all-time record of 51,723 in at-
tendance, and thousands were turned away. The twelve major clubs played 
more games in 1944 than at any time in their history up to 1950. Kansas 
City played many "home" contests on the road. This led an Oklahoma City 
columnist to write: 
It has been the same all over the country--full house 
after full house. u [and] increased earnings of the 
Negro teams best fans--those of their own race •••• We 
grant that the Negroes are good entertainers and that 
they play fine baseball~ But clubs like the [Norman] 
Skyjackets and Fort Riley, laced with big leaguers, 
play airtight baseballbefore a comparative handful 
of fans •••• There's no denying the fans like a crowd 
and they'll go where the crowds go.88 
The Monarchs played over one hundred games in 1944, including nu-
89 merous exhibitions against Army posts. Wendell Smith, Sports Editor 
of the Pittsburgh Courier, proposed that the War Department send black 
players abroad with the white major league troupe, but the plan did not 
h f . . 90 reac ru1.t1.on. Demands that the players be given a chance in the 
white leagues were current throughout the war. Negro newspaper columnist 
Dan Deleighbur even sacred black club owners for not promoting wartime 
91 opportunities because of their fear of "giving away players." The 
colorful Bill Veeck reportedly back off from an initial move to purchase 
the Philadelphia Phillies and sprinkle them with black stars, 92 and a 
bill was proposed for the New York legislature to prohibit discrimination 
. h b. 1 . . . 1945 93 1.n t e 1.g eague ci.rcui.ts 1.n • Although two men did receive 
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tryouts with the Dodgers in 1945, 94 it was not until after the war that 
Brooklyn manager Branch Rickey challenged the color barrier in the 
white leagues. 
Professional football, perhaps drawing response from the "war psy-
chology" of the time, reaped benefits from the period. Despite manpower 
deficiencies, the game came out of the era with a greater distribution 
of teams, leagues, and popularity. Although minor league football under-
went a demise, war plants financed the organization of "semi-pro" teams 
which thrived easily on a schedule made up of the numerous military 
units. Some industrial teams operated at a level previously impossible. 
One group, the Electric Boat "Diesels" of Providence, Rhode Island, ac-
quired such notables as Clark Hinkle of Green Bay and claimed that the 
war had changed the days when "the club didn't have the material to 
95 cope with the high salaried stars other teams boasted." The profes-
sional brand of gridiron play moved also into areas previously void of 
activity, , The Aero Parts Manufacturing Company of Wichita sponsored a 
club because of the "large number of college stars working in the local 
aircraft industry. 1196 The Pacific Coast League grew in the impacted 
97 West Coast manufacturing and military complex, and by the end of the 
war air travel had led to the creation of three "major" football cor~ 
98 porations to accompany the National Football League. 
The National Football League attempted to stave off ignominity. 
Rosters were hacked from thirty-three to twenty-five, and four clubs 
joined forces temporarily to skirt manpower deficiencies. Many men were 
able to work at aircraft and munitions factories during the week, 
practice at night and play on Sundays before voracious crowds. Sammy 
Baugh continued to run his vital Texas ranch during the week, flying to 
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99 the Washington Redskins games on weekends. This formula ideally 
suited the manpower czars' conception of morale activity, and the NFL 
was able to add two franchises in the spring of 1944. lOO 
Professional football had to forego the younger college graduates 
who went directly into service. The professional football personnel 
draft obtained only thirty-four of the two hundred collegians drafted 
101 for 1942, and many of them did not finish the season. This number 
102 slipped to twenty out of three hundred in 1943, after which the se-
lection process was dropped for the duration, the clubs going after dis-
charged veterans and retired players. The 1942 season operated near 
normal with the use of 235 family deferred men and sixty~nine military 
reservists out of a roster of 370a 103 The draft of fathers during the 
spring and summer of 1943 changed this, and lineups were drastically al-
tered. As in baseball, the franchises operating with older men were 
most successful. The 1944 champion Green Bay Packers retained twenty-
one from its 1943 team, fourteen from 1942, and ten from 1941. The 
runnerup New York Giants maintained sixteen, seven, and four respective-
ly, while the winless Brooklyn Tigers kept but eight from 1943, only one 
104 from 1942, and none from 1941. 
Even the college game made a startling comeback in 1944, attendance 
increasing 38a5 percent over depressed 1943. A net gain of 114 was made 
in schools sponsoring football teams with institutions such as Tennessee, 
Syracuse, Alabama, and Michigan State returning to the fold. 105 Ohio 
State University established a record attendance mark, and the University 
of Wisconsin had a 150 percent increase. The University of Pennsylvania 
again led the nation by attracting 379,000 in eight games. 106 The loose 
eligibility rules continued in 1944; only the Southern Conference 
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returned to the old standar ds. The V-1 2 program again served as an im-
portant feature in keeping civi lian spo rts alive. 
Unlike austerity-ridden 1943, college football in 1944 was able to 
locate manpower sourc es separate from c ampus trainees. Except for the 
military ac ademies, it was the year of the deferred student, following 
the nyear of the V=5" and the "year o l the V-12. 11 Ohio State University 
had groomed a number of these deferred men from seventeen-year-olds re-
cruited the previous year. The Buckeyes were thus able to win the 
Western Athletic (Big Ten) title, decisively beat Great Lakes, and 
f . h d h A d 11 lO? 1nis secon to Army in t e ssociate Press writers po • A pre-
dental student at Ohio State, Les Horv ath, won the Reisman trophy. Two 
other eighteen-year=old halfbacks, Bob Fenimore, a 4-F from Oklahoma A 
& M, and Claude "Buddy" Young of Illinois were also acclaimed. The 
electric Fenimore was the product of Jim Lookabaugh's talent search the 
year before but developed a c alcified left leg which forced his defer-
lOS 
ment. The "Aggies" defeated V-12 l ac ed units from Oklahoma, Texas, 
and Texas Christi an universities, the latter in t he Cotton Bowl, losing 
only to the Norman Navy Base. Tulsa' s 4=F's again c aptured the nation's 
fancy, tying Southwestern's Marines and besting V -12 Georgia Tech in 
t he Orange Bowl. They los t only to Oklahoma A & M and the V -5' s from 
Iowa Preflight. Wake Forest and Indiana also fielded good civilian 
109 elevens. An emphasis on student-body participation returned, thus 
fulfilling the expectations of many of the sport's boosters who had 
hoped to make football a type of pre- induction training. Northern Il= 
linois, a college which had a student body of only ninety, fielded a 
team; and many club teams were organiz ed. Boston College had ninety 
c ivilians try for football out of a student body of three hundred. When 
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the Eagles played Harvard, 44,000 fans turned out for this type of ''in-
f 111 • • 110 orma compet1.t1.on. 
Even the Navy schools had compliments of civilians regaling in 
sports activity. Pennsylvania had seventeen seventeen-year-old civil-
12 d . d 111 ians on its V= om1.nate program. Iowa State had forty-seven 
. d f' . '1' ll 2 tra1.nees an twenty- 1ve c1.v1. 1.ans. Although teams from the Navy 
colleges were generally better than their civilian counterparts, the 
Navy Department by 1944 had stripped the colleges of the veteran prewar 
athletes. Those who remained were serious medical and engineering stu= 
dents or boys scarcely older than other freshman material of the day. 
The only exception was the assignment of some battle-hardened veterans 
to the V-12 schools as the result of competitive officer examinations. 113 
The Bureau of Personnel .took a "no nonsense" approach to the duty of V-
12 cadets. Transportation restrictions were tightened, and physical 
training officers and ships company were denied permission to compete in 
11 . hl . 114 co eg1.ate at et1.cs. By October, 1944, the Selective Service was 
empowered to draft slower V -12 students directly out of the Naval pro-
115 
gram~ Southern California, with its Navy-Marine team, proved to be 
the strongest v.,12 outfit, overwhelming a squad of undefeated seventeen-
year-olds from Tennessee in the Rose Bowl. Michigan and Duke were the 
only other Navy schools to approach the strength of the 1943 service 
dominated teamse Faced with a dearth of good college football, the As-
sociated Press chose to select its outstanding teams from among all non-
professional organizations, including military bases. Only ten col-
legiate institutions were chosen in the top twenty, and but two of these 
were truly civilian. Two were the military academies, Army and Navy, 
116 which ranked first and fourth; and six represented V-12 schools. 
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Military football teams dominated the civilian athletics during 
the fall of 1944, and more than one hundred "stateside" varsity elevens 
were fielded. The military academies dominated the collegiate scene, 
and the huge base and connnand teams from the Navy and Air Corps w·ere 
far beyond the ability of contemporary professional <;:lubs. The Bain-
bridge Navy squad, with its bevy of physical trainees, was said by one 
NCAA representative to be "the best team this observer has ever seen 
1 11117 p ay •. The excellence was also maintained by the Norman (Oklahoma) 
Navy Base, which also was undefeated. James Crowley was transferred 
from the Pacific theater to the coaching position at Sampson Navy Base 
and promptly scheduled three games against professional teams. Paul 
Brown was assigned to Iowa Preflight, then to Great Lakes as a grid 
coacho George Halas, founder of the Chicago Bears, coached at Norman 
Navy as did Paul W. Bryant at North Carolina Preflight in 1945. 118 
The Air Corps connnitted itself to a broad scale football program. 
Using air transportation to ferry its teams, the service placed small 
limitation on the activities of its units. The Second Air Force of 
Colorado Springs, the Fourth Air Force of March Field, Californi?, and 
Randolph Field, Texas, fielded successful elevens. Fans clamored for a 
post-season national championship game between Bainbridge and Randolph 
but, due to Navy policy, had to settle for the "Bond Bowl" between the 
Second Air Force and Randolph. Played in mid-December in New York City, 
the game was a financial flop. 119 Randolph also contested March Field 
in a Pacific Recreation fund game held in Los Angeles before 50,000 
fans, including General Arnold. It had a handpicked roster of 
120 
playerso No less than twenty-three members of its team had appeared 
in a bowl game of some description. Its defensive backfield alone 
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included four college All-Americans, including Bill Dudley, the number~ 
. 121 one professional draft cho1.ce of 1942. The Third Air Force of Mor~ 
ris Field, North Carolina, was "three deep in pretty good men," includ-
. , h . 11 1 . f, 1 122 1.ng e1.g t maJor co ege p ayers on 1.ts 1.rst e even. Colorado Springs 
played in front of 175,000 troops from 105 bases in a fifteen game, 
eight state schedule$ 123 . The University of Nevada was flown 1,650 miles 
. 124 to play an Air Transport Command team in Edmondton, Alberta. 
Frustrated in their attempts to bring together Army and Navy elevens 
in the States, welfare and recreation officials brought the men together 
in a Hawaiian Benefit game on New Years Day, 1945. Dubbed the "Poi 
Bowl," it was actually an All-Star game between the plethora of stars 
then playing in the Air Corps and Navy varsity programs. Players were 
shipped out of Bainbridge so rapidly that one Navy official waggishly 
suggested that the Pearl 1,-Iarbor coach was probably needing to "plug some 
k . h" 11125 wea spots 1.n l.S team. The clash, held at Nimitz Bowl in Honolulu, 
featured seventy=seven gridiron gladiators, sixty-four of whom had 
played college football, including sixteen professional players and an 
126 equal number of All-America performers. 
With this panorama of sports unfolding in the United States, it is 
natural that the "dogface" in the trenches would soon begin to wonder 
what was going on back home. Despite repeated assurances of sports 
writers citing some popularity poll indicating that the infantryman or 
sailor wanted sports to continue, the pursuit of these apparently "non= 
essential" activities began to be questioned, especially the participa-
tion by 4=F men. The 4=F was a much discussed phenomenon in both col= 
legiate and professional sports. "How good is a 4~F? 11 was an important 
question to those whose investment in sport was a major business. The 
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answer often was"very good." Journalist Bob Considine, although ad-
mitting that the boys in the trenches wanted civilian athletics to con-
tinue, was bewildered by the response of "why ain't that guy in uniform," 
when a prominent baseball player's name was mentioned among those same 
troops. Considine remarked~ 
It's an understandable attitude when you look at some of 
the G. I. 's and stir up visions of the traditional lean 
limbed, strong jawed athlete, you see a bag bellied, flat 
footed sad sack~ •• training perhaps to be knocked off, and 
he reads about some much finer physical speciman still at 
home ••• "He thinks that ••• Joe Blow the fan winds up with 
the gun and the muscular superman of the stadiums is given 
permission to stay home, make big dough and have the good 
time.l 27 
This was a sensitive point in the War Department, and General Mar= 
shall took time out from the Cairo Conference in November, 1943, to re-
quest a special inquiry. Marshall, having read of the exploits of a 
deferred major league catcher (probably Bill Dickey of the Yankees), 
whose broken fingers dictated a limited service deferment, charged, "If 
he can't handle a machine gun, I am no soldier." He determined to have 
the Inspector General review induction policy to see if Army doctors 
were involved. 111 don't want any damn nonsense about this thing," the 
General fumed. nr have seen dozens of men with half a dozen serious 
complaints, in addition to their years, passed by Army doctors--and now 
to find great athletes, football and baseball, exempted is not to be 
128 tolerated." 
War Department policy was to blame for the confusion existing 
around deferments. Beginning in August, 1943, the Army started a whole-
sale policy of discharging men with physical defects rather than carry 
out a complex reassignment or retraining program. However, the service 
was unable to attract the high physical quality man that it had expected, 
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thus leading to pressures to replenish forces with men previous re-
jected. Athletes were in the forefront of those called for review, and 
much publicity was given their passage or failure of examination pro-
cedures. Misunderstanding about what constituted a deferrable dis-
ability led to suspicion that certain professional athletes were ma-
lingering. 
An example was the case of Frankie Sinkwich, an All-American half-
back at the University of Georgia, whose World War II career closely 
approximated the fluctuating policies of the military services and the 
manpower agencieso Sinkwich had won the Reisman trophy as a senior 
during the 1942 college football season and accepted the uniform of a 
Marine reservist. Much publicity accompanied Sinkwich's report to boot 
camp in June, 1943, but due to a case of flat feet and a heart murmur 
he was discharged after only two months of service. He subsequently 
played professional football, performing in a Detroit Lion uniform only 
twelve days after his medical discharge. Criticism of Sinkwich' s ac-
tivities and an abrupt change in Army policy was followed by his induc-
tion into that branch the following spring, but he again was discharged 
for medical reasons. The professional athlete attempted to enlist in 
the Maritime Service but again was rejected. Meanwhile, the Army again 
inducted Sinkwich in July of 1944. Rejected once more, Sinkwich was 
again free to play--and stand out=-in the professional football season 
of that year. By January, 1945, the Office of War Mobilization, sparked 
by a "work or fight'' psychology began to review 4-F 's again. Sinkwich 
was called in April and finally passed his induction physical. In 
August, he had been trained and assigned to his military task, playing 
football for the Colorado Springs Air Base. 129 
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The. fevered opposition to civilian athletes was involved in the 
move by Congress to pass a national service bill and a directive by 
Office of War Mobilization Director James Byrnes that the War Department 
review previous rejections of 4~F men, particularly athletes. By March 
of 1944, General Marshall, plagued by the shortage of trainees for com-
bat arms caused by inefficiency in the conscription process, was forced 
to empty the colleges of ASTP pupils to meet demands for the European 
invasion. At the same time, the War Manpower Commission was disturbed 
at the number of draft eligible men who were exempted from military 
duty for work in war industries, jobs that could have been held by men 
unable to pass draft physicals. The pool of unemployed men began to 
run out, and both the OWM.and the Army were forced to consider new meas-
ures to guarantee national mobilization. In April, 1944, Congress re~ 
jected the Bailey=Brewster Bill, which had called for drafting physic-
11 f . f . 1 k 130 a y un ~t men or essent~a war wor • General Marshall was opposed 
to the measure because of the logistical problems it would bring for the 
Armyo His immediate problem was the acquisition of infantry trainees 
as the Army still had an abundance of men unacceptable for combat 
131 tasks. How·ever, by the next fall both the Chief of Staff and OWM 
Director James Byrnes were ready for drastic mobilization measures. Al= 
lied revf!rses in the Ardennes pointed to the necessity of increasing the 
supply of material to the fronto Marshall, expressing distaste for the 
deferment of certain professional athletes from the draft, reversed his 
stand of the previous March. Having previously resisted efforts to in-
duct more physically disqualified men, Marshall pivoted, inquiring of 
his deputy, "Is there not some approacho •• that might be made in the case 
of famous athletes whom the medical officers are about to turn down?" 
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Complaining that he frequently saw "soldiers well up in years whoc•• 
lack the stamina necessary to arduous service.~ •• At the same time we 
have athletes engaging in most sport of football and the strenous sport 
of baseball.~ .who have been exempted~" The general insisted that such 
men should have their exemption "cleared by higher 
. 132 
author1 ty." Byrnes 
advised Lewis Hershey on December 9 that it had been "difficult for the 
public. uand certainly it is difficult for me to understand how these 
men can be physically unfit for military service and yet be able to com-
pete with the greatest athletes of the nation in games demanding physi-
cal f . '' 133 1tness. Peeved with shortages at the front and angered over 
the rail walkout of December, 1944, the general's attitude demonstrated 
the government's mood. Roosevelt on January 11, 1945, asked Congress 
to enact national service legislation in his State of the Union mes-
134 
sageD 
Urged on by the War Department, Byrnes issued a "work of fight" 
directive on December 23, 1944. He wrote later that a "bottleneck in 
the critical programs," such as the crash race for atomic weaponry, 
could be broken by "two hundred thousand able bodied men, willing to do 
135 
hard worko" Just after the Germans launched their counter-offensive 
in Belgium, the mobilizataion chief ordered both the closing of race 
tracks and an investigation by General Hershey of "the large number of 
young men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-six, allegedly unfit 
for military service who were featured in professional athletics.11136 
This situation, according to Marshall, had turned "the physical exemp-
. 137 
tion business.~ein some cases of almost a racket.," 
On December 15, 1944, Selective Service Director Hershey had di-
rected local boards to "review the classification of men known to be 
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engaged in professional athletics •••• 11138 Hershey's memorandum to 
local boards on December 23 was timed with Byrnes's announcement and 
directed attention to the fact that "many registrants who are deferred 
as physically or mentally disqualified for military service~ •• are, de-
spite their apparent physical defect, engaged in the principal occupa-
tion of professional athletics.11139 Hershey's order for the review of 
these men had the cooperation of Secretary Stimson, who viewed the 
regulations as a "work or fight" incentive,~ thus challenging more men 
. . b 140 1.nto war JO s. Stimson forsaw little necessity for actually proces-
sing these people into the military as a penalty for refusing work in 
defense plants. Such a plan was contrary to his policy which honored 
military service as a patriotic duty. Although 12,000 such men had been 
inducted, a move to channel such overage and physical misfits into a 
1 b d f . 1" d 141 a or ra t never materl.a l.Ze • The Byrnes-Hershey-Stimson plan 
added fuel to the administration's drive to have a national service bill 
passed. The House gave the measure easy approval soon after the New 
Year, but by spring enthusiasm for the act waned. 
Compliance with the spirit of national service was forced without 
the bill. Numerous athletes found themselves classified 1-A in the 
draft after a review of their defects., "A man may have a trick knee," 
observed the acid Byrnes, "but if he doesn't get tricky on a football 
f • ld h h h I k d 1 • II 142 1.e , t. e c ances are, e won t get tric y at Ver un or in Be g1.um. · 
The government's seriousness was indicated when featherweight boxing 
champion Willie Pep was reinducted despite a medical discharge from the 
143 Navy. The campaign against professional baseball players was almost 
a purge, and the threat of compulsory national service drove many into 
. 1 k 144 essent1.a wor • A minimum of 320 players appeared to be necessary 
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for the leagues to open the 1945 pennant race, and the Associated Press 
speculated that 462 of the 530 major leaguers were subject to review by 
Selective Service. Arthur Daley called it the "End of the Trail" for 
organized baseball; and when on January 9, the Office' of Defense 
Transportation called for a ban on "conventions" of more than fifty 
people, it looked as if "blinkers" had been applied to the "green 
light o II 
The sporting community, which had viewed itself as the leading 
supporter of war measures, .was stunned<> Grantland Rice mused that it 
was because after three years the United States was still fighting only 
a "60 percent war." On Christmas Eve of 1944, he wrote: "It took the 
sudden, unexpected and additional. loss of life to wake up our home 
front--to let it know that 60 percent was not nearly enough in the way 
of a winning effort!" Record sports crowds and an increase in betting 
were an indication to Rice that the u. S. was not engaging in "an all 
out war." 
"I have never been able to tell just what part of big-time sport is 
a morale builder and what part is a morale wrecker," said Rice. ''We 
simply overdid ito•••" The Tennessee sage admitted that many. men re-
turning from the front were asking the question of why "clerks and 
filling station workers could fly planes, carry guns, and storm pill-
boxes" while "such fine athletic specimens ••• were allowed to play pro-
fessional baseball or professional footbal1. 11145 
As the reasons for the Byrnes directive became clear, opposition 
to the new War Department purpose gathered. Resentment gathered over 
the regulatory measures which suggested a fascist-type regimentation. 
Government motives were characterized by Arthur Daley as a "discriminatory 
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146 
ukase." NCAA President Philip Badger suggested that 4-F athletes 
were being "singled-out" for unjust treatment, but he cautioned member 
institutions from an inclination to "cling to 4-F's to strengthen ath-
1 . "147 et1.c teams. Rice accused Byrnes of placing these unfortunate men 
in a "false position." In an editorial of January 17, 1945, he at-
tacked the War Department for attempting to place restrictions on the 
pursuit of civilian sporting events on the grounds of war manpower needs 
while sheltering "more than 480 star athletes" in Special Services pro-
148 
grams. 
Organized baseball had been cautious not to appear self~serving, 
but its officials abandoned their stand of passivity. Clark Griffith 
forwarded a brief on baseball 1 s position in the defense program, and 
National League President Ford Frick abandoned his previous reticence 
by engaging in talks with government officials in order to gain a re-
definition of baseball's position. 149 Griffith claimed that the American 
way of life was threatened by the elimination of baseball and offered ex-
tensive abstractions on baseball's national service record, some parts 
of which had surely escaped everyone's attention except Griffith. His 
spectrum of benefits included the combatting of juvenile delinquency, 
the entertainment of shut-ins, and the maintenance of a substantial part 
of the communications _industry, including sports pages and sports movies. 
Griffith dredged out the issue that baseball was a "morale builder," 
claiming that 4,500,000 service men had been given free admission to its 
games. The sports executive recommended the appointment of a coordinat-
or to direct the shuffling of professional athletes between essential 
industries and seasonal sporting entertainment, the elimination of all 
"stigma attached to their participation," and the direction from 
223 
!so-
Washington of a wartime sports program. Rice, too, called for a 
"sports coordinator," but expressed doubt that professional sport would 
"want any such policy" directed by the government. The relationship of 
sports with the bureftUCracy was paradoxical. Federal spokesmen voiced 
vocal support for the continuance of athletics, but its mechanism hamp-
d h . f . . . 151 ere t e cont1nuance o act1v1t1es. Elements of the steel industry 
defended the essentiality of baseball, and Congressman Melvin Price of 
Illinois endorsed ball playing "as a wartime morale builder" which would 
152 
guarantee worker efficiency and relaxation through "clean sports." 
Congress battled over the labor draft issue until April 3, 1945, 
when the Senate rejected the May-Bailey Bill by a 46 to 29 vote. 153 
With German resistance crumbling rapid·ly, the reasons for such measures 
were largely moot. The ban against horseracing was lifted after V-E 
Day, and baseball's reprieve came in a presidential press conference of 
March 13, 1945, when Roosevelt responded to the question to whether the 
"big leagues" would be allowed to operate •. ''Why not," answered the 
President. "It may not be as good a team, but I. would go out to see a 
b b 11 1 d b d 1 ' d ld 1 " 154 ase a game p aye y a san ot team=-an so wou most p~eop e ..... 
The pronoun~ement was followed a few days later by McNutt's decision to 
allow baseball players in war· plants to return to their summer occupa-
. . h 1 . d f 155 t1ons w1t out os1ng e erments. · Only those holding family type de-
ferments were considered for this allowance according to a War Depart-
ment release of April 5, 156 and the discriminatory draft of 4-F athletes 
continued until May 11 when the War Department under threat of investi-
gation by the Inspector General, announced the suspension of its January 
guidelines to the Selective Service. 
The regulation of sport shifted to the Office of Defense 
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Transport;ation, whose director, Monroe Johnson, was adamant about re-
serving public conveyances for necessary travel. On May 12, 1945, 
Johnson predicted the suspension of bowl games, the world series, and 
all-star games until six months after the defeat of Japan. He also 
wanted to allow the holding of the Kentucky Derby on a 11 tro lley-car 
basis" only. Although these threats were not enforced, major athletic 
enterprises were startled into submitting travel plans and other fuel 
I 
157 saving measures to the ODT for approval. The immediate impact on 
amateur sport was paralyzing, travel in the last summer of the war 
being virtually at the whim of the ODT. Unable to invite a single out~ 
of~state amateur baseball team to its 1945 tournament in August, 1945, 
the popular National Baseball Congress became an elimination tournament 
for military teams. Twenty~five of the twenty-seven clubs were Army and 
158 
Air Corps personnel. 
Had it not been for the well-publicized race-track gambling, or-
ganized sport may have escaped some of the restrictions with which it 
was affectede More than any other sporting event, horseracing reached 
new levels of public attraction, and the war-inflated economy made race-
track gambling a pastime for many workers. Record bets were placed 
during each year of .the war with a peak of $1.4 billion wagered during 
1944. 159 The ODT was constantly concerned with the movement of uneces-
sary traffic to facilitate track operation, and the OWM questioned the 
diversion of man hours by the location of the tracks near to defense 
plants. Racing's chief protagonist', Henry Bayard Swope, served as a 
public information officer in the War Department, while coordinating 
racetrack charities as Chairman of the "Turf Committee of America." In 
November, 1944, the suave and urbane Swope in a letter to FDR claimed 
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$16,000,000 in war relief and promised "a healthy cut" to the Infantile 
Paralysis Foundation to curry the President's favor. However, the 
operation of certain tracks in the impacted Los Angeles area aroused 
enough indignation to force Byrnes to order the closing of all tracks 
160 until after the defeat of GermanyG Although the Greater Los Angeles 
War Manpower Committee had advised its acceptance of a racing season at 
S A . 161 k b . f h . 1 . d h d . d anta n~ta, wor er a sentee~sm or t e par~mutua w~n ow a ra~se 
162 the ire of the Pasadena city government, which demanded a crackdown. 
The Byrnes order was implemented by January 3, 1945; and on January 16, 
Paul McNutt of the War Manpower Commission requested the horse breeding 
and training industry "release for employment in other industry all males 
under 46 years of age." 163 Like alcoholics, thirty customers lapped up 
the last few days of track operated betting. Over $5.1 million was 
wagered in the last eight days of the season in Florida's Tropical Park 
164 raceway, a record $857,414 in the las·t day aloneG Much betting was 
shifted to foreign tracks until May 9, 1945, when racing was again al-
165 lowed, just in time for the Kentucky Derbyo 
It was not civilian sport, however, but the military that defined 
the American sporting purpose during World War lie With mobilization 
completed, the War Department was set to launch a massive athletic pro-
gram of its own. Propriety aside, the Army was prepared to seize the 
initiative in wartime athletics. 
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CHAPTER VI 
MILITARY ATHLETICS 1944-1945: 
THE ARMY TAKES OVER 
Military athletic events had extended throughout the world by 1944. 
Although the Navy had seized the philosophical initiative in using 
sports for training, the Army off-duty program rapidly became the larg-
est athletic enterprise ever developed. Early Army planning led to the 
Special Services Division being given charge of recreational activities 
through the assignment of special mobile units to service the various 
Army detachments in the field. This differed: substantially from the 
Navy plan, whose commanding officers largely directed morale activities 
through athletic specialists under their command. The Army scheme was 
slower to take root because,most of the athletic activities were outside 
the purview of training. Units going overseas were allowed to requisi= 
tion the Army !'Au kit, which included recreational and sports equipment. 
Once abroad, the mobile athletic specialists moved in to organize inter= 
. d 0 
• 0 1 un1t an 1ntercamp compet1t1on. By March of 1942, training of these 
specialists was underway at the Army Special Services School at Fort 
2 Meade, Maryland; and by April, the Army had launched a nationwide search 
for professional administrators in athletics and in physical education. 3 
Athletics in the Army were technically under the peacetime plan de-
veloped in December of 1941; a new outline was not authorized until March 
4 of 1944. Bases both at home and abroad carried on athletic programs 
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with whatever guidance and advice they could muster. Even under the 
loose-knit Special Service guidance, athletics in war theaters still 
grew extensive and contributed to raising the morale of the men. Init-
iative was seized with whatever material was available. On Midway the 
organization of Army, Marine, and civilian groups into baseball leagues 
helped raise morale for the completion of defense facilities. 5 Even the 
American Volunteer Group (Flying Tigers) in China found time to play a 
basketball game for refugee relief. 6 
By the spring of 1943, Special Services units around the world had 
established popular off-duty programs. The European Theater had prior-
ity (Special Service dee~ed the Southwest Pacific too hot for active 
sports), and in April of 1943 the Special Service field officer sent out 
a "secret" memorandum calling for more softballs, football bladders, 
basketball and baseball shoes, and boxing gloveso Basketball was so 
popular in England that a British Isles championship was played in Lon-
don's Albert Hall in front of 5,000 people. Such "big league" activi-
ties were so prevalent that field representatives feared that "we may 
walk into trouble and criticism thoughtlessly and needlessly by attempt-
7 
ing to set up in the U. Ka too extensive an American sports program." 
American brass encouraged the morale building activities, and on May 8, 
1943, the first "big time" American football game ever held on British 
soil was played by two Army teams at London's White City stadium before 
25,000 spectators, including much of the ETO general staff. The charity 
game, won by the Artillery "Crimson Tide" over the Engineers nFighting 
Irish, 11 even featured girl cheerleaders from the Red Cross. 8 Not to be 
outdone, Army and Navy grid squads duelled for the Australian champion-
ship on Independence Day in front of a comparable crowd/ and activities 
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"down under" included a Signal Corps basketball team that played sixty 
10 games. 
Air Corps Special Services Corporal Henry (Zeke) Bonura proved 
that heat was no obstacle to baseball in No~th Africa by scavenging 
enough materials to build twenty ball diamonds within months after the 
f 11 f T . ll a o un1.s. The enterprising Bonura also promoted the "hottest 
bowl game in history" on January 1, 1944, oJle of many New Year Day games 
held around the world by servicemen. The attraction, played in Oran, 
was dubbed the "Arab Bowl," but due to a lack of equipment featured a 
touch football doubleheader. The clash attracted 15,000 curious ser-
vicemen, Frenchmen, and Arabs. Halftime activities included parachuting 
12 and camel races, the latter between Red Cross and WAC girls. The 1943 
sports boom in the Middle East found nearly ~11 units engaged in boxing, 
swimming, and baseball, which even the Briti,sh began to popularize. 13 
Bowl games overseas rivaled in number those in the United States 
by New Year 1 s Day of 1945. The sports-minded G. I. viewed football 
matchups from Hawaii to Bermuda, as well as in London, Florence, and 
Marseilles. The dungaree clad WACs had grown sophisticated, donning 
scanty majorette costumes and vying for football queen, much to the de-
14 light of the homesick doughboy. An estimated 25,000 men participated 
in the sport of basketball in the United Kingdom during the winter of 
1944-1945, and when eliminations were held to determine a champion of 
the American bases there, the 2,000 teams involved made it the largest 
sports set-up ever to be unified in a single American effort. One team 
alone, the Troop Carrier "Pipers," by January of 1945, had recorded 135 
15 games, losing only seven. 
The European Theater featured baseball leagues, basketball 
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tournaments, "bowl" games and track meets. American and British boxing 
teams pounded out the ETO championship, and major league players were 
matched in the first ETO World Series played in Britain during the fall 
of 1943. 16 General Mark Clark's Fifth Army, bereft of track shoes, even 
staged a track and field championship in Rome's Mussolini stadium only 
a forthnight after its capture. 17 
Sergeant Joe Louis Barrow and Corporal Walker Smith (Sugar Ray 
Robinson) were detached to Special Services for exhibition tours in Army 
camps in the fall of 1943; then Louis was sent overseas for an eight-
month tour of bases in the ETO, arriving back in the States in October 
of 1944. The Louis troupe visited 275 units and hospitals on the tour, 
and the champion continued to provide fight exhibitions for troops 
throughout the United States until the end of the war. 18 
It is hard to assign a value to sports in the military effort. 
Off-duty sports were seemingly popular. One Navy official placed par-
ticipation just below letters from home and movies as a source of mor-
19 
ale, and overseas publications constantly offered a heavy dose of 
sports news. Well known sporting author, John R. Tunis, however, placed 
sports in last place in interest among front-line troops. He claimed 
that they would much rather have heard about general home-front news, or 
news of the war and international affairs and stories of fighting by 
individual units. Tunis ridiculed "the promoter who says his sport is 
h ff "20 necessary tote ware ort •••• 
Army researchers in 1944 discovered that ninety percent of the en-
listed men in the United States believed that sports were an aid to 
preparing men for combat, although oyer half did not participate in 
21 
athletics either on or off duty. The Army published material that 
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was at least superficially supportive of this theory. A postwar evalu-
ation of the performance of American troops in combat showed that of all 
men whose performance fit a "best adjusted" scale, sixty-two percent 
participated a great deal in at l~a~t one body-contact sport. Converse-
ly, only five percent of the combat·troops who had symptoms of neuroses 
indicated that they had engaged in such activity. Further evaluation 
revealed that incentives for combat were closely associated with group 
solidarity, goal accomplislunent, and "duty," all of which may also be 
closely identified with sporting behavior, especially team sports. 
Lower incentives were derived from the need for survival, "idealism," 
vindication, and discipline, which, although not outside the realm of 
sport, did not seem to be as closely associated with team play. Refer-
ences to home and community also were high as a motivating force, a pos-
. 22 
sible indication of high primary group involvement. 
Facilities for Army athletic competition either in or out of 
training were inadequate until late in the war, much equipment being 
held for use in the massive demobilization plan. If combative sports 
were emphasized, they had not been overwhelmingly accepted by troops in 
training. Foptball ran fourth in an Army survey of the popularity of 
• 
off-duty games. It ranked only ninth as a pastime when all recreational 
sports were considered, while boxing was tenth. A control group of 
aviation cadets ranked them second and fourteenth respectively. Soft-
ball, basketball, and swimming consistently surpassed the major contact 
. 1 . 23 sports 1n popu ar1ty. 
Although the Army increased its emphasis of athletics in 1944 and 
1945~ the Navy was not immobile., The sometimes harsh dialectic betwe~n 
advocates of combalive varsity sports and those of intramural games had 
239 
stilled, and the Navy's unique conditioning activities were firmly en-
trench in theory. Any doubt as to where the Navy stood with regard to 
football and other rugged contact sports was erased by Secretary of the 
Navy Frank Knox in a speech to the Washington Touchdown Club on January 
11, 1944. Specifically disagreeing with War Secretary Henry Stimson, 
who had been reluctant to find a place for team sports in the Army, es-
pecially football, Knox remarked: 
••• We think there is a definite relationship between the 
spirit which makes great football players and the spirit 
that makes great sailors and soldiers •••• We in the Navy 
definitely believe in the type of physical exercise and 
sports which involves bodily contact with your opponent 
•••• And I don't know anything that better prepares in 
peace for bodily contact, including war,~ •• than the kind 
of training we get on the football field. 24 
Performance reports of V-5 trained pilots were extremely comple-
mentary, and there was a widespread acceptance of the Navy athletic pro-
gram. Frank Wickhorst, who succeeded Tom Hamilton as Director of Physi-
cal Training in BuAero, defined the athletics-trained pilots as "marvel-
25 
ous." They were "flying fools," remarked Connnander William R. (Killer) 
. 26 
Kane, Navy ace, who was to head the training program 1n 1945. Kane's 
own battle experience as well as his athletic background lent credibil-
ity to preflight athletics. Kane offered a precise analogy between com-
bat flying and sports. He reduced the carrier pilot's formula for 
aerial proficiency to four characteristics: "aggressiveness," "coordi-
nation," "discipline," and "toughness~" "Flying tight formations," he 
wrote, "calls for timing and coordination that is duplicated on the foot-
ball field by the offensive play of the lineman, the menace of the backs 
ahead of the ball carrier, the open field running of the ball carrier 
himself." To Kane, this discipline was of the type maintained by the 
group, teamwork in which there was no room for "an individualist, a 
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non-conformist, [who] becomes a menace to his own mates." 27 
It was the team, the group, which inspired men both to play hard 
and fight hard. Not only was Kane aware of this, but so was Hamilton, 
who used his athletic-influenced philosophy in replacing carrier pilots 
in the Pacific. Detached from the Enterprise to serve as training of-
ficer for Pacific Air Command during the last six months of the war, 
Hamilton soon perceived that the keeping of fighter divisions together 
as combat teams worked better than replenishing one or two men in each 
f d . . . 28 our-man ~v~s~on. Morale and efficiency were kept at an optimum. 
The Bureau of Medicine also sought evidence for the efficiency of 
preflight training. Late. in 1944 four BuMed psychologists were assigned 
to the Pacific combat zone to obtain performance evaluations of 1,354 
pilots with physical training records. It was discovered that pilots 
with high performance ratings had done better in preflight athletic 
training than those whose ratings were not as high. The same men also 
proved to have participated more in high school and college athletics 
and were bigger and stronger than their lower performing counterparts. 
However, the psychological testing proved inconclusive because a larger 
number of low athletic achievers had also performed well in combat fly-
ing, and it was difficult to measure the impact of the athletic training 
on those performance. There was a great deal of confidence shared in 
the value of athletic training, and nothing had occurred to discredit 
29 
the method although the thrust was to keep men in training longer. 
The Navy moved early to establish athletic accommodations for its 
forward areas. In a letter to New York Times sports editor Arthur Daley, 
former preflight coach James Crowley wrote that within days of establish-
ing a base in the South Pacific, Navy Seabees had gouged out "ten ball 
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fields, four volleyball courts, one soccer field, ••• boxing and wrest-
ling accommodations." 30 In addition to regularly scheduled games, the 
Navy sponsored an All Pacific boxing championship on Guadalcanal on 
Christmas night, 1943, in which twenty-four boxers from twelve divisions 
battled for medals awarded by the Chief of Physical Training, Gene Tun-
h f N hl . f . 1" . 31 ney, w o was on tour o avy at et1c ac1 1t1es. 
Throughout the Pacific, Naval forces utilized sports in training. 
The Marine Corps, in particular, used athletics to maintain combat 
readinesso The Marine philosophy of training included "battlefield 
teamwork," which built, as in Navy pilots, "an aggressive fighting 
spirit," along with "confidence, the will to win, and the ability to 
think and act quickly and effectively under fire." Marine Corps assault 
teams were demanded to be in top-flight condition, and its physical 
training, although modeled in organization after that of the Navy, had 
its own internal structure, and several collegiate football coaches 
were closely involved with it. Marine amphibious divisions usually had 
three to four months between operations; and one, the Fourth Marine 
Division, was regrouped during the fall of 1944 between the Siapan and 
\ 
Iwo Jima Operations. All forms of supervised athletics were used to 
build each man back to his normal weight, strength and maximum physical 
stamina. Each battalion was encouraged, with the effort of small unit 
leaders, to put together league teams in baseball and football. This 
was essential to keep the men in fighting .trim. Athletic and morale of-
ficer Pat Hanley, former football coach at Northwestern University, saw 
that every available space was bulldozed for games. The division foot-
ball squad went on to win the championship of the Pacific Ocean area, 
and the team was part of the amphibious forces to hit the beaches on 
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Iwo Jima in February, 1945, losing ten dead and twenty-one wounded. 32 
Hawaii was the recreation area of the Pacific, and the Navy dedi-
cated the Nimitz Bowl on May 23, 1944, as the showplace facility for 
its recreational sports program. Beginning with an All Pacific Boxing 
Championship in May, the services unified their Pacific theater activi-
ties on Hawaii with a series of Army-Navy championship events, includ-
ing two track meets in 1944 and 1945, a 1944 baseball "World Series" 
and the 1945 Poi Bowl. The baseball series was held between September 
22 and October 5, 1944, and a host of professional players played. They 
included Joe Gordon, Phil Rizzouto, and the Dimagio brothers, Joe and 
Dominic, for the Army. Among the Navy players were John Mize, Johnny 
33 
Vander Meer, LeRoy "Pee Wee" Reese, and Virgil "Fire" Trucks. The 
popular nine-game series prompted a military publicist to call for the 
St. Louis Cardinals to "abandon the title of world champion ••• or come 
on out here and prove their right to it, 1134 and one baseball manager 
suggested that a presidential trip to Hawaii was made so that the 
35 
diamond fan FDR could "see a major league game." 
It was obvious that the Navy version of wartime baseball was su-
perior to the major leagues. During spring training in the states, one 
base, the Curtis Bay Coast Guard, won five out of five against major 
league teams, most of which were incredibly weak. The New York Giants 
won only two of five exhibitions against military teams, and the all 
amateur West Point team shut out the Brooklyn Dodgers. 36 The sports-
loving Admiral Chester Nimitz was anxious for the 1945 world series to 
be played in the Pacific, and a task force of Navy and Marine Corps 
representatives held meetings with baseball officials in June, 1945, to 
work out the details. The Navy proposed that the series be played in 
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rotation from Pearl Harbor, Guam, and the Philippines for the benefit 
of military personnel, the eventual world champion then touring the 
Pacific in exhibition play against service teams. 
The Marine officer in charge of the meeting suggested that the 
Navy meet baseball 1 s objections to the arrangement by playing on its 
vulnerability to public criticism. Marine Major R. c. Torrance wrote 
that "a ball player that is fortunate enough to have played baseball 
during the war period certainly now should be willing to take a few 
risks for the benefit of others who ••• would probably be playing organ-
. d b 11 d 1 d. . •• 37 1.ze a un er norma con I.tl.ons. The baseball representatives 
countered by proposing a tour of forty all-stars, a plan the Navy 
judged "too excessive," and was turned down by Nimitz with the aside 
that ''such teams are already available from among the services in the 
II h d d d 1 h • d 38 area. T e war soon en e , an specu ation on t e proJect cease • 
The Navy was anxious to slow down its free-wheeling sports opera-
tions at about the same time the Army and Air Forces were promoting 
such public relation events. The Bureau of Personnel prohibited the 
use of ship's company in collegiate athletics at the beginning of the 
1944 football season; and on March 14, BuPers Chief Randall Jacobs at-
tempted to dissolve aggregations of well-known athletes by forbidding 
their retention beyond the "normal period of duty or training in a par~ 
ticular comm~nd •••• " 39 · BuPers did not back down on its insistence of 
military purity in the sports arena, and immediately after V-J Day a 
long directive was issued by Secretary Forrestal which substantially 
1 h 40 codified wartime guide ines for t e peacetime Navy. This order was 
liberalized in Apri 1 of 1946 when Forrestal issued a "sports for all 
hands" order and removed travel and participation restrictions. 41 
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There was much admiration within Special Services for the Navy 
programs as well as the initiative shown by the Air Corps in utilizing 
the athletic talent that it had for publicity and training purposes. 
There were other advocates of a unified and planned athletic program for 
the Army. Chief athletic officer Ted Bank emphasized interunit com-
petition in both training and ain the field all the way down to the 
squad level. Bank, in a speech to the NCAA on December 29, 1941, had 
advocated cross country competition in training on the platoon level 
42 
and was a great advocate of football. He idealized it as a war game 
involving the strategy of offensive thrusts, organizing of strong points 
in the main line of defense, combining ground and air operations, and 
. 43 
maintaining a mob~le reserve. Bank's hope for the combination of ath-
letics and training were marked by conditions in some early war fronts. 
Long periods of inactivity between engagements and the build-up of men 
and supplies in some areas had given rise to boredom, physical inac-
tivity, and frustration. 
In a confidential report to the Chief of Special Services training, 
Bank argued for the integration of physical training with military drill 
through organized athletics. Citing conditions in the Southwest Pacific 
where, once acclimated, men had organized extensive sports and games, 
Bank pointed out that "more emphasis on planned physical training in 
44 
SWPA can have an important effect on the conditioning of troops." The 
only real unification of athletics with physical training had been 
through i 11-conceived War Department public relations ventures, and any-
thing that smacked of those schemes was rejected outright. A plan by 
Special Services to conduct an All-Army boxing tournament in 194G was 
45 
opposed by General Marshall as a diversion from training. Although 
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prevented from incorporating his athletic theories with training, Bank 
closely identified the physical activity of an infantryman with those 
of the athlete. In a speech to the Amateur Athletic Union on December 
7, 1942, Bank compared the conditibning activities in training to the 
"overload principle," in which a man is conditioned to do more than he 
would be normally capable of doing due to the positive shouts and en-
couragement of his comrades. These types of calesthenics, along with 
"ranger exercises," "grass drills of the football conditioning type," 
running, relays, combatives, rope climbing, tumbling, aquatics, and 
various doses of competitive sports, had been combined to create the 
A h . 1 . . 46 rmy p ys1ca tra1n1ng program. 
Special Service Chief Brehon Somervell launched a program to inte-
grate athlics into duty~time as well as off-duty activity. General 
Somervell directed that an Army-wide plan be placed into operation in 
March of 1944. The syllabus for a twenty-six~week program was sub-
mitted to the general on July 26, and it began on September 3, 1944., 
The unification of athletics was designed to implement standardized in-
struction. Participation was held from the platoon through service com-
mand tournaments, including championships for both the Army and Air 
Corps. Trained Special Service Units carried out the program. An Ath-
letic: Branch was created within the Special Services Division in August, 
47 
1944, to supervise the plan. 
An Athletic Steering Committee was created from civilian sports 
leaders, and the Joint Army-Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation 
reactivated the old subcommittee on athletics (renamed the Athletic Ad-
visory Council} to lend advice to the new operation for interservice 
cooperation and logistics. The JANC subcommittee retained a nucleus of 
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of its old membership, including Philip Badger, Charles McCloy, Seward 
Staley, and John Griffith, and the Negro representative, Edwin Render-
son, among others. The Army Steering Committee was offered ex-officio 
membership. The latter was a publicity and entertainment oriented sports 
group, and it included a number of collegiate athletic directors as well 
as Badger, Delbert Obertauffer of Ohio State University, Arthur Daley 
of the New York Times, National League President Ford Frick, and Avery 
. 48 
Brundage of the Sports Federat1on. There was Navy objection to Hen-
derson's participation on the Council, but Army insistence kept him 
49 
Henry Clark, Chief of the Army Athletic Branch, directed the on. 
Steering Committee's deliberations. The presence of Daley as well as 
Arch Ward of the Chicago Tribune on the groups guaranteed that the 
operation would catch the public's attention. The purposes as out-
lined by the steering group were formulated in New York from August 14-
19, 1944. These included the provision of a mass athletic program, the 
teaching of sports skills, and the organization of another inter-
allied games as had been done after the Armistic of 1918. A plan for 
accompanying the demobilization of troops abroad was also begun. Per-
sonnel for administering the program were derived from the Ft. Meade 
program and the Army schools for personnel services at Lexington, Vir-
ginia, and Camp Sibert, Alabama. Training included courses in the or-
ganization and administration of athletics, equipment maintenance, pub-
lie relations, game theory, conditioning, and physical efficiency 
. so 
test1ng. 
The main departure of the Army effort was that for the first time 
athletics were established as an "integral and necessary part of the 
daily life of each soldier-during duty-time as an acceptable and 
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enjoyable means of properly conditioning troops, during leisure-time as 
a vehicle for providing a~tivities, facilities and programs for recrea-
tion" (Italics added). Emphasis was placed first on the combative 
sports for their physical and psychological conditioning value, then on 
the recreational for their civilian carryover thrust. Every soldier was 
required to participate in swUDffiing and boxing. Selection of activity 
in another major sport, including football, basketball, baseball, 
51 volleyball, or softball, was mandatory. Competition was organized 
through three outlets. The overseas program, including the demobiliza-
tion effort, and those, for the Zone of Interior and for Army civilian 
facilities. 
The latter program was unique in that civilian employees of the 
Army competed. It was the one program developed by Special Service in 
which the Women's Army Corps was significantly engaged. A morale-
raising venture, it was one of the first successes in the service-wide 
unification project. Beginning in April of 1944, thousands of clubs 
representing uniformed and civilian personnel were soon engaged in soft-
ball and basketball contests in community leagues across the country •. 
Supported by dues-paying athletic associations, this effort occupied an 
estimated fifty percent of the civilian employees. By October 15, 1944, 
1,608 assorted teams had played in 11,915 contests involving 15,623 in-
. . 52 d1v1duals. The sport of softball was popular in this operation, and 
the war helped to spread the game as Special Services emphasized the 
53 distribution of manuals throughout all commands. No less than 67,000 
military softball squads were formed during the war, twenty-five win-
ning state championships of the Amateur Softball Association. One team, 
from the Hammer Field Reception Center in California, won the National 
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Championship in 1943 and 1944. 54 
The neglect of women in Army physical training was partially ab-
solved by the softball program. The official Army position was that 
women did "not know how ·to play most games well enough to get much ex~ 
ercise out of themm 11 Therefore Army physical fitness concentrated on 
body conditioning exercises and left "sports and games as the dessert 
of the programa 11 Consequently instruction in physical fitness for 
women concerned such 
to fall down without 
subjects as lifting heavy objects and leq.rning how 
55 
getting hurt. 
Prior to the effort generated by the creation of the Athletic 
Branch in 1944, the Army relied largely on post squads sponsored by 
base athletic clubs to carry on its athletic program. This voluntary 
program reached up to sixty percent of the men on some bases with the 
56 club concept reaching as far down as the company leveL Some in-
dividual officers demanded that off-duty time emphasize athletic games. 
However, few Army posts could field the veteran material in varsity 
football contests afforded to their Navy and Marine counterparts. Gen~ 
57 erally collegiate material and officers were scarce on Army squads. 
The Army Air Corps was ahead of the Army in perceiving advantages 
from athletics in physical training. Commanding General H. H~ Arnold 
heartily emphasized athletics, although flyers were held out of contact 
sport. Arnold directed the beginning of a strong emphasis on physical 
conditioning in February, 1941, and the next month a suitable training 
. 58 center was organized at Maxwell F1eld, Alabama. A series of exercises 
for prospective pilots was devised, including calesthenics, coordination 
drills, dual combatives (with emphasis on strength and coordination 
rather than ruggedness as in the V-5), track and field, swimming, 
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tumbling and trampoline, and reflex drills. 
59 
Six-man mass games, 
football extensively used the intramural level, 
60 
and Arnold was on en-
couraged varsity athletics at giant air bases. Later in the war, their 
activities expanded into airborne continental championships between Air 
Forces and Bomber Commands. The Air Corps, with Arnold's insistence, 
was the only branch of service to allow its teams to participate in 
civilian football bowl games. The precedent was set when Second Air 
Force from Ft. George Wright, Washington, was given an enthusiastic 
sanction to participate in the 1943 Sun Bowl in El Paso, Texas, by 
61 
Arnold and Chief of Air Staff George Stratemeyer. This later led to 
Randolph Field's trip to the 1944 Cotton Bowl. Arnold was even in favor 
of handpicking a number of Army players to test the powerful Great Lakes 
Navy eleven for one of Joe E. Brown's relief drives in 1943. 62 The Air 
Corps in 1944 also gave impetus to its sports program by integrating 
its unique physical training setup with Special Services athletic pro-
jects. 63 By that fall the Air Branch was committed to the concentration 
of famous athletes at particular bases, the organization of elite coach~ 
ing staffs, and the use of transport aircraft to fly teams long dis~ 
64 
tances for play. Plans for an Air Force "super football conference'1 
were announced on June 17, 1945, which included the four continental 
Air Force commands, the Training Command Air Transport Command, and the 
Personnel Distribution Command. The Air Corps liberally assigned men 
to perform in all~star games and championship tournaments, the "Poi 
Bowl" in Honolulu on New Years of 1945 being a leading example. That 
branch practically saved the 1945 National Amateur Baseball tournament 
from being extinguished by sending eighteen of its top~flight teams to 
65 
the finals in Wichita, Kansas. Plans for an even broader scale series 
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of events began through the Steering Committee in August of 1944. 
Special Services detachments had already been sent abroad to assist 
support troops and men in training to utilize their off~duty time, but 
the decombatization project required more precise organization. 
The Special Projects Section of the Athletic Branch was activated 
on October 15, 1944o Its first priority was to contact and organize 
civilian and military sports celebrities to entertain and instruct 
troops in the various theaters. A number of sports films for the pro~ 
ject were acquired, and five instructional teams left the United States 
in November. A key component of the overseas program w·as the Anny Ath= 
letic Staff School, established by order of Supreme Allied Counnander 
Dwight D. Eisenhower on February 8, 1945. This school opened in Paris 
at the Cite Univeritaire on March 8. Its staff of ten officers and 
civilian experts and ten enlisted men taught classes in major sports for 
the orientation of athletic officers of the various counnands. The one-
week school was then offered to Special Service personnel down to regi-
mental level. By May 27 twelve classes of 100 students each had turned 
out 1,2.00 trained athletic officers, including three classes of WAC in= 
structors. After closing temporarily, the school reopened on June 11 
for four weeks with a format aimed at training coaches and sports of-
ficials. Although the Air Corps version of this plan began as early as 
February 27, 1945, V-E Day initiated the Anny operation, replacing com-
bat field maneuvers and close order drill with sports and games. 66 
The demobilization sports program began for combat troops as soon 
as feasible after their operating areas were secured. Some divisions 
switched to this type of training in mid~May, 1945; and by June this 
most extensive athletic program in the history of American sport was 
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well underway. Army press releases suggested that sports would 11 decom~ 
batize" the soldier. Sports writer Arthur Daley, who had advocated 
sports for the psychological war conditioning they gave, welcomed the 
new plan as ideal. for eliminating "anti=socialn behavior, giving the 
"G,. I J. h 1 1 f h 0 • 1 '"' . 0 d . "6 7 • oes a w o esome out et or t e1r an1ma s.t-'1r1ts an v1.gor •••• 
So rapid was the adoption of the reconditioning project that, de~ 
spite the stockpiles in the Army warehouses, Special Services was caught 
without enough equipment. Welfare and recreation equipment was not al~ 
lowed for use in the physical training program, and appropriations the 
previous November had not been soon enough to avert extensive shortages. 
On March 9, 1945, enough athletic equipment for 500,000 men was re~ 
quested for the Army Ground Forces, but this was denied by the War De= 
partment. On May 19, the Department denied any further use of recrea= 
tion equipment for duty=time activity despite the fact that much of the 
gear used by the ground troops had been hauled uselessly around Europe 
68 
during a year of combat and was quickly scavenged. Another appeal on 
June 19 by AGF for extra equipment was denied, but a compromise was 
reached by which a fixed percentage of enlisted men welfare funds was 
attached for the purchase of physical training material. The "foul up 
was not corrected until September of 1945 when the appropriations were 
activated. By this time the war had ended, and there was a greater de= 
mand than ever for equipment which made the plight of the Special Ser~ 
vices operation "disappointing in the extreme •1169 Facilities for the 
sports venture were not as great a problem. In Germany, where physical 
culture was well established, American units appropriated stadiums, 
olympic size swinnni.ng pools, and running tracks as booty, renaming them 
after their units and "living off the fat of the land."70 
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Half the training day was often devoted to the sports program. The 
activities of several units are indicative of this philosophy. After 
securing its occupation zone on and around V-E Day (May 7, 1945), the 
Forty-Fifth Infantry Division distributed all athletic equipment on 
hand, appropriated the use of a sports stadium, and sent its Special 
Service staff to the school in Paris. One regiment alone organized 
71 
twenty softball teams. 
The Army zone of the interior program went into operation on April 
5, 1945, replacing the "peacetime" plan of 1941. A minimum of four 
hours per week was recommended to be devoted, and an outline of seasonal 
competition was devised. Traveling sports clinics were organized, made 
of teams of three to five men, in order to familiarize base operations 
with organization of teams, teaching techniques, and rules. Service 
Command Championships w·ere established for varsity team sports, and a 
national championship was held for track and field. Varsity athletics 
were organized from the regimental level on up, with intramurals de-
72 
veloped down to platoon. 
Equipment for this vast enterprise constantly lagged behind the 
demand. In June, 1941, the Quartermaster Corps began working on a list 
of specifications for Special Services sporting goods; after the war 
began, Army bidding occupied produsers up to a year in advance to catch 
. 73 
up with the need. From February, 1.942, to April, 1944, $20,000,000 
worth of athletic supplies were reportedly shipped out of the Kansas 
City Quartermaster establishment, including $1,000,000 worth of soft-
74 
balls and $1,700,000 in basketballs and footballs. When the vast de-
mobilization duty time program was planned in the summer of 1944, new 
appropriations had to be made since Army regulations prohibited the use 
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of recreational equipment in training. An initial budget of $7,800,000 
was granted, ninety percent of which was directed to the European 
theater. Included were expenditures for 563,000 softballs, 240,000 
mitts, 360,000 softball bats, 183,000 volleyballs, 100,000 baseballs, 
34,000 basketballs, 65,000 basketball uniforms, and 17,000 sets of foot-
ball togs. After this first response, the Quartermaster Corps began to 
stockpile equipment for the demobilization program, and inventories by 
November, 1944, had surpassed the initial allotment. Readied for ship-
ment among other items were no less than 457,000 athletic supporters and 
75 360 vaulting poles. Enough equipment for 238,000 softball teams, 
65,000 baseball squads, and 30,000 football units had been produced by 
1945; and all services were ordering at a rate of $38,000,000 worth of 
. 76 sports eqUI.pment per year. 
The peacetime athletic syllabus which guided Special Services in 
the organization of athletics did not intervene in the seg~egated con-
ditions that existed between white and "colored" troops in the Army. 
Black troops participated in the off-duty recreation program, but ath-
letic contests held were in conjunction with other Negro units. War 
Department historian Charles Lee wrote, ''Negro units with athletic 
teams ••• sometimes found their morale lowered rather than raised by vir-
tue of having teams." With no sanction to play against white units or 
to use post facilities -at the same time as whites, Negro athletic squads 
took on a vagabond image, frequently having to play reformatory, prison, 
high school, or college teams of their own race when post clubs were 
. 77 not ava1lable. The controversial Army War Football, Inc., had no 
colored players, a fact noted by the black press. Attempts by Negro 
citizen groups to raise a segregated Army team of their own to play for 
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war relief were made, and a promotion for an "All-Star Negro Army Foot-
ball Team" was appealed to President Roosevelt by the "Pigskin Club," 
78 which promoted education benefits for black youth. Although this ap• 
peal went unheeded, progress in the field of interracial athletic com-
petition within the Army was made. 
Edwin Bo Henderson, lone Negro member of the Joint Army-Navy sub-
committee on athletics, requested credentials to inspect athletic fa-
cilities in Negro camps shortly before Pearl Harbor and within days 
after his committee appointment. 79 Henderson, who was the Chairman of 
the High School Physical Education Department for Washington, D. c., 
and had authored sporting literature for Negro youth, immediately be-
came an "activist" in promoting increased opportunity for black sol-
diers. Henderson prepared a paper which posted the advantage of war-
time social change to the advantage of interracial reconciliation 
h h h f . 80 t roug t e use o recreat1on. In a letter to War Department Negro 
Civilian Aide William Hastie, Henderson developed this same approach for 
81 the creation of social harmony withi.n the Army. Hastie encouraged 
Henderson to develop this theme through the JANC subcommittee with the 
suggestion that Henderson limit the scope of his recommendations to se-
1 d . 1 b. . 82 ecte camps on a tr1a as1s. Henderson quickly submitted his plan 
in a letter to subcommittee Chairman Philip Badger in which he observed 
that since many colored troops paralleled the treatment of Negroes in 
America with Nazi discrimination against European minorities, sport 
could be used to bring about mutual respect between the races among 
American combat forces. Henderson argued: 
In a short while colored and white soldiers will be serving 
our Nation on many battlefields. In some combat zones 
white and colored soldiers will be called upon to do battle 
or rescue where race lines will be obliterated. Why not 
begin in the training camps to eliminate some of these 
traditional resentments that have grown up and lie dormant 
in the minds of many soldiers in separate units? Why not 
try this plan of using athletic competition to cement a 
unity of purpose and good feeling between our armed forces 
before they arrive on fields fighting our common enemy. 
' Henderson's plan was developed around the theory of encouraging 
athletic contests between individuals "that have the least number of 
elements of friction," then proceeding to the more combative dual 
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sports, and from there to team or group contests in which the progres~ 
sion fro~ physical dexterity to a combination of skill and aggressive~ 
ness were again emphasized. Henderson's suggestions were initially re-
buffed by Philip Badger, who cautioned the black educator that the ath-
letic sul:lcommittee was only advisory. 83 Having been refused in his 
initial effort to secure a tour of camp recreation facilities, Henderson 
repeatedly requested the opportunity for "evaluating some of the pro~ 
84 
grams and making suggestions of possible value." Following meetings 
with representatives of Special Services on July 2 and again on July 3, 
. 85 1942, Henderson's tour was author1zed. Although the educator's tour 
was screened to include the less delicate cantonments, he was impressed 
enough by the few examples of interracial athletics to write Badger a 
hopeful letter on September 16, 1942, in which he declared; "I am still 
of the opinion that through sports we can overcome intolerances that may 
86 seriously handicap total war effort. 11 
Henderson's efforts were partially vindicated when on March 5, 
1943, the War Department ordered the desegregation of all Army recrea-
. d hl . f . 1" . 87 t1on an at et1c ac1 1t1es. Camps in the States continued to offer 
segregated athletic programs, and those operations became notable in 
their own right. Individual Negroes participated on white post teams as 
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88 early as the fall of 1942, and by the following autumn, completely 
integrated football squads were organized overseas. 89 In the Army, 
Negroes from the Ninety~Second Infantry Division dominated the Fifth 
Army track and field meet at Rome in 1944,90 and all four amateur box-
ing champions in the ETO all-allied meet held in December, 1944, were 
91 colored, including Light Heavyweight Champion Ezzard Charles. Charles, 
an infantry private, later earned the world heavyweight title. 
Several outstanding football teams representing black establish-
ments graced the domestic scene in the fall of 1943; one which consist-
ently caught the public eye was the Tuskegee Army Airfield ''Warhawks" 
of Tuskegee, Alabama. The Warhawks represented the elite among black 
military establishments in the United States; by 1944 they commonly 
played before large football crowds, ranging as high as 20,000 to 22,000 
people. Coached by former Ohio State University tackle William Bell, 
the Warhawks were representative of aggressive Air Corps measures to 
emphasize athletics. In 1944 Tuskegee defeated both Wilberforce and 
Morgan State colleges to claim the unofficial title of Negro football 
92 champion in the United States. By 1945 the base claimed one of the 
most powerful units in the United, States, either white or black. Having 
lost only one game to a black service team in two years, the Warhawks, 
despite official Navy opposition, successfully matched a game against 
the New London Submarine Base gridders for Thankgsgiving Day. Inclina-
tions by the Bureau of Personnel to torpedo the encounter on the basis 
that the Polo Grounds in New York City was not the official home playing 
field of either team were overcome by the 11 delicacy of the problem" and 
the "racial factor involved." The Submarine Base game became a landmark 
test for interracial athletics, since both a Navy establishment and a 
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test of sup,remacy were at issue. Tuskegee won the grid encounter 14 to 
7e 93 The war frequently brought white and black men together on the 
athletic field, especially overseas; although integrated infantry pla-
toons did not appear. until January of 1945, fighting men were commonly 
associating on the fields of vicarious sporting combat long before that 
time. 
The most spectacular project of the Athletic Steering Committee was 
the organization of an Army demobilization program for all theaters. As 
the federal government was concerned about reconversion, the military 
was interested in "decombatizing" the soldiers with sports. This para-
doxical program w·as implemented in Olympian proportions. On the one 
hand, sport forms had been used to prepare men psychologically for com-
bat; on the other, the demobilization activity meant to use group games 
to return. men to the rules and orderly behavior of society. As armed 
forces ground to a halt with the defeat of the Axis, it was feared that 
occupational boredom would affect the discipline, efficiency, and mo-
tivation of troops. Special Services planned. a massive program of duty-
time sports to be implemented upon the surrender of Germany for ground 
combat troopse This concept had been utilized after World War I through 
the Interallied Games. 94 By July, according to reports from the 222nd 
Infantry Regiment, a "majority" of all men was taking part in some phase 
of the duty-time sports program. Consignments of athletic gear increased 
immediately after V-J Day (September 2, 1945), and schedules were ad-
justed to give all men a chance to participate. By September 26, 1945, 
"every man'' in the 222nd was taking part. 95 The weather, availability 
of equipment, facilities, and the mass participation of personnel die-
tated an emphasis on the sports of softball and track and field. 
2~ 
Baseball was played on the varsity level, regimental boxing teams or-
ganized; and golf tournaments held before the summer was out. Men of 
the Forty-Fifth Division staged sixty-six softball games in one eleven-
day period, and it was not unusual for two hundred men to participate 
in a battalion track meet. A surprising number of soldiers gamely tried 
their skills on the cinder turf with a minimum of training. One regi-
ment held seven of these contests in a single month. Usually an entire 
day would be spent at a sports stadium in town with plenty of rooting, 
music, girls, and drinking. Pageantry was provided by ingenious con-
testants. When the Twenty~Ninth Division held a meet at Rothholz, 
Austria, the winning battalion was festooned in Hitler Jugend shirts, 
96 trunks, and combat boots. 
In the fall, troops turned their attention to football, and the 
game was welcomed as a symbol of homes One Army sports writer in-
sisted on the importance of the grid sport to troop morale: 
With every man in the division ••• sweating out home, it is 
the responsibility of the Third Army ••• to insure a foot-
ball league that will hold general interest. Balanced 
football competition can help immeasureably to prevent a 
severe case of 'occupational boredom' from setting in •••• 
The games should be held in as near of a collegiate 
setting as possible, with plenty of attached color, 
rooting sections, bands, beer, and coffee •••• 97 
General Patton's Third Army was subsequently issued 9,000 footballs and 
enough uniforms to outfit two hundred teams. Whatever happened to 
diminish the activity in the United States had its antithesis in Europe. 
Two hundred men tried out for the Seventy-First Division team, and full 
competition was held on regiment, battalion, and even the company level 
98 for the homeward~bound men. All~star games satisfied the thirst for 
post-season action. 
The first post-VE-Day championships were held in July and August 
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of 1945. The Seventh Army splashed to a win in the swimming meet in 
Nuremburg on July 29. 99 Corporal Lloyd Mangrum won the golf tournament 
100 in Paris on August 3, and the Third Army was triumphant in the ETO 
track and field games at the great Nuremburg sports stadium on August 
12a (General Patton dramatically kissed the hand bf one champion on the 
victory platform.) A crew of speedsters from the all Negrb Ninety-
Second Division paced the Fifth Army to the Mediterranean crown but fell 
101 short in the all Europe meeto A summer-long baseball elimination 
tourney ended the European victory events when the Oise Base All Stars 
won the ETO "World Series" in September over the Seventy-Fifth Di-
vision. 102 Redeployment and troop rotations eliminated a championship 
from the highly successful football program. However, the demobiliza-
tion effort was only the beginning of Special Service training efforts 
for a peacetime Army in Europe. The success of the operation, according 
to the junketing Representative Samuel Weiss, would "stimulate a desire 
for competitive athletics among our European Allies which will aid in 
bringing together a closer spirit of cooperation and fellowship in build-
103 ing a lasting peace." 
With the Army emphasizing sports in training, West Point won recog-
nition as the overwhelming intercollegiate athletic power. Many young 
men sought transfer from other institutions into the various service 
academies. With the curtailment or suspension of normal athletic ac-
tivity, the regular officer schools at West Point, Annapolis, and New 
London, Connecticut, were blessed with an inordinate number of superior 
athletes. The Army and Navy academies in particular became so dominant 
over collegiate sport that they took on the image of national univer-
sities. Their athletic teams were able to exemplify the national unity 
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involved in the war effort. 
A large number of officers of the highest command echelons during 
World War II had been athletes in their undergraduate years at the 
academies. This led to wide-ranging support of athletics there during 
the waro Included in this number were Generals Eisenhower, MacArthur, 
George S. Patton, Omar Bradley, Joseph Stillwell, and Emmitt (Rosie) 
O'Donnell, as well as Admirals William F. (Bull) Halsey, William Ghorm-
ley, and Earnest J. Kinge 104 MacArthur, a former superintendent of the 
U. s. Military Academy, had memorialized sport in epic terms for the 
academy grounds with the inscription: 
Upon the fields of friendly strife, 
Are sown the seeds, 
That upon other fields, o,n other B~ys, 
Will bear the fruits of victory. 1 
Nevertheless, there was speculation that athletics in the academies 
was a non-essential luxury. General Brehon Somervell, of the Army Ser-
vices of Supply, considered that they were a waste of manpower and 
transportation, recommending their abandonment upon the completion of 
106 the 1942 football season. The spring of 1943 were crucial days for 
the continuance of intercollegiate athletics. Academy superintendents 
insisted that their military appropriations committees in Congress in-
elude sports in academy budgets. On March 2, 1943, Representative J. 
Buell Snyder of Pennsylvania, a member of the Defense Appropriations 
Subcommittee, wrote Secretary Stimson to suggest "that we put no curb 
on athletics, at Annapolis and West Point.11107 No less a figure than 
Navy Bureau of Personnel Chief Randall Jacobs requested that the Ap-
priations Committee increase academy athletic employees and expendi-
108 tures. In May, West Point Superintendent Francis B. Wilby appealed 
S 11 h . b. . 109 to omerve to remove 1s o JeCt1on. 
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Although athletics were continued, the academies were not allowed 
to exploit their annual football clash for the public. The "big game" 
in 1943 was again held in virtual isolation, this time at West Point. 
llO Only 15,000 local residents.and cadets were allowed to attend. De-
mands that it be returned to Philadelphia, where 100,000 urban patrons 
would ensure huge sums for a bond drive, were ignored. Congressman 
Weiss, the Pennsylvania gadfly, began pestering War and Navy Department 
brass ·in July, 1943, to make the spectacle a national event for unity 
d f d . . lll an un ra1s1ng. The. services steadfastly refused due to the crowds 
involved, a rather asinine stand since Navy had already played before 
80,000 fans in Cleveland against Notre Dame, and Army had drawn huge 
crowds in New York City. Such myopia was pointed out in a letter to 
Secretary Stimson from Congressman John E. Sheriden of Pennsylvania who 
was flabbergasted that both academi~s could play the University of Penn-
sylvania in Philadelphia but not each other. He asked, "Is this just 
another instance of where the reasoning and the logic cannot be justi-
fied on the facts--or another demonstration of the 'Army' way of doing 
h • ?II ll2 t 1ngs •••. Stimson's decision that moving the corps of cadets to 
Philadelphia was out of the question dictated instead that a huge press 
corps move into virtually empty Michie Stadium to report the game to an 
ll3 intensely interested public as well as servicemen abroad. 
In 1944 the demand that the Army-Navy spectacle be moved to an ur-
ban center became overwhelming. The two football squads were far the 
best on the impoverished national scene, and Weiss began his annual ap-
peal in August, 1944, stating that the game "should be bale to seJ.l at 
ll4 least a billion dollars worth of war bonds." Navy Secretary James 
Forrestal tried to dampen the suggest,ion on August 30 by announcing that 
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the game would be held in Annapolis. 115 This time, however, a number of 
Congressmen took an active interest in its movement, and press connnen-
tary for the promotion of the spectacle was incessant. Weiss compared 
Forrestal's "edict" as comparable to the "hysteria that enveloped this 
nation after Pearl Harbor." 116 Weiss and Representative A. S. (Mike) 
Monroney of Oklahoma led a move during September to rally support for 
moving the tilt. They were joined by Joseph Martin of Massachusetts, 
who suggested a War Bond game, an idea backed by officials of the Treas-
ury Department. By November, 1944, Weiss and others began to budge 
military officials. This was much to the chagrin of ODT Chief Monroe 
117 Johnson, who considered the transfer an "outrage." When Governor 
Herbert O'Connor of Maryland proposed in a telegram to the Navy Depart-
ment that it be held in Baltimore, an alternative site to Navy's home 
stadium, the issue was virtually settled. Two days later on November 
118 17, with Roosevelt's urging, the Navy Department assented. 
The game, held on December 1, 1944, was won by Army 23-7 and was 
witnessed by over 66,000 people, including the top staff echelons of 
h .1. 119 t e m1. 1.tary. Only 17,000 or so of the crowd was made up of the 
general public that had apparently demanded the evento Innnediate resi-
dents of Annapolis and high officials of the Army and Navy, as well as 
numerous governmental and civic functionaries, predominated, tickets 
being almost non-existent within a day after the site was approved. 
The price of seats included the purchase of up to $1,000 in bonds, and 
fifteen box seats were sold for $1,000,000 in War Loans each. Over 
$58,000,000 were raised by the event. The game was broadcast to far-
flung American troops around the world and was filmed for viewing in 
. 120 
isolated war fronts. 
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The Army team which won that day's contest was considered to be one 
of the greatest aggregations to appear on the collegiate football scene, 
121 possibly the superior of any service and professional squads. The 
success of the Army football program was in large measure the responsi-
bility of its coach, Coach Earl (Red) Blaik, and pre-war academy super-
intendent General Robert Eichelberger. Foreseeing the United States' 
entry into the war, Eichelberger hoped to upgrade the football program 
at West Point, deeming it inadvisable for the institution representing 
the American fighting man to be a gridiron doormat, which it was. There 
was also suspicion that any activities at the "Point" which were not 
serious parameters of achievement would be axed by Marshall for an ac-
celerated wartime academy program. Blaik, a successful coach at Dart-
mouth, was hired by Eichelberger in December of 1940. He was given free 
rein to promote football over other sports and crack down on discip-
122 
line. 
Eichelberger left in January, 1942, to assume connnand of a combat 
unit but continued to keep up with Blaik's progress. After hearing of 
the Navy's V-5 pilot training program, the general was certain that 
therein lay the secret of turning out top=flight field connnanders. On 
July 5, 1942, he wrote Blaik insisting that "competitive athletics in 
our schools and colleges simply cannot be allowed to fall by the way-
side if we are to go through to a win against the Axis." He further 
wrote: 
Earl, I must take time to go on record with you that 
there is nothing which we can do in the educational 
field with our youth which will do more toward winning 
the war than production of leadership qualities, 
courage, initiative, force, and all the other things 
that go to make up a man. That as a mechanism for 
this education there is nothing that can touch competitive 
athletics and, among this group of sports, nothing can 
touch football. 123 
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Blaik's task of recruiting was made much easier, for attending the 
academy was one of the few ways left for a college student to complete 
his career uninterrupted. Age, height, and weight requirements were 
often waived, and many hardened battle veterans were appointed to the 
school directly from the field. 124 Other football stars transferred di-
rectly from their places of matriculation, including Felix (Doc) 
Blanchard and George Poole from the University of North Carolina, Max 
Minor from Texas, Bobby Dobbs from Tulsa, Dean Sensanbaugher of Ohio 
State, and Dick Walterhouse of Michigan. 125 The already demanding aca-
demic and military schedule was telescoped from four years to three, 
and flight training was added. There was less time to spend on foot-
ball, but added physical demands made the super-talented crew invincible 
126 on the gridiron by the war's end. 
Navy's situation was similar. George Whelchel took over from 
Marine Major Emery (Swede) Larson just after Pearl Harbor as the Mid-
shipman coach. Navy enjoyed the privilege of its man having an extra 
year of eligibility due to NCAA rules, a situation much to its advantage 
in the 1943 season. Due to the success of the V-12, Navy was able to 
127 attract even more athletes through its officer program. Not only did 
the Annapolis school offer an outstanding gridiron team throughout the 
war, but its other te~s were among the best, especially wrestling, 
which was considered the finest in the country for the 1944 and 1945 
seasons. So dominant were the academies that Navy, Army and the Coast 
Guard took the first three places in the 1945 Eastern Intercollegiate 
W 1 . Ch . h" 128 rest 1ng amp1ons 1ps. Navy's transfer program was even more 
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liberal than Army's. Its football squad was lo.aded with transfers. 
The roster was sprinkled with men who had already been standouts at 
such universities as Notre Dame, Alabama, Texas, Vanderbilt, Princeton, 
Indiana, and Cornell. 129 Some transferred to other schools at the war's 
end, including Navy's Clyde (Smackover) Scott to Arkansas and West 
Point's Ed (Shorty) McWilliams who went back to Mississippi State. 130 
Navy won the 1942 and 1943 football clashes with Army. However, 
1944 found the two academies sitting firmly astride the college foot-
ball world. An otherwise unbeaten Notre Dame team could not compare to 
the service titans. Army beat it 59-0, as did Navy 32-13. No team 
came close to Army, and Navy lost but once, so it was fitting that foot-
ball supremacy should have been decided between the two. Blaik refer-
red to the 1944 Cadets as the "greatest collection of football players 
131 I ever coached." Two complete teams of equal ability could be placed 
on the field. Ten men made at least one All-America team, and there 
was little to choose between its second-string backfield of Arnold 
Tucker, Dale Hall, Walterhouse, and Dobbs, and the first group of Glenn 
Davis, Dale Kenna, Max Minor, and Blanchard. Army averaged fifty-six 
points per game, and four of its backs, Blanchard, Davis, Kenna, and 
132 Minor, made All-American.. With news of the "Black Knights·"' victory 
over the Midshipmen, General MacArthur wired, "THE GREATEST OF ALL 
ARMY TEAMS STOP WE HAVE STOPPED THE WAR TO CELEBRATE YOUR MAGNIFICENT 
SUCCESS. II 133 
The success of the service elevens continued through 1945. Both 
entered their annual clash unbeaten. The game was awarded to Phila-
delphia shortly after the defeat of Japan, and the meeting became 
something of a national victory celebratioh. Over 100,000 fans 
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attended, some of whom paid as much as seventy dollars to "scalpers" 
for admission. Republican Senator William Langer was so disturbed by 
the latter practice that he proposed a bill to move the annual classic 
around the country as a free show for the public. The Cadets won and 
. 134 repeated as national champ1ons. Blanchard, whose bulky size had led 
to his rejection to the V-12 in 1943, 135 won the Reisman trophy in 
1945, as did Davis for the 1946 team. The fabulous Army team revolu-
tionized college football, and their team and individual offensive 
records were thought to be out of reach in peacetime. Some people were 
rankled by Army's gridiron success, and the cry of "slacker" occasion-
11 d . d h 1" 136 a y was 1recte at t e e 1te youngsters. Notre Dame deprived Army 
of a third consecutive championship by tying it in 1946, but the: heri-
tage of World War II continued to uphold West Point's athletic greatness 
during the post war period. 
The war had made physical combat on the athletic field seem both 
desirable and necessary. Not only had a rhetoric of national ideals 
been verbalized through the use of sport euphemisms and examples, but 
popular American games became representative of the kind of desirable 
attributes needed in physical training. 
First the Navy, then the Army symbolically led the United States 
in athletic methods for the maintenance of physical fitness. The great 
armies of the United States and its elite officers had trained on the 
"fields" of friendly strife." This was to mean much to postwar America. 
A nation not given to fitness had been greatly committed to fitness, 
physically and psychologically. Hordes of its soldiers and sailors, 
once given to this type of inspiration, would not forget it easily. 
FOOTNOTES 
1nHistory of the u.S. NavySpecial Services," V, p. 1. 
2 
Memorandum, Frederick Osburn to Marshall, March 7, 1942, Marshall 
Papers, Special Services File. 
3Letter, Brehon Somervell to Commanders of All Corps Areas, April 
24, 1942, AG Records, file 353.8. 
4 
"History of the U. s. Army Special Services,"·V, p. 3. 
5 
Ne 11 Murbacher, "Sports on Midway," Scholastic Coach, XIV (Febru= 
ary, 1945), p. 5. 
6New York Times (April 7, 1942). 
7 
Letter, Halleck Lefferts, Captain, Special Services, to Frederick 
Osburn, April 13, 1943, Special Service Records, file 353.8. 
8NCAA 1943 Football Guide, PP• 24-25. 
9 
New York Times (July 5, 1943). 
10rbid. (March 17, 1943). 
11rbid. (October 23, 1943). 
12 
Joseph N. Bell, Bowl Game Thrills (New York, 1963), pp. 95-101. 
13. 
F1eld Memorandum for Flynn Andrew, Lt. Col., Special Service 
Training Branch, September 24, 1943, Special Service Records, file 
3 53 o 8o 
14 
New York Times (January 2, 1945). 
15rbid. (January 20, 1945). 
16 
Stars and Stripes (June ll, 1943;. August 30, 1943). The first 
"world series" concluded on September 30, 1943, had the Field Force 
"Yankees" defeating the Fighter Command "Thunderbolts." New York Times 
(October 1, 1943). 
17 
New York Times (June 21, 1944). 
18"History of the U. s. Army Special Services," V, p. 42. 
19 
New York Times (June 3, 1944). 
267 
268 
20John R. Tunis, "Sport in War Time," New Republic, CX (Apri 1 3, 
1944), p. 467. 
21 
"What the Soldier Thinks" (January, 1944), a monthly digest of 
War Department studies on the attitudes of American troops, Eisenhower 
Papers, Miscellaneous Historical Materials File, Box 2. 
22 
Samuel A. Stauffer, et al., Com~at and Its Aftermath, vol. II, 
Studies in Socl:al Psychology During_ World War II (3 vols., Princeton, 
N.J., 1949), p. 143. 
2311A.A.F. Sports P 11 11 29 30 - 0 ' pp. - • 
24 
Navy Department transcript of Frank Knox speech to the Washing= 
ton, D. c. Touchdown Club, .January 11, 1944, Hamilton files. 
25 
New York Times (May 19, 1944). 
26rbid. (January 28, 1945). 
27william R. Kane, "Football Pays Off," NCAA 1945 Football Guide, 
pp. 41-43. 
28·H · 1 C d M 4 1974 am~ ton orrespon ence, ay , • 
29 0 
"Cadet Phys~cal Training Performances as Related to Combat Cri-
teria Classification," in BuMed letter VX=AK, P2-5/A21, Chief of BuMed 
to Chief of Naval Operations, March 22, 1946, Hamilton files. 
30 
New York Times (May 23, 1943). 
31rbid. (~anuary 1, 1944). 
32speech of F. A. Hart, Brig. General, USMC, in National Collegiate 
Athletic Association, Yearbook of the N~onal Collegiate A.thleti_c As,., 
sociation and Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Convention (January, 
1946), pp. 108-111. 
33 
New York Times (May 24, 1944; September 22, 1944-0ctober 5, 
1944). 
34rbid. (October 8, 1944). 
35rbid. (August 22, 1944). 
36rbid. (March 29, 1945; March 30, 1945; April 5, 1945). 
37Memorandum, R. c. Torrance, Major, U. S. Marine Corps, to 
Timothy J. O'Brien, Captain, u. S. Navy, June 11, 1945, Physical Fit-
ness Correspondence, Athletic File. 
38 
BuPers letter 51121-GAS, Randall Jacobs to A. B. Chandler, Com-
missioner of Baseball, August 11, 1945, Physical Fitness Correspondence, 
Athletic File. 
269 
39 . BuPers letter 21-hs QR/Pl6~3, Ch1ef of BuPers to various com-
mands, March 14, 1945, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File, 
Physical Training Directives folder. 
40 
Navy letter 5-MD PlO-l(c), Secretary of Navy to All Navy Com-
mands, September 7, 1945, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File, 
Physical Training Directives folder. 
4 ~avy letter 511-ED PlO-l(c), Secretary of Navy to All Navy Com-
mands, April 25, 1946, Physical Fitness Correspondence, Command File, 
Physical Training Directives folder. 
4~CAA Proceedings (1941), pp. 90-95. 
43 
Theodore P. Bank, "Army Football," 1942 NCAA Football Guide, p. 
17. 
44 . . Memorandum, Theodore P. Bank, Ch1ef of Army Athlet1c Branch, to 
Chief of Special Services Training, Special Services Records, file 
353. 8. 
45 
Memorandum, Marshall to Secretary of War, February 6, 1943, OCS 
file 353.8. 
4611Address of George Stienhaus at the AAU Con:vention," The Amateur 
Athlete, XIII (February, 1943), pp •.. 5, LO,.,.U, 13. Steinhaus taught the 
overload principle as the exercise of "psychological sensibilities." 
47 
"History of the U. S. Army Special Services," V, p. 4. 
48 
Ibid., pp. 77-78; M~mbership list of Athletic Advisory Council, 
Records of Army and Navy Boards, Athletic Advisory Council folder; 
Letter, Henry Clark to Philip Badger, August 8, 1944, Physical Fitness 
Correspondence, Command File. 
49 
Letter, John Reynolds to Henry Clark, August 10, 1944; Letter, 
Joseph W. Byron, Director of Army Special Services, to Arthur Page, 
Chairman of the Joint Army~Navy Committee on Welfare and Recreation, 
August 14, 1944, Records of Joint Army and Navy Boards, Athletic Ad-
visory Council folder. 
50 
"History of the U. s. Army Special Services," V, pp. 13, 16-17, 
79-80. 
51 
Henry W. Clark, 11The Army Athletic Program," 1945 NCAA Guide, p. 
39. 
52 
11Army Recreation Program Idea for Industry," The Amateur Athlete, 
XVI (November, 1945), p. 4. 
53 




Beale, pp. 56, 100-117. 
55 
Donna I. Niles, "Physical Fitness and the WAC," J'OHPER, XIV (Oc-
tober, 1943), pe 409. 
56 
Albert L. Shennan, "Anny Athletic Clubs," Athletic Journal, XIV 
(December, 1943), p. 22. 
57 
Theodore P. Bank, "Football in the Anny,n NCAA 1943 Football 
Guide, pp. 27~29. 
58 
Speech of Brig. General William M. Walsh, NCAA Proceedings (1944), 
PP• 84-89. 
59 
M. D. Seil, "Physical Education for Fledgling Flyers," JOHPER, 
XIII (May, 1942), pp. 288~289. 
60 
Ao F. Byrnes, "A.A.F. Sports Poll," Scholastic Coach, XIII (April, 
1944)' p. 29. 
6 ~emorandum, George Stratemeyer, Chief of Air Staff, to Henry H. 
Arnold, Commanding General Air Corps, December 22, 1942, Chief of Staff 
file 353.8. 
62 
Letter, Arnold to Joe E. Brown, Chainnan, Pacific Recreation 
Fund, June 24, 1943, Chief of Staff file 353.8. 
63 
"Proposed Merger of Physical Training and Special Services in the 
Training Command," dated February 5, 1944, Chief of Staff file 353.81. 
64 
"History of the U. s. Army Special Services,'' V, p. 47. 
65 
Out of the twenty~seven team tournaments, the Anny furnished 
seven, and there were two civilian clubs. BuPers travel rules elimi-
nated Navy competition. Wichita Eagle (August 10, 1945). 
66"History of the u. s. Anny Special Services," V, pp. 23-26, 29, 
35-42, 73=74. 
67 
New York Times (May 16, 1945). 
68Palmer, p. 645; Special Services folder for May 1-10, 1945, 
Eisenhower Library, 45th Infantry Division, After Action Reports. 
69 
Palmer, p. 645. 
70 . 
"H1.story of the U.S. Anny Special Services," V, p. 37. 
71 
Special Services folder for May 1-10, 1945, 45th Infantry Di-
vision, After Action Reports. 
72. 
11H1.story of the U. S. Anny Special Services," V, section on 
"Anny Service Forces Manual" (M211-lA), pp. 1-18. 
271 
73 
"History of the U. S. Army Special Services," V, pp. 8, 44. 
74 
Grier Lowrey, "$50, 000,000 for G. I. Sports," Scholastic Coach, 
XIV (October, 1944), P• 28. 
75 
"History of the Uo s. Army Special Services," V, pp. 22, 75. 
76NCAA 1945 Football Guide, p. 23; New York Times (August 27, 
1944). 
77 
Ulysses Lee, The Employment of Negro Troops, vol. XIII, Pt. 2 
( 1966) of The United States Army in World War II (13 vo ls., Washington, 
1947-66). 
78 
Letter, Charles B. Fisher, Pigskin Club of America, to Roosevelt, 
September 24, 1942, FDR Papers, file 481. 
79 
Letter, E. M. Henderson, JANC Subconnnittee on Athletics, to 
Francis Keppel, December 4, 1941, Records of Joint Army and Navy Boards, 
file J71, Henderson folder. 
80 
Manuscript by T. J. Anderson and E. B. Henderson entitled 
"Recreation and Race Adjustments in Washington, D. C.," Records of 
Joint Army and Navy Boards, file J71, General Subject 1942-1946 folder. 
81 
Letter, Henderson to William Hastie, December 17, 1941, Records 
of Joint Army and Navy Boards, file J71, Henderson folder. 
82Letter, Hastie to Henderson, December 29, 1941, Records of Joint 
Army and Navy Boards, file J71, Henderson foldero 
83 
Letter, Badger to Henderson, January 6, 1942, Records of Joint 
Army and Navy Boards, file J71, Henderson folder. 
84 . . 
Letter, Henderson to Keppel, May 26, 1942; Conf1dent1al memoran-
dum, Keppel to Theodore Bank, January 28, 1942, Records of Joint Army 
and Navy Boards, file J71, Henderson folder. 
85 
Conference memorandum, July 6, 1942, Records of Joint Army and 
Navy Boards, file J71, Henderson folder. 
86 
Letter, Henderson to Badger, September 16, 1942, Records of 
Joint Army and Navy Boards, file J71, Henderson folder. 
87 
Restricted Memorandum, Asst. Chief of Staff to All Division 
Connnands, March 5, 1943, AG Records, file 353.8. 
88 . 
NCAA 1943 Football Guide, p. 115. 
89 
,Tulsa Eagle (November 27, 1943). 
90New York Times (June 21, 1944). 
91 
Ibid a (December 17, 1944). 
9 ~CAA 1945 Football Guide, pp. 127~128. 
93BuPers letter 5112-ip, Director of Welfare and Recreation to 
Chief of BuPers, November 2, 1945, Physical Fitness Correspondence, 
Conunand File. 
272 
94Elwood Brown of the Young Men's Christian Association proposed 
the games to General John J. Pershing, AEF Conunander, shortly before 
the Armistice of 1918. Orders to train for the events were issued on 
December 29, 1918, and men were released from duty for up to four hours 
per day to train for the various sports, championships for which were 
held on both the AEF and Allied levels along an Olympic format the fol-
lowing spring. Twenty-nine nations, colonies and dependencies took 
part in the game eliminations, which had included soccer, rugby, basket-
ball, football, volleyball, and baseball. Finally, championship bouts 
in boxing, fencing, equestrians, tennis, track and field, shooting, and 
grenade throwing, among others, were held in the giant YMCA stadium be-
fore a crowd of 90,000 in Paris. See The Allied Games Connnittee, The 
I~terallied Games 22nd June to 6 July 1919 (Paris, 1919). 
95 
Special Services folders for June, 1945, July, 1945, August, 
1945, and September, 1945, Eisenhower Library, 222nd Infantry Regiment, 
After Action Reports. 
96special Services folder for June, 1945, and August, 1945, 
Eisenhower Library, 45th Infantry Division, After Action Reports. 
97Red Circle News (August 25, 1945), Eisenhower Library, 7lst Di-
vision, After Action Reports. 
98 . 
Ib~d. (September 22, 1945). 
99 
The Amateur Athlete, XVI (September, 1945), p. 14. 
100 . New York T~mes (August 4, 1945). 
101 
Ibid. (August 12, 1945); The Amateur Athlete, XVI (July, 1945), 
p. 16; XVI (September, 1945), p. 14. 
102 
Red Circle News (September 15, 1945). 
103 Letter, Samuel Weiss to Robert Patterson, Secretary of War, 
September 29, 1945, AG Records, file 353.8. 
333. 
104 
Gene Schoor (ed.), The Army Navy Game (New York, 1967), PP• 324-
lOSibid., p. 324. 
106 Memorandum, Somervell to Chief of Staff, August 18, 1942, AG 
Records, file 353.8. 
107 
Letter, U. s. Rep. J. Buell Snyder to Stimson, March 2, 1942, 
AG Records, file 353o8o 
108New York Times (March 4, 1943). 
109Letter, Francis B. Wilby, Superintendent, U. S. Military 
Academy to Somervell, May 15, 1943, AG Records, file 353.8. 
110 
New York Times (November 27, 1943). 
111 
Ibid. (July 7, 1943). 
273 
112 
Letter, U. So Rep. John Seriden to Stimson, October 19, 1943, 
Chief of Staff file 353.85. 
113 . . Letter, St1mson to Sher1den, October 25, 1943, Chief of Staff 
file 353.85. 
114 
New York Times (August 24, 1944). 
115 
Ibid. (August 31, 1944). 
116 
Tulsa Daily World (September 7, 1944). 
117 
Clary, pp. 154-155. 
118Ibid., p. 155; New York Times (November 16, 1944; November 18, 
1944). 
119 . . New York T1mes (December 2, 1944). 
120 
Clary, p.· 156. 
121Danzig, p. 376; Lingeman, p. 319. 
122 
Earl Blaik and Tim Cohane, You Have to Pay the Price The Red 
Blaik Story (New York, 1960), pp. 168-175. 
123Ibid., P• 180o 
124 
Ibid., pp. 168-175. 
125New York Times (November 17, 1944). 
126Tim Cohane, Gridiron Grenadiers The Story of West Point Foot-
ball (New York, 1948), p. 223. 
127 
New York Times (September 13, 1944). 
128R. G. Clapp (ed.), The Official NCAA Wrestling .Guide 1945 
(NewYork, 1945), p. 39., 
129 . New York T1mes (November 17, 1944). 
130"Red Blaik of West Point," Spore·, I (October, 1946), p. 12. 
131n . 377 anz1.g, p. • 
13~CAA 1944 Football Guide, pp. 35-36. 
133Blaik, p. 204. 
134 Clary, pp. 166-168. 
135 
Cohane, p. 243. 
136"Red Blaik of West Point," P• 12. 
274 
CHAPTER VII 
WARTIME ATHLETIC PROGRAMS 
AND PEACETIME AMERICA 
The commitment of the United States to war altered the thinking of 
those in political power regarding the emphasis necessary in physical 
training through sports. As a prerequisite to survival in international 
conflict, deep interest was created in physical fitness, but no struc-
ture had be~n created centrally to carry out a national policy. The 
Office of Civilian Defense, headed by Jack Kelly, was a political ci-
1 pher, with a budget of only $80,000 per year and a small staff. Its 
advisory function was largely limited to the numerous fitness confer-
ences held under the auspices of the Office of Education. Even there 
it was usually military spokesmen and their civilian advisors who 
molded public attitudes in relation to athletic fitness. Kelly's at-
tempts to make his office meaningful in formulating a national sports 
policy had been frustrated. His idea for local athletic clubs as part 
of a community services aspect of the Federal Security Agency was large-
ly preempted by AAU efforts in the same area. His insistence that the 
office be used to coordinate wartime civilian sports was denied. The 
eventual separation of the Office of Education from the Federal Security 
Agency, under which the OPF operated, changed the function of the Kelly 
operation. 
Kelly, therefore, turned the Office of Physical Fitness into a 
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kind of medical and health care advisory operation through the creation 
of a Joint Committee on Physical Fitness, made up of representatives of 
the American Medical Association and the Committee on Physical Fitness. 
Budget Director Harold D. Smith marked the OPF for obliteration because 
of the duplication of efforts involved with the Public Health Service 
and the Office of Education and the lack of congressional authorization 
for its function. Presidential advisor Edwin "Pop" Watson also was 
skeptical of the office because it seemed a front for "limited work ••• 
2 
in promoting sports and physical- buildup." Kelly protested this ex-
elusion in a letter to Watson and in a memorandum to Mrs. Roosevelt, 
3 whom he asked to influence the President in his behalf. The Budget 
Director informed Mrs. Roosevelt of the lack of authorization for 
Kelly's job, but this did not deter the first lady from pushing the 
f . h f . . 4 1g t or 1ts cont1nuance. The struggle continued until the Presi-
dent's death. On March 45, 1945, Kelly wrote Smith that his unique 
program differed from those of other government agencies since it in-
volved national preparedness to eliminate draft rejections for physical 
infirmities. On April 2, 1945, a perplexed President assigned the 
problem higher up on his level of advisors for further evaluation. The 
President's death on April 12 eliminated this far-sighted seminal pro-
gram from budget consideration for 1946. 5 
The elimination of the Office of Physical Fitness switched the 
concentration for a nation-wide sports and physical fitness plan from 
the federal bureaucracy to the military. The success of physical train-
ing in the military, as well as that of the highly visible preflight 
sports training method, had been vital in bringing the American fight-
ing man to a high degree of physical and psychological trim. The 
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recognition of this, the high prewar physical rejections for the draft, 
and the popular belief that the people of the United States had been 
"duped" with a mental condition of unpreparedness led advocates of cen-
tralized physical training to propose a universal military training 
plan. Ideally this would have provided compulsory military training 
for periods of a year to all high school graduates prior to their entry 
into college or vocational training. Satisfying the needs of the nation 
for perpetually trained national reserve, the method had an auxiliary 
of providing physical training for health, dexterity, and the elimination 
of physical defects. 
Although the method by which physical training should be carried 
out differed among its advocates, there was diverse support for some 
form of universal physical if not military training. Grarltland Rice 
t 
wrote in the May, 1943, issue of Recreation, '~hat this country must 
have is enforced athletic training, nation wide, from the ages of twelve 
to sixteen or eighteen." Rice included hiking, jumping, running, swim-
ming, and a compulsory "rough body contact sport" in his regime. 6 The 
schools, although approaching this philosophy during the war, were by no 
means unanimous in their efforts of motives; and it became obvious that 
if the war continued, the military would have to take responsibility for 
the physical and psychological conditioning of the American youngster. 
Brigadier General Walter Weible, Director of Training in Army Special 
Services, spoke to the National Federation of State High School Athletic 
Association in December of 1943 and urged that competitive sports be re-
quired of all students not only to condition youth in the physical de-
mands of combat training but to psychologically prepare them with "fight-
7 ing spirit" and "teamwork." 
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The Navy preflight schools practiced this approach on a broad scale 
from their inception in the spring of 1942, and Frank Wickhorst sug-
gested in the NCAA 1944 Football Guide that this same method be re-
quired in some form of unified instruction. Wickhorst conunented: 
••• it is possible for a boy to take a well-rounded train-
ing program in athletic activities and at the same time 
carry on academic load. This could be done at all educa-
tional institutions by revising schedules, spreading them 
out over the full day, and it would be invaluable in the 
development of manhood for the future in America. This 
would avoid a future catastrophe which we almost had at 
the beginning of the present war in the lack of physical 
fitness of our youth.s 
William R. (Killer) Kane, Wickhorst's successor in the Navy preflight 
training program, was more emphatic. In a speech of January 24, 1945, 
to the Eastern Intercollegiate Athletic Association meeting in New York, 
Kane proposed a grade-school-through-college competitive program for 
every boy and tied athletics to compulsory military training. 9 Another 
advocate, E. B. DeGroot, Public Relations Director of the Boy Scouts of 
America, outlined a method by which this training would be incorporated 
into the young man's secondary school years. Athletic training would be 
a partial substitute for military aspects, creating within the young 
10 man the "unshakeable confidence" in himself. 
The first UMT bill was submitted to Congress on January 11, 1944, 
but it died in conunittee. It was not reintroduced until October 11, 
1945, after the war was 
11 
The fight over the passage of the bill over. 
ran well over a year, and advocates of the physical training attributes 
of the measure were important in dissecting its rationale. 
America's civilian athletic leaders had been initially supportive 
in principles of using athletic training for military purposes, but us-
ing military training as a rationale for physical fitness and 
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motivational conditioning in time of peace was another matter. A sub-
committee of the Educational Policies Commission of the National Educa-
tion Association voted unanimously in March of 1944 to rebuff any ef-
forts for the passage of UMf, further declaring that "A year of Army 
life is not a guarantee of lasting health and fitness •••• 1112 John Grif-
fith, one of the foremost advocates of rough and tumble combat sports 
and games as military training, compared the scheme with "youth camps" 
by which "Hitler did his poisonous work in Germany ••• •" Griffith in-
sisted that the American schools and colleges were more fit to provide 
13 all the needs of American young people. Writing that "there must be 
no confusion between military training and physical education," an edi-
torialist for the Journal of Health, Physical Education and Recreation 
compared placing young people in "primitive conditions" to cure their 
intellectual and physical weakness as being close to the "opportunity 
for the nationalization of our youth such as Germany and Italy have suf-
14 fered5" 
The UMT subject was the topic of lengthy discussion at the NCAA 
convention held at Columbus, Ohio, in January of 1945. That body was 
primarily concerned with correcting the alarmingly high rate of physical 
rejections for military service by emphasizing compulsory physical edu-
cation and athletics in the colleges. However, the use of military en-
campments to achieve the same objective was considered unwarranted. 
Fears were expressed that the military served its own ends rather than 
that of physical education, and that most physical defects to which UMf 
arguments referred were incorrectable through military training. In a 
resolution passed on January 13, 1945, the NCAA requested full consulta~ 
15 tion with government representatives before such a plan was implemented. 
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Military figures were assembled into an informal advisory commit-
tee to formulate a "statement of principles" under which the physical 
and athletic purposes would operate in the universal training plan. 
This Army-Navy committee included three representatives of Army Special 
Services and four from the Navy, including three from the Division of 
Aviation Training, which had fathered the preflight concept. Also on 
the planning board was Max Farrington, Gene Tunney's successor as of-
ficer in charge of the Physical Training Section, and Kane, who followed 
Tom Hamilton and Wickhorst as officer in charge of preflight athletics. 
Their statement was prepared by General Wieble, who was the liaison with 
General Marshall and the War Department, through which the measure was 
being channeled. 16 
Although UMT was largely an Army project, the Navy athletic ad-
visors deeply influenced the advisory group's philosophical stance with 
regard to physical training. Farrington's brief for UMT referred to 
both varsity and intramural athletics as "essential".in the compulsory 
plan. The teaching of advanced swimming was required for all hands, 
and the maintenance of a cadre of "professionally trained" physical 
training officers was emphasized. These goals were considered necessary 
to maintain a "fighting, aggressive spirit in trainees through team 
play and vigorous competitive athletic activities." A general progres-
sive physical maintenance program was also included. 17 The advisory 
committee almost totally repeated these Navy principles in its report 
to General Wieble. The experience of both services led to the inclu-
sion of a testing program. The motivational statement on athletics was 
changed slightly after consultation with Special Service advisors, sub-
stituting the term "cooperative" for "fighting" and adding "unit 
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espirit" as the basis for engaging in athletics. 18 
With the war nearly over, physical educators became extremely vocal 
in their opposition to the War Department measure. A leading argument 
expressed fears about the centralization of authority in the indoctrina-
tion of young people. Former AAHPER president Jay B. Nash declared, 
"military discipline is not the discipline of democracy," and he ac-
cused advocates of UMT of using physical fitness to disguise their real 
. 19 
mot1ves. H~ Vo Porter, Executive Secretary of the National Federation 
of High School Athletic Associations, tied the War Department effort to 
that of civilian reconversion, one of trying to satisfy an imaginary 
need created by the war in the social condition of postwar America. 
Porter insisted that there was no pre-war situation to which the United 
States could return in the field of physical training, and that it was 
up to the schools to provide a program of "initiation not reconven-
sion.1120 Defense Secretary Forrestal and other government leaders 
pressed for physical and mental discipline through the use of sport 
metaphors, including an argument by President Harry S. Truman that the 
project would give American trainees "a fundamental basis for disci-
pline.1121 Yet universal military training was not able to capture the 
long-range imagination of American athletic leaders in their desire for 
physically trained youth. 
The services had contributed much in the fashion of broad popular 
participation in sports and games. By establishing a Field Administra-
tive Division in Physical Training, the Navy had worked with civilians 
in an advisory capacity during the war., "The hundreds of thousands of 
service men and women returning to civilian life after the war will 
bring with them a much greater familiarization with many more sports 
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activities than they had before they went into service," remarked ath-
letic administrator Charles Forsythe. A Navy assistant to Farrington, 
Forsythe also predicted the establishment of a broad sports program in 
the public schools for both boys and girls and emphasized the necessity 
f ' ' f 11 bl . ' 22 h h A o sw~mm~ng or a a e c~t~zens. However, at t e time t e rmy 
Special Services athletic programs were enjoying much success, the Navy 
began dismantling its innovative physical training school and preflight 
facilities. "Tight" conditions in the postwar Navy dictated the use of 
already qualified men in the advisory and training capacity. On Decem-
ber 10, 1945, the Chief of BuPers rejected a request for continuation 
that such a move would be "disastrous," and he objected to the return 
of the Navy to the "hit or miss volunteer recreation and athletic pro-
grams of prewar days." The Physical Training Director lamented that 
"morale, fleet efficiency, and attractiveness of service to youth" would 
be destroyed by the cost-saving measure. 24 Plans for the September 1, 
1946, discontinuance were not abandoned. 
Preflight training was consolidated. Contracts for the V-5 schools 
were allowed to expire, and by the summer of 1946, only the Del Monte 
facility remained. Its function was later merged with the consolidation 
of flight training at Pensacola. The nature of the preflight program 
had already been modified. Beginning in the spring of 1944, only men 
with some preliminary certification of flying skills were admitted. Ap-
plicants were carefully screened, but athletic skills were still desired. 
By lengthening the training program to twenty-six weeks, the V-5 schools 
portrayed more of the appearance of air academies, complete with the 
highly developed varsity athletic programs. The final preflight stu-
dents entered the college facilities in January, 1946, and by May 31 of 
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that year the V-5 experiment had ended. Approximately 80,000 men had 
been introduced to athletic and indoctrination courses of preflight 
during the World War II era. 
The Chief of Naval Operations recognized the work of the preflight 
athletic planners in a letter to the Secretary of the Navy in August, 
1946, in which Tom Hamilton and others were credited with using com-
petitive athletics to "develop in a minimum amount of time those charac-
teristics deemed desirable in a combat pilot such as leadership, a fight-
ing will to win, teamwork, physical stamina, tough physical condition, 
mental alertness, and espirit de corps •••• " The American athletic 
ethic had been officially recognized as contributing to the spiritual, 
social, and psychological qualities of the Allied victory of 1945. 25 
The V-5 experience was involved in the idea of Universal Military 
Training, and the failure of UMT was perhaps the last gasp for the 
uti~ization of a massive centralized compulsory sports program for 
young men. Hamilton, who again joined the staff of the United States 
Naval Academy as Head Football Coach in 1946, helped in the formation 
of the "V-5 Association of America" at Annapolis in 1949. Among its 
objectives was the "promotion of proven principles, standards and bene-
fici.al methods in Physical Training of American Youth as developed by 
the military services in World War II," and an emphasis on molding the 
"Social Competency" of young people through "Competitive Athletics." 
The V-5 Association also aimed to lift athletic and physical instruction 
to levels of academic professionalism as well as instill "wholesome and 
competitive spirit" and "a love of country" in its recipients. A con-
stitution with an outline for officers, a board of directors, and an-
nual meetings of interested membership kept the ideals of preflight 
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1 . 26 a 1 ve. 
No one had to remind the young American fighting men from the 
victorious armed services of their debt or interest in athletics. They 
laced the immediate postwar period with athletic contests. The American 
public, starved for skilled spectator sports competition, reacted en-
thusiastically to the exploits of the service athletes. Not only was 
the 1945 West Point football team hailed as one of the best of all time, 
but the spectacular Fleet City (California) Base eleven attracted a fol-
lowing among civilians normally accorded to professional or major col-
lege clubs. All but one man of the thirty-eight member Fleet City team 
had played college football, and of that number twenty-six of the mer-
chant mariners would be or had been professional players, the greatest 
single aggregation of civilian talent of any club during the war period. 
Over 70,000 fans gathered that fall in the Los Angeles coliseum to see 
the "Bluejackets" race by El Toro Marines to claim service superiority. 27 
The Marines, too, had a well-developed postwar demobilization program. 
Hundreds of Marine varsity squads had competed around the world. One 
b h 1 1 d . d 28 ase at Camp Lejeune, Nort Caro ina, c aime sixteen organ1ze teams. 
Together with the Pacific recreation program the ETO demobilization pro-
ject, among the other similar camp activities, these activities unified 
America's sporting heritage under a panoply of cultural and spiritual 
hegemony .. 
Established and aspiring young athletes poured into the profession-
al and collegiate sports world to find expression for their war sharpened 
skills. Other Special Service standouts returned so rapidly to active 
professional football status during the fall of 1945 that the service was 
suspected of giving the men preferential discharge treatment over combat 
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veterans with longer service, a charged voice in Congress by Repre-
sentatives Mike Monroney of Oklahoma and Raymond Springer of Indiana. 29 
The postwar period involved an expectation of an increased inter-
est in team sports, created by the absence of normal civilian activity 
and by the sports rhetoric issued in the name of Am~rican fighting men 
and the athletic training which went before them. This interest was not 
at all unexpected. Jack Meagher, football coach in the V-5 program and 
formerly of Auburn University, noted in 1943 that ready-made athletic 
material for the colleges would be the heritage of the Navy experience 
0 hl . . . 30 1n at et1c tra1n1ng. This trend was echoed throughout the war by 
Navy officials, and in October of 1944 Allison Danzig predicted of the 
sport of football thatg 
Thousands of young men who have had no previous connection 
with the sport who have been playing ••• in college service 
training units and in Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force 
camps •••• will avail, themselves of an opportunity to go to 
college after getting their discharge and will swell the 
football squads.31 
The first professional beneficiary was football, in which new 
leagues were "dropping out of skies like paratroops." Twenty-one new 
clubs for three new nationwide leagues were announced during the fall 
of 1944. 32 One of these, the All=America Football League, managed to 
survive the proliferation and challenge the National Football League for 
spectator appeal. War=impacted Honolulu, with aid of public stock sub-
scriptions and the urging of Navy athletic officer George Halas, 
launched an optimistic though ill-fated venture in professional foot-
46 33 ball in 19 • With the flood of young men returning to college cam-
puses under government benefits, the college athletic rosters reflected 
a surge of renewed participation. 
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Anticipating the boost in interest and revenue, many colleges re-
instated college football in 1945, if they could find equipment. Al-
though the youngsters on the squads could hardly be compared to the 
postwar material that appeared the next fall, 168 colleges had returned 
to the game in 1945. 34 Attendance actually rose from the prewar period, 
despite the caliber of play. The Rose Bowl attracted a record 103,000 
fans to see Southern California defeat UCLA, even though both teams were 
much inferior to little St. Mary's College, which was taking a "back~ 
seat11 ·to a preflight team on its own campus. St. Mary's, which had 
only sixteen healthy players to suit, attracted 60,000 at the turnsiles 
for a game with the University of Nevada. The "Gaels" then played in 
front of nearly 80,000 more in the Sugar Bowl, only to be decisively 
beaten by the young Oklahoma A & .M "Aggies" and their great 4*F back 
Bob Fenimoreo An oddity of the war period, the Aggies and Fenimore were, 
with the exclusion of the academy teams, the best of their peers in 
1945Q 35 The average player was incredibly young. Fenimore was only 
nineteen years old, and most of his teammates were younger. Texas A & M, 
whose enrollment dropped from 7, 000 to 2, 5000 during the war, used mainly 
seventeen and eighteen year olds despite the availability of some dis= 
charged V·eterans; and the University of Nebraska had twenty-nine young= 
sters and 4-F Is w•e:te swep,.t. away with the return of the "G. I& s" in 1946. 
All but three members of the University of Oklahoma football squad in 
1946.were war veterans. There were forty-one of these men in 1947 on a 
squa:d<i.f' fifty-two, twenty-six of whom were twenty-three years of age .•, 
or oldere. As late as 1948 fully sixty percent of the "Sooner" team was 
made up of "vets." Other universities showed similar trends. 37 Forty-
eight G. I .. s, nearly ninety percent of the team, graced the 1946 Iowa 
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State football list, and nineteen returning wrestlers competed for po-
sitions on a squad of twenty=six at Oklahoma A & M. 38 
If there was a single sport toward which World War II contributed 
significantly, it was football, and the post war approach to it was 
largely one of attitude~ It should not be surprising that the most sue~ 
c.essful. coa.c.hes of the most spectacular team game in American society 
were affiliated with the social. engineering of the preflight training. 
The vision of the highly conditioned rapid hitting precision units of 
Oklahoma's Charles (Bud) Wilkinson, who, like the Navy instructor he 
was, led his own men in calesthenics, is enough of an insight to the 
meaning of competition handed down to postwar Americae The combat train-
ing methods of Paul (Bear) Bryant 1 s Texas A & M and early Alabama teams, 
the military organization of Woodrow (Woody) Hayes 1 famous Ohio State 
squads, the efficient free~enterprise of the fledgling Cleveland Browns 
by their innovator Paul Brown offer evidence that a portion of the Amer-
ican character was seized by these men and offered to the American pub-
lic in an idealized and highly polished image of itself as it hoped to 
be. If the attitude of young people in America adjusted from a prewar 
ambivalence toward world affairs and foreign doctrines to one of aware-
ness, aggressiveness, and self~assurance, then·the same. thing was re-
flected in the sports that the young soldiers, sailors, M?rines, and 
Airmen so vigorously and confidently pursued. 
A concentration of energetic young men, located far from home and 
anxious for opportunities to exhibit the cherished values of accomplish~ 
ment and companionship, readily participated in team play. Regardless 
of the rhetoric involved, millions of men would have participated in 
sport, because the opportunities were there, whether or not there was 
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sophisticated organization. Yet feeling was important as well as rec-
reation, and something basic to American society was found in the ex-
pression of sport in the postwar United States. The war made Americans 
aware of their deficiencies and awakened citizens to the things they 
really wanted to preserve, part of which was found to be representative 
of the old community feeling in all of us, team sport. Another was 
found to be of an entirely new sounding term, physical fitness. In 
these two terminologies, the old and the new America were to meet in 
globe-girdling circumstances in the middle of the twentieth century. 
The federal government, as a vehicle for innovation or as an office of 
regulation, did nothing more than show plainly what American institu-
tions meant to its people. Sport forms were emblematic of the great 
power exhibited in the wealth of the American nation and spirit. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSION: THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II 
ON ORGANIZED ATHLETICS 
As a result of government and military initiative during World War 
II, a sporting and athletic culture pervaded American life as never be-
fore. By equating aggressive group behavior with positive combat 
traits, the Navy and Army gave credibility to athletic games as an ex-
pression of national virtue and commitment. Combative sports acquired 
overtones of war and national solidarity. Group sport emerged from 
World War II with a positive social definition related to such com-
bativeness, therefore justifying the promotion of these activities for 
civilians. The involvement of the Office of Physical Fitness in the 
advice which the Office of Education directed toward the schools, coupled 
with the use of pamphlets and advice produced by the military services, 
helped to establish a combative philosophy for athletes and physical ed-
ucation in the schools and colleges. The war aided the federal bureau-
cracy in initiating its control over state education through federal 
advice in physical training. 
During this period suspicion was voiced that military and govern-
ment involvement in vital social expressions such as exercise and games 
was a dangerous manipulation of the group mind through social engineer-
ing tactics, which was uncharacteristics of basic American traditions. 
Objections to social development as a war rationale were effectively 
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silenced within the physical education profession. However, the issue 
of social control was again raised through the debate over universal 
military training. The argument, which had been successfully defended 
regarding physical training in the schools, could not be transferred to 
the universal military training analogy in a peacetime setting. Navy 
preflight training methods were elevated as a model for this type of 
civilian character development but were not adopted. 
Athletic programs as a part of military training had a great impact 
on the development of postwar civilian sport. The return of militaryly 
trained athletes to the college, amateur, and professional sporting 
scene created an increased demand for sports programs. Huge numbers of 
men were exposed to physical training techniques during World War II. 
The Army's demobilization program effectively established the largest 
organized athletic program ever known. The military branches trained 
numerous athletic and physical fitness teachers and administrators 
through its recreation and special services programs. Those men who 
saturated college athletic rosters after the war had their interest 
maintained by military recreation programs. The structure of collegiate 
athletic competition was guaranteed by the investment of the Navy De-
partment in furnishing students, instructors and improved facilities. 
Realizing the importance of sport as a community control device, 
the government sought to develop a sports policy to accommodate organ;-
ized professional athletics during the war. Only when horseracing, and 
to some extent, professional baseball and football, seemed to interfere 
with government manpower policies, were these organized activities 
threatened with dissolution. 
It can only be suggested that the idealization of sport forms 
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somehow embodied the characterization of the American spirit, which led 
to an attitude of invincibility and correctness of national goals. The 
solidarity of the group and its ability to overcome obstacles was fa-
cilitated in the American character through sport. This lasted long 
past the Second World War and raises the need for investigation into 
its effect on determining American perceptions toward the outside world 
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